FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1995

A Plan for Europe

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Asia's Cultural Fusion

KISHORE MAHBUBANI

Haiti's Class Warfare

SIDNEY W. MINTZ

Russia's Political Key

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Richard Pipes on Cold War Doves

Barton Bernstein on the Atomic Bombings

David Fromkin on LBJ's Ruin

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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1995
VOLUME 74, NUMBER 1

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The Clinton administration needs to lead Europe and expand NATO, but without harming ties with Russia. Washington should dispel the ambiguity created by its current waffling. The president must take a two-track approach: start the process of accepting Central European states into NATO by spelling out criteria for membership and sign a global security treaty with Russia. To make it work, Germany and Poland will have to reconcile, the West and Russia will have to soothe Ukraine, and the problem of the Baltics will have to be finessed. Only American leadership can help create a wider, safer Europe for the next century.

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No single successor to the containment doctrine could possibly guide U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. Instead, American policymakers must distinguish between the means and ends of policy and strike the proper balance between the contending schools of thought in each. The task is to fashion a sturdy intellectual framework for policy, one weighted in favor of American leadership and "augmented realism." But the drift toward short-term ad hocracy simply will not do.

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Sustaining the embargo on Iraq punishes innocent civilians, not Saddam Hussein and his henchmen. Ridiculously, the U.N. Security Council has banned imports of socks, wristwatches, light bulbs, and other militarily useless items. The United States, meanwhile, drags its feet on removing sanctions in the spurious hope of overthrowing Saddam. The sanctions are demoralizing regional allies and costing them billions of dollars. The Clinton administration should treat Iraq as it has treated North Korea and China—with diplomacy instead of crude and ineffective coercion.

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Europe's Map, Compass, and Horizon
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In Western Europe, there has been a cowardly inability to redefine NATO's role and no stomach for free trade with eastern neighbors. But there is hope if European leaders squarely face the issues. Which nations will be admitted into "Europe" and when? France and Germany must recognize that there is no alternative to the European Union, and European leaders must convince their electorates that the long-term benefits outweigh the near-term pain.

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The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.*

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Editor's Note

The Old Continent's Troubles

They were years of wonder, 1989-91. The Cold War ended, Germany unified, and Russia headed toward becoming a normal nation. Now, "hopes are fading for a Europe united by democracy from west to east," write Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes in this issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Moïsi, a Frenchman, and Mertes, a German, fear demoralization from the Balkan war and high sustained unemployment. Having finally received "the epochal project they needed: the heroic task of reunifying Europe," West Europeans are finding "the details troublesome."

They fear losing sovereignty if the European Union is deepened and prosperity if their markets are opened to poor eastern neighbors. The decisive issue, the authors say, is whether the EU can "develop a new consensus on the direction and speed of deepening integration, thus preparing the road to a successful widening by inclusion of new members." Without a basic consensus, Europe could end up as a "supermarket of options" for its member states. The authors say that "European integration plus transatlantic partnership was the key success in Western Europe during the postwar era, and it will be so in the post–Cold War future." Anything less will revive the errors of the Old Continent.

The transatlantic partnership and especially its leader, the United States, confront three pressing questions, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski. These questions—on the alliance's scope, Germany's role, and the U.S. relationship with Russia—are interrelated and thus require a comprehensive response. Brzezinski faults the Clinton administration for projecting "neither a strategic vision nor a clear sense of direction" on NATO's enlargement. The challenge, writes Brzezinski, "is to find a formula that consolidates Germany in a wider Europe and facilitates a cooperative relationship with the new Russia—while eliminating any disruptive geopolitical vacuum between a wider Europe and the new Russia." He would couple an eastern enlargement of NATO with a treaty of "security cooperation" between NATO and the Russian Federation that includes mutual guarantees of Ukraine's independence and security. This approach can make a Europe stretching "to the Urals" feasible in the next century.

BROTHER, CAN YOU PARADIGM?

Richard N. Haass finds confusion in the Clinton administration's efforts to articulate a new foreign policy doctrine. Haass identifies at least five schools of thought in Washington: Wilsonianism, economism, realism, humanitarianism, and minimalism. While recognizing these camps are

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not mutually exclusive, Haass favors "augmented realism." He argues that traditional realism alone is too narrow to motivate the American people. America's principal focus should be on threats to interstate order—classic aggression, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, and state-supported terrorism.

Haass proposes four tests for U.S. military intervention: "that it be worth doing, that it be doable, that likely benefits exceed likely costs, and that the ratio of benefits to costs be better than that provided by another policy." He sees room for promoting democracy and dealing with humanitarian crises but warns against a strictly economic or minimalist foreign policy. He worries about an outbreak of substantial disorder and the ability of the United States to respond effectively.

Eric Rouleau offers a decidedly French critique of U.S. policy toward Iraq, which he thinks punishes Iraqis for their government's madness. Rouleau recommends moving "beyond the immobility created by a policy based exclusively on sanctions to the dynamism of a multifaceted diplomatic action [similar to] that applied by the Clinton administration to other states whose behavior it would like to change, such as China or North Korea."

Closer to home, Sidney W. Mintz examines the deep historical roots of Haiti's difficulties and finds that it cannot "be changed structurally without some yielding of power by the haves . . . If it is to be our policy to sustain at all costs the present distribution of economic power in Haiti, hardly anything can be done that could have a long-range beneficial political consequence . . . What ought not be permitted is to sustain a constellation of forces that will lead inexorably to renewed terror upon our departure."

LEGACIES

Michael McFaul assesses developments in Russia since the first post-communist election in December 1993 and finds the economy in 1994 was an overachiever. But having economic reform without sufficient political reform has been costly. He worries that "the combination of a weakly articulated civil society, a nascent party system, and continued economic hardship for most Russian voters creates opportunities for demagogues and populists." Without political reform, which the United States should bolster more, "Russia's revolution will almost certainly fail."

François Mitterrand, now in his final months as president of France, has been the most important French leader since Charles de Gaulle. Ronald Tiersky credits him with making the left politically acceptable, legitimizing the institutions of the Fifth Republic, and negotiating France's central place in the EU. Kishore Mahbubani, examining the culture behind Asia's economic boom, finds a fusion of Western and Asian practices and values that could spark creativity "on a scale never seen before." Barton J. Bernstein traces the evolution of thinking under the strain of World War II that led to the targeting of civilians with atomic bombs 50 years ago.

With this issue we regretfully bid farewell to Associate Editor Kirk Kraeutler, who has served *Foreign Affairs* with excellence for five years. He will be joining the foreign desk of the *New York Times*.

James F. Hoge, Jr.
Editor

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Comments

PHOTOGRAPH BY ZED NELSON, KATZ/SABA

Who is principally responsible for this catastrophe? The European powers who colonized Africa.

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A New Colonialism?

Europe Must Go Back into Africa

William Pfaff

The destitution of Africa has been an all but forbidden topic in political discourse for reasons as comprehensible as they are disabling. The time has arrived, however, for honest and dispassionate discussion of this immense human tragedy, for which the Western countries bear a grave if partial responsibility and which will worsen if not addressed.

THE RETURN OF BWANA

Much of Africa needs, to put it plainly, what one could call a disinterested neocolonialism. Africans acknowledge the immensity of their crisis and the need to consider hitherto unacceptable remedies. The democracy movement, which in the past few years produced a series of national conferences to end dictatorships, is foundering. Fewer than a third of sub-Saharan Africa's nations have anything resembling multiparty politics. The Congolese author Ange Séverin Malanda says, "From now on, the danger in several parts of the continent is of pure destruction or generalized destabilization. The destabilization is already evident in Somalia, Liberia, and Angola. The pure destruction began to be realized in Rwanda on the sixth of April 1994, annihilating every contemporary African standard of reference. Genocide there accomplished the unimaginable and the unlimited." A spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross says of Liberia that "no moral barriers remain . . . every reference to the principles and values which found and bind a community of men have disappeared . . . virtually nothing remains except horror and cruelty." The Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, writing in anguished response to the repression of minorities in Nigeria, has questioned—as have some Western commentators—the postcolonial convention that frontiers must be left as they are. Any program, however, for redrafting frontiers on the principle of ethnic self-determination must explain why the equitable redivision of Africa on ethnic lines would be more feasible than it has proven in the Balkans, where the pursuit

WILLIAM PFAFF writes a syndicated column for the *International Herald Tribune*. His latest book, on nationalism, its origins, and its consequences, is *The Wrath of Nations* (Touchstone).

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of this principle has engendered war after war, from the Serbian uprising of 1804 to the present war in the former Yugoslavia.

In Africa, any attempt to redraw borders on ethnic lines would seem certain to accelerate political disintegration and inspire new conflicts. It is now the convention in right-thinking Western circles that Africa's tribes and ethnic groups are repressive colonial inventions and that nothing significant distinguishes Zulu from Xhosa, Masai from Kikuyu, or Tutsi from Hutu, notwithstanding the reactionary Western sciences of ethnology and anthropology.

Nor does the idea of a new form of colonialism stand much chance of acceptance, but in the absence of an alternative it must be considered. It has separately been proposed by the Kenyan historian Ali A. Mazrui,[1] editor of the final volume of the *UNESCO General History of Africa*, and by several Western observers of Africa, including the present writer.

THE MISSING MIDDLE

Most of Africa, I have argued, lacks the crucial educated middle and professional classes and the mediating private and public institutions that compose a "civil society." Civil society makes democracy possible; without it democracy has failed and will continue to fail in Africa.

The history of the continent since the great wave of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s includes a shameful series of self-interested foreign interventions and ruthless exploitation of indigenous African conflicts by the Soviet Union, its proxy, Cuba, and the United States, with deliberate instigation or intensification of wars in Katanga, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, and Somalia. But this history is also a chronicle of anarchic breakdown within African societies, some of which are manifestly worse off now than under colonialism, heading toward the type of social collapse and genocidal struggle that has occurred in Rwanda and Burundi.

The anarchic struggle for factional power in Somalia goes on, with both the United Nations and the United States humiliated. Before that came horrors in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as in Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique, and Sudan. A part of West Africa today suffers insensate and feral struggle, devoid of political or ideological purpose, conducted by uprooted, ignorant, anomic young men serving Caligulan warlords. This is a postmodern barbarism unconnected to any African past. The Uganda of Idi Amin and the Central African "Empire" of the egregious Jean-Bédel Bokassa seem rational enterprises compared with the inadvertent and apocalyptic nihilism practiced there and in Rwanda.

A MIXED RECORD

The historical record is complex, but it seems fair to say that when the Europeans first came to Africa there were coherent, functioning societies of varying degrees of sophistication, some of great political subtlety and artistic accomplishment, others simple hunting and gather-

[1] Ali A. Mazrui, "Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign Colonization," *International Herald Tribune*, August 4, 1994.

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ing communities, some extremely cruel in their practices, but all possessing their own integrity and integrated into the natural environment of the continent. This was destroyed by colonialism.

What followed was exploitation on the one hand, including the atrocious trade in slaves, and on the other hand more or less sincere attempts at Western-style education, "uplift," and religious salvation of "pagan" Africans so they could be remade culturally as European, assumed to be the most advanced form of civilization. Whatever the merits of the latter project (and it was also the project of the first generation of independent African leaders, all products of European education and politics), the colonizers did not stay in Africa long enough for it to have the faintest chance of succeeding. Colonialism lasted long enough to destroy the preexisting social and political institutions, but not long enough to put anything solid and lasting in their place. As Robert Heilbroner wrote:

> Economic penetration came without any of the historic preparation that accompanied this development in Europe. Imperialism imposed on its colonies the raw economic drive of capitalism without the social and political underpinnings and protections which blunted that drive at home . . . Into [the] primitive circulation of life a powerful and dangerous virus was injected with terrible effect. It turned millions of traditionally self-sufficient peasants into rubber-tappers, coffee-growers, tin-miners, tea-pickers—and then subjected this new agricultural and mining proletariat to the incomprehensible vagaries of world commodity fluctuations. It uprooted ancient laws and gave in exchange Western justice, whose ideas disrupted the local culture by striking at the roots of time-honored traditions and customs . . . Colonialism, even its most missionary moments, never succeeded in seeing the "natives" as equals, and it usually simply took for granted their irremediable inferiority.[2]

This was a crucial moral blow, whose consequences persist.

What can be done? Mazrui wants the old League of Nations trusteeship system reestablished, with African and Asian nations among those appointed by the United Nations to govern certain countries, under the guidance of a council of major African states, which would possess a peacekeeping army. (France proposed the creation of such an inter-African force at the French-African summit in Biarritz in November 1994 and offered logistical support, but this evoked little response from the African participants.)

The feasibility of one-nation trusteeships seems slight, and the probability that any nation would take on such a thankless responsibility seems near zero. An internationalist U.N. trusteeship, as Mazrui wants, seems equally unlikely. The United Nations, even now, is overburdened. It has great difficulty finding

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[2] Robert Heilbroner, *The Future as History: The Historic Currents of Our Time and the Direction in Which They Are Taking America*, New York: Harper, 1960.

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peacekeeping troops. It is all but bankrupt, with the United States the principal defaulter on pledged payments. It has no apparatus for actually governing a country, and the politicking of its membership makes it all but impossible to acquire one. It is the agent of the Security Council, and the policies it would follow in any nation-building enterprise would be dictated by the Security Council majority. Neither the Somalian nor the Bosnian experience encourages confidence in such an undertaking.



GRAFF, CARTOONISTS & WRITERS SYNDICATE

HELP FROM ABOVE (THE EQUATOR)

What is left? The answer seems to lie in the responses to three questions. Who is principally responsible for this catastrophe? Answer: the European powers who colonized Africa, out of a complex mixture of good and bad motives, destroying Africa's existing social and political systems and its customary institutions and law.

Who outside of Africa has the most urgent material interest in its condition? Clearly, the former European colonial powers. Africa's continued foundering means the exodus of hundreds of thousands, even millions, of desperate people headed to the closest place where they can find order, jobs, security, a future. Their scarcely controllable migration to Europe has already created immense social problems and serious political tensions there. Europe is also the principal consumer of African mineral and agricultural exports.

Who is competent to supply not only peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa but serious support for building administrations, economies, and infrastructure? Neither the United Nations nor the United States, as we have seen. Both Italian and French peacekeepers in Somalia vainly warned the United States and United Nations against their ill-conceived attempt to impose American-style solutions there. As its former colonial ruler, the Italians know Somalia, just as the French know West and Central Africa, the British, East Africa, and the Portuguese, Angola and Mozambique. They know the languages. They still have among them not only former colonial administrators but specialists and scholars concerned with these regions. If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with these countries, the Europeans are.

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It is true that in some respects Europe has never left Africa. France's persisting presence in Western and Central Africa still evokes hostility from American and British commentators and many non-Francophone Africans, and there undoubtedly is much to criticize in a policy whose ruling principle has been stability above all else. However, the overall judgment must also be that French Africa for more than three decades has been the Africa that worked, the place where life for ordinary Africans has been markedly better than where the old colonial powers, as one commentator put it, "absconded with no forwarding address."

France today is probably the only European country that might, if invited, consider a major commitment to the rehabilitation of a former colony. It would be better if the European Union as an institution, which insists it wants an international role for "Europe," would collectively assume such responsibilities in cooperation with Africans in an effort to arrest the continent's decline and put it on a progressive course.

The components of such a program are easier to imagine than how European opinion could be mustered to support it or African authorities persuaded to accept it. There would have to be a cooperative Euro-African trust organization to which the majority of African governments would assign a defined (and irrevocable) authority to keep or restore order in troubled societies, establish regimes of political and social rights, rebuild health and educational institutions, develop national economic infrastructures, and develop and support competent government administrations.

EARNING REDEMPTION

This would be the project of a half-century, perhaps a century. But it could mean a great deal for Africa and be a deeply constructive accomplishment for Europe. It would eventually end, and that would have to be understood from the start. The European pledge to the Africans would be: We imposed this ordeal of modernization on you, which you are determined to complete. We are prepared to rejoin you and support you in that enterprise.

There need be no moralization or condescension. Europeans can also say to Africans: You are divided by hysterical tribalisms and suffer anarchical social upheavals? Some among you have committed genocide? You have practiced ethnic murder? We know all about that. Look at our history in this same century. There are no invidious moral distinctions to be drawn between us. Let us now work together to find a way out of this, toward higher ground.

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Free-Rider Redux

NATO Needs to Project Power (and Europe Can Help)

David Gompert and Richard Kugler

The alliance that won the Cold War has lost its way. Contented summit photos cannot hide the fact that NATO no longer defends its members' vital interests.

With the Soviet Union gone and regional threats on the rise, the proper object of strategy is to protect more distant interests—Persian Gulf oil, for instance—not Western Europe's borders. The United States has executed this strategic U-turn more or less gracefully by refocusing its defense plans on "major regional contingencies." Its European partners, however, have not. NATO does not figure into current American strategy, while the strategy of America's NATO allies is a mystery altogether.

As the only nation able to project military power, the United States is giving its best friends a free ride. This new inequity is worse than the lopsided burden-sharing of Cold War days. It need not continue. Using NATO as the vehicle for organizing the defense of the West's interests—an old idea with a new focus—the United States can get its allies to become partners in power projection. Doing so would improve security in key theaters (the Persian Gulf and Eastern Europe), rejuvenate the alliance, reduce the U.S. defense budget, and avoid a revolt by the American people against international duties that fall too heavily on them alone.

WHERE HAVE ALL THE ALLIES GONE?

When Saddam Hussein menaced Kuwait last October, the force assembled to scare him away consisted of 40,000 U.S. troops, an American fleet, 600 U.S. aircraft, and a thousand or so Brits. Had it come to war, the American public would have demanded to know why, yet again, they were shouldering nearly all the burden of defending interests—oil, in this case—dearer to our rich friends than to us.

In the 1991 Gulf War, the United States provided 90 percent of Western "coalition" forces. As Americans debated whether to back President Bush's plan to liberate Kuwait, supporters and opponents alike complained that the United

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States should not have to fight such a war alone. After all, Western Europe and Japan together import four times as much oil from the gulf as we do. Moreover, it is not as if only the United States has the wealth to field forces able to protect oil and other shared interests. Western Europe's economy is 120 percent of ours, and Japan's is 60 percent.

Back in 1991, complaints about America's heavy burden had answers. Our allies' lack of intervention forces was understandable: Germany and Japan due to their aggressive pasts, and other NATO countries because their Cold War assignment was the stationary defense of Western Europe—force projection being America's job. Even so, Great Britain and France sent what they could to the gulf—a division each. And Germany and Japan wrote checks to help defray the costs.

Leaky even then, those excuses hold no water today. Only the low level of American casualties averted public outrage about our absent allies. Had America suffered heavy losses, those donated deutsche marks and yen would have counted for little. As for the unsuitability of their forces, America's allies have had four years to shift from the old mission of border defense to the new task of protecting distant interests. Yet in October's Persian Gulf flare-up, the European response was patent tokenism, contrived to create an illusion that the United States was acting within a coalition.

This latest episode illuminates a larger phenomenon: deny it though we may, the United States is the world's policeman, owing to its unique ability to project power. Beyond participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and sending small expeditions now and then to quell disturbances in Africa, our allies cannot wage war in the places where Western interests and international peace are most likely to be threatened—where major conflicts could occur—such as the Middle East, Korea, and Eastern Europe.

Yes, several thousand allied troops are serving with the United Nations in Bosnia. But it took two months to get them there from nearby Western Europe, and those forces are not up to heavy combat. Indeed, a decisive intervention to roll back Serbian aggression would have to be mainly an American operation—a certainty that helps explain Washington's chronic cold feet about putting U.S. troops into Bosnia. While the presence of Europeans and absence of Americans in Bosnia today may be viewed as unfair and unfortunate, it does not change the fact that only the United States can fight a real war in the new era.

At the moment, the United States is already juggling too many demands: its current occupation of Haiti, its promise to send 20,000 troops to help police a Bosnian peace agreement, the lingering danger of a war with North Korea, the occasional threat to the Persian Gulf, and some unidentified crisis that could crop up almost anywhere (say, Cuba) in this unstable era. Because U.S. forces are currently sized to handle only two major regional contingencies at once, American reservists could be sent to defend Western interests even before meaningful numbers of allied active forces show up. Indeed, this has already happened, in the gulf and Haiti.

The problem is not that our partners' armed forces are too small. Our European

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allies have 2.5 million men under arms to our 1.7 million. They spend two-thirds of what we spend on defense. Yet the United States must supply nearly all the forces needed to defend the gulf and other common interests. The West Europeans remain well prepared to defend themselves against an invasion—a contingency as far-fetched as an invasion of the United States. So the United States is left with the duty of actual war-fighting, while our allies—our economic competitors—enjoy the benefits at no risk.

The failure of America's prosperous friends to take responsibility to help defend shared vital interests is costing American taxpayers billions of dollars annually. If we could count on our allies to provide, say, half the force required to protect the gulf—a fair standard given their healthy economies and dependence on oil—the United States could scale back its armed forces and save more than $10 billion annually. Alternatively, the United States could keep its current posture and enjoy greater security. An allied role in power projection could be the best way out of America's defense predicament, in which its strategy does not address all its security needs, its forces are not up to its strategy, and its defense budget is too small to maintain its forces. In any case, Americans would not have to be asked again to send their youth to defend Western interests single-handedly.

American allies will avoid the sacrifices needed to create and use power projection capabilities as long as we are prepared to do their fighting for them. Of course, prudent strategists will insist that the United States needs no less than an independent ability to defend its interests, even if it means letting our partners off the hook. But faced repeatedly with a choice between unilateral military action and inaction, the American people will be tempted by the latter, not because they are isolationist at heart,

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but because they demand fairness. Instead of ensuring that the United States can always act independently, failure to build a Western coalition to project force could make it politically impossible to act at all.

FROM PETROL TO POLAND

The Europeans could help meet the need to project power by drastically, yet safely, shifting forces from territorial defense. This could be done without increasing the $1.5 trillion they plan to spend on defense over the next decade. In fact, ample intervention forces could be built with less than five percent of that amount. Because West European territorial defense forces serve no purpose, the alternative to creating needed force projection capabilities is essentially to have no serious combat forces at all, making Western Europe a sort of giant Switzerland.

To say the allies can afford large intervention forces is not to say that it would be popular with European publics. While the potential for political controversy is modest in France, Britain, and the Low Countries, it is considerable in Italy, Spain, Scandinavia and, above all, Germany. The question thus becomes how the United States can secure its allies' commitment to build a Western force projection coalition over the next several years. The answer may lie in a related question: What are NATO's intentions toward Central and Eastern Europe?

The idea that NATO should provide for the security and thus the successful transformation of Central Europe's new democracies—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia—has gained increasing support. With these countries likely to join the European Union in the coming years, it is logical to bring them into NATO as well, lest one part of the future EU have a U.S. defense commitment and the other part not. President Clinton has declared that NATO membership for the so-called Visegrad Four is only a matter of time. NATO's largest European member, Germany, agrees.

Russia does not now militarily threaten these new democracies, but it does oppose their joining NATO. While the alliance is nevertheless almost certain to expand into Central Europe this decade, it will want to take care not to arouse a new Russian threat by the way it goes about it. Therefore, there will not, and should not, be much support for stationing Western forces in Poland and the other Visegrad countries. Such a step would be seen by Russia as provocative and feed its anti-NATO paranoia. It could even trigger the reintegration of Ukrainian forces under Russian command and another confrontation with the West across a new dividing line in Europe—something no one wants.

Fortunately, since there is no threat of a Russian invasion of Central Europe, basing NATO forces there is not only ill-advised but unnecessary. With Russia's steep economic, industrial, and military decline, NATO will have years of warning time if Russia rearms. In the meantime—indeed, in perpetuity, if Russia does not threaten Europe again—NATO can rely on a power projection strategy to keep Central Europe safe and confident.

The choice of power projection over forward stationing would also be less divisive in the West. It should allay the fear that NATO expansion will alienate

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Russia and sidestep the tender issue of basing German troops on the territory of its eastern neighbors. Finally, this strategy would cost little extra, provided NATO does what it should do anyway: become a power-projection coalition.

This is the key point. The basic military capability needed to safeguard the new democracies of Central Europe is essentially the same as that needed to protect other Western interests such as Persian Gulf oil: highly mobile ground forces, overwhelming air power, agile logistics, and integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence (C^3I). The United States has such capabilities; its allies do not.

NATO TO GO

A NATO power projection capability is the only realistic solution to the West's common security needs. But it requires European allies to transform their territorial defense forces into troops capable of winning a distant, heavy war alongside U.S. troops. In the meantime, of course, it would be folly for the United States to reduce its own defenses before knowing that such forces will actually be built and shaped to fight in a coalition.

The European allies already have a rudimentary capability to help the United States defend the West's strategic interests. Great Britain and France can project about a division each, albeit with deficient reach, speed, readiness, and stamina for distant heavy combat. A few other allies can each deploy a brigade in ragtag fashion. Despite being the world's fourth-largest economy and second-largest per capita gas-guzzler, Germany is good for only a brigade, though it plans to expand that capability to two divisions.

Still, NATO itself lacks a credible projection capability. Its Rapid Reaction Force, created in 1991, was originally meant to be a corps-sized mobile force for defending the alliance's remote territories, such as Turkey. It has since swelled into a 10-division hodgepodge that lacks the agility, command structure, logistics, and air and naval power for large-scale interventions. Likewise, the Franco-German "Eurocorps," concocted in 1992 for political reasons, has neither the right forces nor the strategic reach. NATO's Combined Joint Task Force, adopted at the 1994 Brussels summit to provide for situations other than border defense, is an idea that has yet to be matched with the right forces. There is no telling when those troops will be built or if they would be ready when needed.

NATO has met this sort of challenge before. After the Vietnam War, in the face of a steady Soviet buildup against West Germany, the alliance implemented its Long Term Defense Plan. A similar program, the Conventional Defense Initiative, was implemented in the 1980s. Those efforts succeeded, without hype, because the United States took the lead, key allies accepted the challenge and made needed investments, the costs were fairly shared, and the forces were made ready to fight as a true coalition. They also succeeded because we did not deem it too risky to count on our allies to join in defending common interests.

In the same way, the United States and its partners should now set out to create a NATO power projection capability of, say, 10 divisions, 10 air wings, and associated lift, logistics, naval forces, and

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C³I. Such a force should be able to prevail in a major conflict anywhere Western interests might be challenged. The United States would provide a share of the forces while concentrating on such American specialties as air strike and airlift, naval forces, and C³I.

These forces would allow NATO to back up defense commitments to Central Europe's new democracies and project power to the gulf and elsewhere. The program would be paid for by eliminating useless West European border-defense forces. The more confidence we gain in our NATO allies, the better the prospects for sizable savings in the U.S. defense budget. This shift in strategic thinking, combined with the hard work of getting it done, could produce the nearest thing to a free lunch—which is vastly better than a free ride.

THE WILLING AND THE ABLE

Some cannot see the point of an Atlantic alliance with the U.S.S.R. gone. But the idea of the alliance was wider than this, even at its creation. In addition to providing for the mandatory defense of allied territory, the NATO treaty stipulates that the alliance may act if its members' interests are threatened anywhere, without obligating all allies to do so.

This unstable new era demands even greater flexibility. NATO's decision-making rules must be adapted to relax the need for unanimity. It is neither necessary nor possible to get prior agreement among all NATO members to use force in every circumstance. Indeed, there are situations—turmoil in North Africa, perhaps—where the United States and the West Europeans might take different views about whether to intervene. The key, though, is to have the ability to act with strong mobile forces and a flexible command structure. Those allies willing to project power together should be allowed to use NATO assets.

This new way of viewing and using NATO as a Western force projection coalition would also give the alliance a strategic purpose not dependent on an increasingly implausible Russian threat to Europe. Indeed, Russia could itself come to cooperate closely with such an Atlantic alliance, even one that includes former Warsaw Pact countries. After all, our defeated enemies from World War II are now the very nations with the greatest potential to bear more of the burden of our common security.

The United States cannot get its European allies to share in power projection without Germany. Fortunately, German leaders and people are emerging from the unnatural role of the democracy that could not be trusted with power. This new maturity is healthy, welcome, and important to the United States. Japan, in contrast, shows little willingness to accept its share of responsibility for international security. As a consequence, Europe is now the only candidate to be America's partner in the coming era.

There is not much time to get all this right—to create a new partnership with Europe, to reorient NATO, to get our allies to help us bear the burden of security. If this effort is long delayed, the American people will lose their patience. The allies will disarm completely. The new democracies of Central Europe will give up on the West. A new threat to the Persian Gulf will appear. Who will respond if not a new Western coalition?

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U.S.-India Tensions

Misperceptions on Nuclear Proliferation

Deepa Ollapally and Raja Ramanna

Relations between India and the United States have improved considerably since the end of the Cold War, but they are still punctuated by controversies over nuclear nonproliferation. To a significant extent, these conflicts seem to be the result of persisting American beliefs that India is obstinate about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, that India is vulnerable to technology-denying efforts, and that it can be equated with its neighbor, Pakistan. These perceptions take on added import because of the assumption by American policymakers that South Asia is the most dangerous nuclear hot spot. Implicitly, India's image also continues to be that of a revisionist state destined to be at odds with the United States, a status quo global power. These are misperceptions that deserve attention, as only four months remain for constructive dialogue before the NPT conference convenes to review the expiring 30-year-old treaty.

The NPT has come to represent the core of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. The Clinton administration has promised to spare no effort to get an indefinite extension. The United States sees India's continuing opposition to signing what New Delhi considers an inherently discriminatory NPT as symptomatic of India's tendency to obstruct global arms control efforts. This view, however, discounts India's numerous disarmament initiatives (in the United Nations and elsewhere) and its adherence to the principles that underlie the NPT.

In India's view, the NPT curbs the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states without providing adequate security guarantees. Furthermore, it fails to reduce or eliminate stockpiles of the weapon states and thus legitimates them. India regards vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as equal threats to peace, and contends that elimination efforts ought to proceed in tandem. It also believes the United States unfairly singles it out from Pakistan and Israel, two other key NPT nonsignatory states. Although undeclared, Israel is surmised to have a siz-

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able nuclear arsenal. While controversy surrounds the Pakistani nuclear program, Pakistan is on record as having the components of at least one bomb and was identified in reports last summer as smuggling weapons-grade contraband plutonium from the former Soviet Union through Germany.

INDIA'S RESTRAINT

For its part, India has remained at the threshold level. In the two decades since the Pokharan test explosion, India has neither tested nor deployed nuclear weapons. Nor has it transferred sensitive nuclear technology or trained nuclear experts from other countries. Within India there is a broad consensus for protecting the country's nuclear option but no significant lobby for "going nuclear" among the scientific and political elites. India's support of nonproliferation has received little U.S. acknowledgment, although its record is better than the United States' from this perspective.

Given that military planners assess capabilities rather than intentions when making strategic choices, India's restraint could be viewed as exceptional. Neighboring China has steadily advanced the size and sophistication of its nuclear weapons program, and until recently the superpowers continued their intense competitive buildups. The second Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty ceiling of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads for the United States and Russia by the year 2000—and even the lower ones recommended by some American strategic analysts—fail to assuage India's concerns about the potential for a nuclear holocaust or the security of nuclear have-nots. India's goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons through a nondiscriminatory regime is gaining adherents (former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara is one) and precedents (including the convention banning chemical weapons).

Almost 20 years of painfully slow negotiations were capped in 1993 by the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC would subject all countries' chemical industries and facilities to verification, with sanctions against violators. Previously, the United States insisted on maintaining a two-percent security stockpile until all states possessing chemical weapons destroyed their stocks to an equivalent level. Until it shifted its policy after the Persian Gulf War, Washington's insistence was regarded by India as yet another nonproliferation instrument that would create two unequal classes for the purpose of controlling the spread of weapons rather than eliminating them.

The all-or-nothing attitude attributed to India by some American observers tends to neglect or underestimate the flexibility, even initiative, that Indian policymakers have demonstrated on several arms control measures. India has championed a ban on prospective plutonium production and highly enriched uranium for weapons, even though it would result in highly unequal stockpiles of materials among nations. Although details are still to be worked out, India is cosponsoring with the United States a U.N. resolution that accepts in principle a global ban. A backdrop to such a proposal has been the ongoing controversy regarding the disposition of spent fuel at the Tarapore atomic power station,

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India's first power reactor built with American assistance. Although the reactor falls under the purview of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the reprocessing of its plutonium must be approved by the United States, even if it is recycled for use in the same reactor. The United States has refused to grant permission, and as a result large quantities of unprocessed plutonium are accumulating, which goes against all safety regulations. This safety hazard, which is causing increasing concern in India, could rival the problem of diverting materials for weapons production and needs to be addressed more seriously by the United States.

Favorable U.S. policy shifts concerning a comprehensive test ban treaty, long proposed by India, could be undermined by the U.S. Energy Department's 1994 nuclear weapons research and development budget, which includes a request for studying precision low-yield warheads, dubbed "mininukes." Proponents of nuclear testing are reportedly pushing for a one-kiloton-threshold version of a comprehensive test ban, which would accommodate more sophisticated laboratory tests, a capability countries such as China and India lack. The development of mininukes would leave the distinct impression that, whereas the larger ones were arguably for pure deterrence purposes, the newer ones could conceivably be for actual use, most likely against developing countries. If such exemptions are sought, it will create a unilateral advantage for the United States that others will likely challenge.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the NPT by itself is unable to contain proliferation. The Iraqi and North Korean cases reveal the shortcomings of the NPT approach and of America's coercive strategy against the so-called rogue states. In the more uncertain post-Cold War period, in which some states may feel more pressure to adopt self-help measures, the United States is likely to be tested elsewhere. During such a time, the support of a stable and democratic country like India could be valuable. Even with the NPT as the core of its nonproliferation efforts, the United States would better serve its interests by recognizing India's continued support for measures consistent with the spirit of the NPT.

ISOLATING THE SUBCONTINENT

The American tendency to equate India and Pakistan, especially pronounced in the past, artificially reduces Indian security concerns, making any wider strategic calculations by India appear unreasonable. Sino-Indian relations are now clearly on the upswing, but the memory of the 1962 war and the continuing border dispute between the two countries in the face of significant Chinese military superiority suggest that Indian concerns were not baseless. The strategic links between China and Pakistan, especially the sale of M-11 missile components, indicates that China views Pakistan as one instrument of its foreign policy toward the subcontinent. China has reportedly provided assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program, and Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons can reach India. This has increased the existing imbalance in China's favor. Although China formally acceded in March 1992 to the NPT (as a nuclear weapon state on

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terms different from those offered currently to other countries), it is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which delineates guidelines calling for restraint in exporting sensitive technologies like production of heavy water, enrichment, and reprocessing. The U.S. policy of isolating arms control initiatives to the Indian subcontinent does not match the strategic realities of the area.

The most recent five-power proposal put forth by the United States continued to focus on nuclear issues in South Asia as an Indo-Pakistani problem. Chinese participation was premised on the exclusion of its nuclear arsenal from consideration. Meanwhile, China continues to engage in nuclear testing despite moratoriums by other nuclear states, and it appears disinclined to forgo tactical nuclear weapons, unlike many other nuclear powers. Not surprisingly, India rejected the American proposal (as it had before), adding fuel to the opinion that India is obstinate.

From the Indian perspective, America's outlook on South Asia's present and potential nuclear capability is based on faulty assumptions. There is a strong fear in the United States that a nuclear-capable Pakistan and India have made South Asia "the most dangerous place on earth." Such a view fits what some have termed the nuclear theology of the West: that developing countries are more prone to go to war with each other and that these wars are more likely to escalate to nuclear war if the nations have such a capability. Beneath this view seems to be the unstated assumption that leaders of developing countries are more irresponsible, volatile, and cavalier with the lives of their people. In the case of India and Pakistan, Kashmir is seen as the probable spark.

But the behavior of Indian and Pakistani leaders suggests otherwise. In the three Indo-Pakistani wars since independence, considerable restraint was exercised in avoiding civilian targets and in not pushing the military advantage to gain territory in the heartland or disputed areas—for example, India's decision not to thrust forward in the western sector in 1971 or to "liberate" Kashmir. There is little reason to believe that the two countries will change their behavior after obtaining nuclear capability and act with less caution than before. Indeed, a strategy of "nuclear realism" by India and Pakistan has given rise to bilateral confidence-building measures, including a mutual agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations, reciprocal notification of key military exercises, and a hot line between the nations' army generals. The United States' policy in the region gives a hollow ring to its current nonproliferation exhortations. Throughout the 1980s, at the height of Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, the United States pursued a policy of strategic alliance and military largess without which Pakistan's success would have been unlikely.

NO KNOW HOW

In the post-Cold War period, there are signs that the United States is stepping up efforts to limit the transfer of dual-use technologies to developing countries. Technology denial is considered a workable form of containing proliferation. This assumption seems misplaced, especially in the case of India, which already

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has a mature technological base. The policy of closing the technology door to new entrants does not appear to be a viable or verifiable way of managing destabilizing technologies that will inevitably be developed. Moreover, the multilateral technology control regimes that have evolved under the American umbrella resemble cartels rather than global institutions from India's vantage point.

American optimism regarding limiting dual-use technology is questionable in the case of India. The vast majority of technologies that fall into this category are state of the art and crucial to industrial modernization. Leading-edge technologies are a precondition to global economic competitiveness, and it is only logical to expect India, which is poised to harness the latest generation of technical know-how as part of its economic liberalization drive, to resist unwarranted constraints. Indian objections to such schemes are in part related to the perception that they spring not only from America's strategic compulsions but also from economic motivations aimed at eliminating or disabling potential second-tier competitors in the most lucrative sectors of the global economy.

When the Missile Technology Control Regime was formed in 1987, India already had a fairly ambitious space and missile program. Since then India has successfully tested the Prithvi short-range, ground-launch missile and the medium-range Agni. While analysts disagree on the exact extent of the MTCR's impact on India's missile program, its most lasting effect has been to spur greater self-sufficiency, with signs of eventual success. As with its nuclear capability, India has exercised restraint in missile deployment. In many ways it exemplifies India's tendency to have technology "demonstrators" as part of its strategic posture for sending strong signals of its capability without necessarily ratcheting up the arms race.

While the United States depicts missiles as inherently destabilizing, it has not convincingly spelled out why they are more so in India's arsenals than in more powerful countries'. Most of India falls within the range of Chinese and Saudi Arabian CSS-2 missiles. America's enhanced fear of missiles seems to be generated more by Iraq's use of SCUD missiles in the Persian Gulf War than by a considered analysis of India's intent and capability.

A SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY

The various strands of U.S. policy toward India seem rooted in the implicit attitude that India is somehow a revisionist power bent on restructuring the international system at the expense of America's global interests. This negative view of India arises from a misreading of the meaning of India's drive for self-reliance and national sovereignty. It is also tied to the paradoxical streak of universalism in America's philosophy of liberal individualism, which implies that "those who are not with us are against us."

As an ancient civilization subjected to prolonged British colonial rule, India is vigilant about both territorial and political autonomy. Even at the height of Cold War bipolarity, India opted for nonalignment, seeking accommodation to and compromise with both worlds, unlike the revolutionary approaches of the Soviet Union

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and China, which envisioned fundamental transformations in the world system. It is important for the United States to recognize that India's independent stance has been much more defensive than offensive. Indian aspirations for autonomy should be seen as the product of specific historical circumstances, and not as a function of some unique Indian ambition.

Excessive ambitions ascribed to India need to be seen in light of its actual behavior. India's restraint in the nuclear arena since 1974 does not seem typical of an aspiring hegemon. Its defense expenditures do not point to committed militarization. For nearly two decades after the Sino-Indian war, India's military spending was approximately 3.6 percent of GDP. While it went up slightly in the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, in the past six years Indian spending declined, to 2.5 percent of GDP in 1993, despite the collapse of its erstwhile partner, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan's drive to acquire a nuclear capability. Neither Pakistan nor China have publicly available defense figures, but it is estimated that Pakistan's spending has remained steady at approximately 7.5 percent of GDP and that China's expenditures have been rising annually at a rate of 10 to 15 percent of GDP.

In many ways, American perceptions of India in the nuclear arena have been and continue to be out of step with actual Indian thinking and policy practices. In light of the approaching NPT Review Conference in April 1995 and the potential for misrepresentation and misunderstanding between the United States and India, genuine and sustained dialogue will be all the more critical.

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Are Missile Defenses MAD?

Combining Defenses with Arms Control

Michael Krepon

Early in the Cold War, renowned strategist Bernard Brodie gave a chilling prognosis for the dawning nuclear age: "No adequate defense against the bomb exists, and the possibilities of its existence in the future are exceedingly remote." That strategic judgment—that the vulnerability of superpowers would be pervasive and enduring—has divided hawks and doves ever since. Hawks have sought to refute what came to be known as the principle of mutual assured destruction, both on philosophical grounds and through technological advances in offensive weapons and ballistic missile defenses. Doves have sought to cement the principle of joint annihilation as a cornerstone of arms control.

Each side has viewed the other's approach as fundamentally incompatible with its own. The purest expression of the hawks' camp was the Strategic Defense Initiative or "Star Wars," which was introduced in 1983 by President Reagan. The embodiment of the doves' camp has been the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which maintains nuclear threats indefinitely and rests on the paradoxical idea that more offensive weaponry does not contribute to greater security. The fruition of one approach has been regarded as the demise of the other.

Despite the end of the Cold War, this rhetorical battle continues within the confines of Washington's Beltway and Moscow's ring road because the debate over strategic vulnerability in the nuclear age remains unresolved. During the 1980s, the Star Wars battle was waged over astrodome defenses of orbiting weapons that would protect entire countries against Soviet attacks. The battle line now forms over the issue of missile defenses for circumscribed areas—troop concentrations, airfields, and ports—against ballistic missiles held by worrisome Third World states. The Clinton and Yeltsin administrations are currently negotiating new ABM treaty guidelines to permit deployment of missile defenses such as the U.S. Army's Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system. THAAD has become the

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focal point of a high-stakes battle involving strategic doctrine, bilateral relations, global proliferation, arms reduction, defense budgets, and billions of dollars in contracts for defense companies. As usual, both arms control advocates and missile defense backers have developed zero-sum arguments that suggest—wrongly—that there is no middle ground between support for the ABM treaty and deployment of effective missile defense systems.

GETTING OFF THE GROUND

Under the ABM treaty, Washington and Moscow are barred from setting up any nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missiles. The treaty was challenged during the Reagan administration, which sought to deploy space-based sensors and weapons that, in theory, would shield against ballistic missile attacks. Since nullifying the treaty outright was politically untenable, the Reagan administration endorsed a disingenuous legal interpretation of it, concluding that all manner of testing for prohibited deployments was permitted. This novel view was successfully contested by Congress.

Reagan's beliefs and proposals, however, provided enormous negotiating leverage for deep bilateral cuts in nuclear weapons. At the time, Soviet fears were nourished by ample U.S. defense expenditures. The physics of producing workable space-based defenses, however, proved as impregnable as the ABM treaty. Despite the extraordinary advances in computers, radar, and miniaturization in the decade leading up to Reagan's decision—and massive Pentagon spending thereafter—defense advocates still lacked the wherewithal to build effective and survivable missile defense hardware. The technological challenges were too great and too costly, and their results would be too easily countered by offensive forces. Arms control advocates were right: homeland defense against a determined nuclear attacker armed with thousands of warheads was—and is—an expensive and futile quest. By the end of the Bush administration, there was much less emphasis on plans for space-based components guarding immense areas and more attention to designs of land-based defenses of narrower scope.

Two recent developments have helped sustain political momentum for smaller-scale ballistic missile defenses such as THAAD. In 1991, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used rudimentary ballistic missiles in the Persian Gulf War to terrorize cities, a reprise of the tactics Hitler used against Londoners in World War II. For the United States and its allies, the war was a chastening experience. SCUD missiles fell on Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Dhahran, where 28 U.S. soldiers died in their barracks. Patriot missiles, used against incoming SCUDs, garnered wide acclaim during the war. However, the Patriot was not designed or tested to combat SCUDs, and later surveys found its performance lackluster. While Saddam's missiles were inconsequential in military terms, they were meaningful as weapons of terror and alliance disruption. They underscored the lesson that future enemy missiles might deliver a more lethal punch in all three respects.

More recently, smuggling of nuclear materials from the successor nations of the Soviet Union has raised the specter of nuclear proliferation and the increasing

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possibility that weapons of mass destruction will be used in regional conflicts. Intelligence community estimates in the United States paint a grim picture: more than 25 countries have or seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to carry them. Even if this assessment were wrong by a factor of two, it would be unsettling.

The Clinton administration is now seeking to clarify provisions of the ABM treaty so it can develop and deploy THAAD and related programs, which are far more advanced than Russia's SA-10 and SA-12 air-defense missiles. Russian and U.S. negotiators in Geneva are now trying to agree on new guidelines covering the speed of interceptor and target missiles for flight tests and deployment of theater missile defenses. This negotiation is required because the difference in the ranges of strategic and shorter-range theater ballistic missiles is closing as Third World states improve their offensive capabilities. Since effective theater missile defenses may also be able to intercept less capable strategic missiles, treaty compliance concerns inevitably arise. The ABM treaty bars signatories from giving non-ABM components the "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and from testing them "in an ABM mode."

INCOMING ARGUMENTS

The Clinton administration has formally buried Star Wars and the expedient interpretation of the ABM treaty it required. Massive reductions in nuclear forces are under way. Meanwhile, U.S. and Russian ground forces carry out joint exercises. All these changes signal an unparalleled opportunity to find common ground on the issue of theater missile defenses. Yet ABM treaty defenders continue to echo their arguments from the SDI debate, while their opponents persist in employing familiar negotiating tactics, such as arguing that if hard-line negotiating positions do not result in Russian concessions, unilateral action should follow.

During the Cold War, the superpowers cooperated quietly on proliferation concerns even when they agreed on little else. Future cooperation on the flight testing and deployment of more effective theater missile defenses should be easier as bilateral cooperation and concerns over proliferation increase. Moscow now has a more flexible attitude toward the issue of ballistic missile defenses. Russia's periphery is aflame in the Caucasus, where ethnic scores are still being settled. The "backlash" states that Washington worries about most cannot reach the continental United States with missile attacks. In contrast, Russia's borders are within range of theater ballistic missiles. As a result, the Yeltsin government is showing more negotiating flexibility than protectors of the ABM treaty in the United States.

Varying perceptions of the threat posed by theater ballistic missiles continue to fuel the debate in Washington over remedies. ABM treaty protectors argue that few missiles now in the possession of rogue states or likely to be deployed over the next five to ten years necessitate defenses like THAAD, which is optimally designed to shoot down ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 km. In this view, a preferred alternative would be to upgrade the Patriot system so that it could deal

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with missiles of 1,000-km range, where most threats are likely to arise.

Such an approach would pose no treaty compliance problems, but would not be helpful if rogue states develop and launch missiles of greater range against U.S. troops, allies, or friends. Supporters of THAAD point out that development and test programs are most useful to commanders in the field before the appearance of significant threats, not after them. Money is also an issue, with critics questioning the $10.3 billion outlay for THAAD and its new radar over the next 15 years. Supporters counter that spending less than one percent of defense outlays annually for THAAD is prudent. More outlays would flow to the Navy and Air Force, which are clamoring for theater missile defense programs even more capable than THAAD. Taken together, theater missile defense programs are likely to constitute less than two percent of Pentagon spending.

DOING WHAT WE CAN

Times have changed, and so has the validity of these contending arguments. The theater ballistic missile inventories of rogue states number in the tens and hundreds, not in the thousands. Unlike the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union, missile arsenals of rogue nations are not sophisticated. Interception of these ballistic missiles in the upper reaches of the earth's atmosphere is not a hopeless task. Moreover, missiles that penetrate defenses, or "leakers," may not be carrying weapons of mass destruction. In sum, even if theater missile defenses are far from perfect, they can still be militarily effective, unlike the SDI program favored by the Reagan administration.

Politically, theater missile defenses can be even more pivotal. Not trying to intercept rogue missiles—or trying ineffectually—can have a corrosive effect on alliance relations, especially if backlash states graduate to nuclear or chemical warheads. The prospect of these warheads heading toward foreign cities and U.S. expeditionary forces reinforces the need to intercept them at THAAD's distant ranges. Friendly states facing neighbors armed with weapons of mass destruction will be more inclined to retaliate in kind without such tangible means of protection. Theater missile defenses provide an opportunity to reaffirm alliance relations and nonproliferation regimes.

While the deployment of THAAD might prompt rogue states to redouble their efforts, it is in the U.S. interest to overtax their missile capabilities, not to provide them with a free ride. Unlike strategic defenses against bloated superpower arsenals, U.S. theater missile defenses can outpace Third World ballistic missile programs. Limiting U.S. anti-missile programs to dealing with 1,000-km range missiles in order to preserve the ABM treaty could encourage what we seek to halt. Theater missile defenses need to be part of a broader strategy, along with diplomatic efforts, negotiated arms reductions, and export controls, to persuade states to forgo the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction.

During the Cold War, even a modest transition from offense to defense was not possible: increments of defense invariably led to more offense. Foremost, superpowers feared falling behind. Today, the nuclear arms race is over; U.S. and Russian strategic missile production is

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approximately one-tenth that of Cold War levels. Ongoing programs are no longer driven by one-upmanship but by electoral politics, job protection, and obsolescence. This situation could, of course, change with a dramatic turn for the worse in Russia, but for now fears of an offensive buildup driven by effective theater defenses lack plausibility.

ABM treaty defenders also argue that THAAD-type defenses, with their inherent capabilities against some strategic missiles, will retard further reductions in offensive arms. Worst-case projections depict THAAD missile batteries defending Washington, D.C., and having the potential—with help from advanced space-based sensors—to protect a geographic area encompassing Albany, Cleveland, Boston, and Charleston. But these scenarios require extraordinary suspension of disbelief. Would hundreds of defensive missiles be deployed around the nation's capital, a move that was politically unacceptable in 1972? In the intervening years, the protection of politicians has not become more popular. Could theater missile defenses save cities against a Russian attack when strategic defenses could not? Would they work properly every time against missiles they were not designed to intercept—unlike the Patriot? Would Congress, which refused to spend untold billions of dollars for anti-Soviet defenses that would not work, do so now? Would the military services support vast expenditures for continental missile defense systems instead of for tanks, planes, and ships?

Strategic vulnerability will continue to be a fact of life. Nonetheless, if U.S. and Russian military planners embrace the worst-case scenarios of staunch ABM treaty defenders, they will have added reason to oppose deeper cuts in their strategic forces. Public debate in Russia suggests deep divisions over the equity of START II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that requires reductions to 3,000-3,500 warheads. Influential voices in Russia oppose the further devaluation of nuclear weapons—Moscow's "great-power card"—especially in light of post–Cold War conventional inferiority to the West and the prospective eastward expansion of NATO. Thus it is not very likely that deeper cuts in Russia would be thwarted by the possibility of effective theater missile defenses. President Yeltsin and his advisers do not view THAAD as an impediment to deeper cuts, covered under the proposed START III treaty. This issue now resonates more in the U.S. arms control community than in Moscow.

Another argument against THAAD is that it makes Chinese, British, and French strategic arms reductions more remote, since their arsenals are more likely than Russia's to be undermined by advanced theater missile defenses. The lesser nuclear powers, with several hundred warheads each, have shown little inclination to reduce their arsenals except as required for budgetary cuts. Forgoing THAAD to facilitate reductions these nations do not want would also sacrifice missile defenses they may someday need.

KEEPING THE ABM TREATY ALIVE

Preserving strategic vulnerability, or a balance of terror, is not an end in itself; it is a means of liquidating the consequences of the nuclear arms race while preventing brinksmanship. With the

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offensive arms competition in a deep freeze, effective theater missile defenses can be safely deployed. This must be done with great care, however, to avoid additional perturbations in U.S.-Russian relations. Flight tests and deployments must be the result of joint decisions, not unilateral fiat. Broad and permissive legal interpretations of the ABM treaty were unacceptable when the superpowers were mortal enemies; they are even more so now that the United States and Russia are trying to forge a friendship.

Devising new rules of the road for theater missile defenses will be one test of that friendship. Successful negotiations will allow both countries to deal more effectively with emerging proliferation problems and give new meaning to hazy notions of strategic cooperation. Contentious negotiations marked by crude efforts to extract Russian concessions by defense enthusiasts in the Pentagon or Capitol Hill will short-circuit this process, helping those in Moscow who prefer their old habits. The natural tendency of missile defense supporters is to keep every option open, notwithstanding funding and technological constraints. This approach is guaranteed to polarize Congress and breed misgivings in Russia.

The new Republican majority in Congress will loosen the purse strings for missile defenses and reinforce unilateralist trends on Capitol Hill. This, combined with President Clinton's inclination not to override Pentagon preferences, could easily deadlock U.S.-Russian negotiations on theater missile defenses.

Arms controllers and missile defense advocates have been fighting so long that they risk losing a golden opportunity to reduce nuclear danger. Paradoxically, the introduction of effective missile defenses requires the ABM treaty, which facilitates cooperation with Russia and far deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals. A return to adversarial relations cannot be ruled out, which is another reason for maintaining the treaty's viability. To endure, however, the ABM treaty must be adapted to vastly changed circumstances.

To begin this debate by asking whether theater missile defenses diminish the national vulnerability at the core of mutual assured destruction confuses the ABM treaty's intent with its practical effect. The treaty's preamble measures its worth in terms of deep cuts, not by imposing strategic vulnerability, which would persist even if the treaty died. To argue that new guidelines covering theater missile defenses would violate the ABM treaty misses the essential point that treaty partners have every right to clarify, reinterpret, or amend provisions to their liking—as long as they do so by agreement and with the consent of their respective legislatures.

The United States and Russia have embarked on such a course. The Clinton administration has wisely chosen to negotiate rather than act unilaterally. THAAD is needed to deal with missile proliferation nightmares, and the ABM treaty is needed to foster continued cooperation with Moscow. By steering a sensible course between hawks and doves, President Clinton can have both effective theater missile defenses and deeper cuts in nuclear weapons.

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A Plan for Europe

Zbigniew Brzezinski

HOW TO EXPAND NATO

THE CLINTON administration today confronts three important and interrelated questions generated by the end of the Cold War: First, what should be the scope of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance? Second, what should be the role of Germany within post-Cold War Europe? And third, what should be Europe and NATO's relationship with Russia?

It is essential to answer all three if America's prolonged commitment to Europe is to be crowned with historic success. The failure to respond decisively to the first question could create uncertainties regarding the second and automatically conjures up troubling prospects regarding the third. Hence, the response must be comprehensive.

It is axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked. The Europeans almost unanimously want to preserve the Euro-Atlantic alliance. But that means both sides must define what today constitutes "Europe" and what is the security perimeter of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. It also calls for shaping a closer relationship between Europe and Russia—one that facilitates the consolidation of a truly democratic and benign Russia.

This agenda is as daunting in its sweep as the one that America faced in the late 1940s. And it is pertinent to recall that the formation

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of NATO was not just a response to the Soviet threat; it was also motivated by the recognition that an enduring Euro-Atlantic security framework was needed for the assimilation of a recovering Germany into the European system. Today, in the wake of the reunification of Germany and the liberation of Central Europe, the ongoing expansion of Europe—favored by a powerful Germany—necessitates addressing head-on the issue of expanding NATO. That expansion in some cases should precede the enlargement of Europe; in others, it might have to follow it.

As the European Union reaches out for new members, so will Europe's security organ, the Western European Union. The WEU has already created a special category of associated partners, comprised of several Central European states. Their formal membership in the EU will create additional economic bonds and shared political interests inseparable from the security dimension. With most of the European Union's members also participating in NATO, neutrality by the alliance in the face of an attack on a WEU member will become inconceivable. As a practical matter, the issue of formally widening the alliance can thus no longer be avoided.

Failure to address this issue will compound the disintegrative trends in the Euro-Atlantic alliance that the Bosnian tragedy has made so evident. The disgraceful indecisiveness of the policies of both the Bush and Clinton administrations has helped create divisive coalitions within NATO, pitting Britain and France, backed from the outside by Russia, against America and Germany. Bosnia as a regional conflict thus represents an immediate challenge to the political cohesion of the alliance. The absence of a longer-range design for Europe can deprive the alliance of its historical *raison d'être.*

AN UNCLEAR POLICY

IT IS NOT carping criticism to point out that, so far, the Clinton administration has projected neither a strategic vision nor a clear sense of direction on a matter of such salience to Europe's future as enlarging NATO. To be sure, the president has stated (and his spokesmen have been repeating it like a sacred mantra) that the issue is no longer

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"whether" NATO will be expanded "but when and how." The task of presidential leadership, however, is not just to define questions but also to provide answers. "When and how" is precisely what begs for answers.

The ambiguity in U.S. policy was intensified by the conflicting emphases of the president's principal advisers. President Clinton himself stated that NATO expansion "will not depend upon the appearance of a new threat in Europe." In contrast, his deputy secretary of state publicly affirmed, "Another factor, of course, that will determine the expansion of NATO is the overall security environment in Europe." His vice president has gone the furthest in assuring the Central Europeans that "the security of the states that lie between Western Europe and Russia affects the security of America." The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was even blunter, stating that "any threat to the East European countries . . . would be considered a threat to the United States." The vice president also indicated that NATO will be expanded in stages, arguing that this "will be of benefit even to those countries who are not in the first group to join," but the deputy secretary of state argued that Russia's and Poland's prospects of being admitted to NATO are the same.

There has been particularly widespread confusion regarding the role of NATO's Partnership for Peace—an ambiguous voluntary association of participating states—in an enlarging alliance. The president's own comments have contributed to that confusion: "Twenty-one nations have now joined that partnership since we began it, and they are already moving to fulfill the dream of a unified and peaceful Europe." Is that to mean that Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan are in the same category as the Czech Republic or Hungary? Is the partnership meant to provide equal security to all? Is it a promise of NATO membership to all or to none? If all are eligible, then, as a practical matter, none are admissible.

A German commentator on this issue aptly quoted Frederick the Great's axiom: "He who wants to defend everything defends nothing, and he who wants to be everyone's friend has no friends in the end."[1] Senator Richard Lugar was undoubtedly right when he noted that

[1] Lothar Ruehl, *Die Welt*, June 10, 1994.

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"the Partnership for Peace must begin with the honest *premise of strategic differentiation.* All countries are *not* equal in the West's strategic calculus" (italics in original). Such strategic differentiation has been slow in coming and the State Department has even actively lobbied against congressional efforts to provide it.

Fortunately, by late 1994, the Clinton administration had begun to fashion a more consistent and forward-looking policy on NATO expansion. Its proposal to initiate an alliance-wide debate regarding the "when and how" of NATO expansion was a positive step, one that could over time generate the needed comprehensive approach. It came none too soon, since failure to resolve the persisting ambiguity in current U.S. policy was intensifying Central European anxieties and causing divisive debates within key allied governments, notably Germany. The surfacing disagreements between German Defense Minister Volker Rühe, who advocates bolder movement on NATO expansion, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, who urges greater caution, signal a potentially disruptive split within the already weakened German government at a time when strategic leadership by America and Germany is especially needed.

Continued U.S. waffling could also consolidate Russian opposition to any expansion of NATO so that any eventual move to widen the alliance will unavoidably be seen as conveying a hostile message to Moscow. In the meantime, because of that ambiguity, Russian leaders with whom a clear-headed Western plan for NATO's expansion could be constructively discussed are being locked into an increasingly negative posture by the rising crescendo of highly vocal Russian opposition. There is little to be gained and a great deal to be risked by more delay in explicitly answering the question of "when and how."

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

THE NEED for such an answer is dictated, above all, by the changing circumstances of both Germany and Russia. NATO was formed in large measure as a response to the challenges posed to a stable European order by the disproportionate power of these two states. Over the last 40 years, NATO created a secure framework for both a con-

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structive role for Germany in a unifying Europe and the protection of Western Europe from the Soviet Union. Today the challenge is to find a formula that consolidates Germany in a wider Europe and facilitates a cooperative relationship with the new Russia—while eliminating any potentially disruptive geopolitical vacuum between the wider Europe and the new Russia.

It must be recognized that both Germany and Russia are in the midst of sensitive and complex national redefinitions. It is no reflection on Germany—a model citizen of the democratic European community—to note that a reunited Germany has the choice of either continuing to become an increasingly European Germany or seeking a German Europe. The former is much likelier within the framework of an expanded European Union and especially a more rapidly expanding NATO, with America deeply engaged in the shaping of that expansion. The latter is more likely if NATO atrophies while an insecure Central Europe, left to its own devices, again becomes a hunting ground for its powerful western and eastern neighbors.

While America waffles, Moscow's moderates are put on the defensive by vocal nationalists.

That is why the next phase in the construction of Europe will have to involve the deliberate promotion of close German-Polish political cooperation. Today's Western Europe would not be a reality without prior German-French reconciliation. The post–Cold War Europe will not become a real "Europe" without a deep and wide-ranging reconciliation between Germany and Poland. Security must be a major aspect of any real cooperation between them. It will make a decisive difference to Europe's future whether such security cooperation—already pursued by them within the WEU—is undertaken within or without the Euro-Atlantic alliance (that is, with or without America's involvement).

The ongoing redefinition of Russia poses potentially starker choices. Germany's democracy is not at issue, but Russia's democracy is tenuous at best. Moreover, Germany's commitment to the West is enduring; the only issue is how integrated or unilateral Germany's role within the new Europe will be. Russia's relationship to the West—indeed, its very inclination to define itself as part of the West—is

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uncertain. Fundamentally, the political struggle within Russia is over whether Russia will be a national and increasingly European state or a distinctively Eurasian and once again an imperial state.

That debate is sharpening. The void left by communist ideology has not yet been filled. Among the several contending schools of political thought, the "Westernists" or "Europeanists" are certainly not gaining ground. Some, like Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who used to lead this camp, seem to be defecting. Increasingly, the most articulate and politically appealing leaders seem to be those who argue that Russia is destined to exercise geopolitical sway over Eurasia, that it is the embodiment of a distinctive Eurasian identity, and that its special political status must be asserted directly in Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe. The Russian debate and the growing appeal of the "Eurasianists" signal the historical urgency of defining more precisely a stable political and territorial relationship between Europe, including its Euro-Atlantic security system, and post-Soviet Russia.

The requisite definition need not now address—let alone reject—the question of whether Russia eventually might become an integral part of NATO. Rühe, the German defense minister, is probably correct in stating that Russia's participation would so dilute the alliance as to render it meaningless—but there is no current need to dot the i's and cross the t's on this sensitive issue. It is not even clear whether the Russians wish to be part of NATO. But if excluded and rejected, they will be resentful, and their own political self-definition will become more anti-European and anti-Western.

Prudence therefore dictates that the issue of Russia's association be kept open, depending on how fast, deep, and wide the expansion of the European Union will be and whether the Euro-Atlantic security system matches that expansion. The question of Russia's participation will have to be faced only when a wider NATO has actually reached the frontiers of Russia—and only if by then Russia satisfies the basic criteria for membership. Neither is likely soon.

In the meantime, the United States should take the lead in what will doubtless be a prolonged discussion in the alliance regarding the criteria that any new members must satisfy; the timing and stages of any expansion, its special modalities, the most constructive way to respond to legit-

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imate Russian concerns, and the best ways to address some unavoidable complications resulting from expansion. In doing so, President Clinton will also have to take into account the growing domestic and foreign interest in this issue and the manifest need for American leadership.

A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

THE CRITERIA for NATO membership should be generic: they should define the essential political standards any new member must satisfy to qualify for the alliance's security umbrella. The alliance is, after all, a community of like-minded democratic states that share a common political culture, are contiguous to one another by land and sea, and are convinced that a threat to the security of one would adversely affect the security of the others. French Defense Minister François Léotard put it well: "The possibility that the new democracies will join the Atlantic alliance must not be viewed on the basis of solely military considerations, but should also be viewed globally, combining the various political, military, economic, and even cultural dimensions of their integration with the West."[2]

Some opponents of NATO expansion have lately taken refuge in defining capricious preconditions for entry, demanding, for example, that the armed forces of any would-be member first be fully upgraded to NATO standards. Since no Central European nation could afford this, the demand is an obvious exclusionary tactic. In any case, a distinction should be made between political criteria that qualify a state for admission into an allied community and operational and logistical standards for effective military integration once within the community. The former need to be satisfied before admission; the latter can be pursued over a number of years both before and after admission.

There appears to be a broad consensus that the basic criteria for membership include a stable democratic system based on a functioning market economy; the absence of entangling territorial or ethnic disputes; an evident respect for the rights of national minorities; preferably, geographical contiguity to the alliance; constitutionally

[2] *Le Figaro,* September 30, 1994.

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grounded civilian control over the military; and transparency in defense budgets and policy. As a practical matter, interoperability in logistics, communications, command and control, and weaponry would be desirable, but these could be pursued after formal admission.

The explicit articulation of such basic criteria for NATO expansion would prejudge neither the timing nor the scope of the alliance's future expansion. It would, however, clarify the existing situation, making it more obvious which states might qualify and roughly by when. The criteria would also serve as a spur for desirable internal reforms among would-be members. These criteria would strengthen the emerging consensus that in the foreseeable future only four Central European countries—the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia—are likely to be considered seriously. It would leave open the possibility for others, including theoretically Russia itself.

The first step, which should be taken at the earliest opportunity this year, would be for the alliance to declare formally its criteria for expansion and to indicate which countries at this stage appear to meet them. This would terminate the counterproductive debates with Moscow over whether NATO should or should not expand. The longer this is delayed, the more vociferous Moscow's objections are likely to be.

This step would not be tantamount to admission, but it would set the formal process of admission in motion. During that process, some further differentiation may become necessary: instead of four Central European countries, the first cut might include only Poland and the Czech Republic. Slovakia, for internal reasons, may qualify later, and that could have the effect (for geographical reasons) of somewhat complicating Hungary's admission, unless NATO is willing to leapfrog spatially. An unintended benefit of a step-by-step expansion would be the implicit message that NATO does not intend to be an exclusive club with slightly increased but closed membership, that a new line is not being drawn after the first admissions, but that the alliance's expansion is a staged and long-term process of enlarging the democratic community. Others can aspire to it and thus have an incentive to meet its standards.

Even the initially limited expansion of NATO would take several years. Unanimity on expansion in the alliance will not be easy to achieve. Negotiations between allies—even with strong American

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leadership and energetic German support—are likely to be tedious, with some states blackmailing the alliance on this issue to obtain satisfaction for their parochial concerns (the example of Greece on Macedonia springs to mind). The new members will also have to satisfy the alliance that they will address over time a large number of post-admission issues pertaining to logistics, operations, command and control, as well as weapons standardization—all of which will take time and money to resolve.

Nonetheless, it is certainly possible, given effective and focused leadership, to complete the political phase of the admissions process by the years 1996-98, at least for Poland and the Czech Republic and perhaps for Hungary and Slovakia as well—and in any case for all four by the end of the decade.

MEETING RUSSIA'S CONCERNS

IN EXPANDING NATO, one should note that neither the alliance nor its prospective new members are facing any imminent threat. Talk of a "new Yalta" or of a Russian military threat is not justified, either by actual circumstances or even by worst-case scenarios for the near future. The expansion of NATO should, therefore, not be driven by whipping up anti-Russian hysteria that could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy. NATO's expansion should not be seen as directed against any particular state, but as part of a historically constructive process of shaping a secure, stable, and more truly European Europe.

Since any foreseeable expansion of the alliance is likely to be pacific, the specific military dispositions arising from enlarged membership need not involve the forward deployment of NATO troops—especially American and German forces—on the territory of the new Central European members. Periodic joint maneuvers, coordinated planning, prepositioning of equipment, and joint command exercises would be sufficient to give substance to the guarantees inherent in NATO's Article Five, while the formula of "no forward deployment" of NATO forces in Central Europe would underline the nonantagonistic character of the expansion. This should mitigate some of Russia's legitimate concerns.

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There are other steps that should be taken to reassure Russia, to propitiate its sense of status, and—most important—to engage it in a transoceanic and transcontinental security system. However, not all of Russia's concerns are legitimate—and the alliance should not shrink from making that known.

Just five years ago, the alliance had to overcome Russian objections to the inclusion of the reunited Germany in NATO. Wisely, the Bush administration spurned those who favored acquiescence to the Kremlin. Faced with U.S. determination to include the united Germany in NATO, with or without Russia's assent, Moscow wisely assented. The present circumstances call for a similar display of constructive firmness. The Kremlin must be made to understand that bluster and threats will be neither productive nor effective and may even accelerate the process of expansion. Russia has the right neither to veto NATO expansion nor to impose limited sovereignty on the Central European states.

At the same time, Russia should be approached on a two-track basis: the independent decision of the alliance to enlarge its membership should be accompanied by a simultaneous invitation to Russia to help create a new transcontinental system of collective security, one that goes beyond the expansion of NATO proper. Such a two-track strategy for enhancing European peace in the post-Cold War era would satisfy, both substantively and symbolically, the common Russian insistence on a wider all-European security system.

The proposal to Russia of a new joint structure should have two components: first, a formal treaty of global security cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation; and second, a new mechanism for special security consultations within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The treaty would underscore that the expansion of NATO is not directed against Russia while leaving open the question of Russia's eventual membership. It would recognize the Russian quest for status and could provide for joint consultations regarding peacekeeping operations. Implicit in the proposed treaty would be an incipient Atlantic-Eurasian framework of security cooperation.

Similarly, the initiative to upgrade the CSCE through more effective mechanisms for security consultations would be designed to meet

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some of Russia's aspirations. The West cannot accept the Russian effort to dilute NATO and make the CSCE the central organ of European security—for the obvious reason that a highly diverse, unwieldy, and unstructured conference that operates on the principle of unanimity could become the guarantor of European security only when there is no longer any insecurity in Europe. But NATO and Russia can together explore ways of injecting into the CSCE procedures that would permit prompt joint reactions by NATO and Russia to regional threats to peace, perhaps through a special consultative mechanism involving the major players: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Poland; and Ukraine.

The two-track strategy—combining the expansion of NATO with new transcontinental security architecture embracing Russia—would represent a productive response to Russia's concerns. In fact, some Russian leaders have privately indicated that they would not be averse to the proposed arrangement—though their freedom of choice is narrowing as Russian nationalists, feeding on continued American ambiguity, become more vocal. It is a felicitous coincidence that the plan outlined here would constructively exploit some earlier Russian ideas—notably President Boris Yeltsin's late 1993 suggestion of a special relationship between Russia and NATO. A Russia whose goal is neither to render NATO impotent nor again to dominate Central Europe would have good reason to favor this approach.

BALTIC AND UKRAINIAN COMPLICATIONS

ADMITTEDLY, THE expansion of NATO, even if accompanied by a positive resolution of Russia's concerns, will create new problems. The most important of these will be the status and security of the Baltic states and Ukraine. The fiercely independent Baltic states want to be an integral part of Europe. Ukraine currently defines itself as "neutral"; it has resisted Russian pressures to integrate itself into the Moscow-dominated security treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and it is the only former Soviet republic to have created a large national army.

Russia has grudgingly accepted the independence of the Baltic

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republics and has formally acquiesced to the independence of Ukraine—but there is a widespread consensus among the Russian political elite that eventually, in some fashion, Ukraine will and indeed should be reintegrated under the Kremlin. That aspiration makes it important that the proposed treaty between NATO and the Russian Federation not be confused with the acceptance by the West of any equivalence between NATO and the CIS. The treaty, therefore, should be with Russia directly. Russian officials would like to establish NATO/CIS parity because it would aid Moscow's efforts to reintegrate the former Soviet Union. In January 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher was uncharacteristically forceful but quite right when he warned that "Russia must avoid any attempt to reconstitute the U.S.S.R."

The Baltic and Ukrainian issues pose rather different political and psychological complications. The Baltic reaction to NATO expansion is quite predictable: the Balts will step up their efforts to become the next members. Their eventual membership will have to be addressed in the wider Scandinavian context. In any case, the Baltic states already enjoy a status in many ways similar to that of Finland during the recent past: formally neutral but aware of the West's enormous sympathy, to the point that any aggression against them—especially if resisted—would surely precipitate a serious international crisis. By the turn of the century, the Baltic states will probably follow Sweden and perhaps Finland in joining the WEU. That will make them also the implicit beneficiaries of the NATO umbrella. Until then, delay regarding NATO membership is justified, unless for some reason Russia adopts an overtly threatening posture toward the Baltic states.

The Ukrainian problem is more delicate and unpredictable. If Russia accepts the two-track approach as outlined above, Ukraine may be less likely to press for immediate formal membership, especially if in the meantime its relations with Russia become more stable. If Russia's reaction to NATO expansion is altogether hostile, Ukraine will be faced with a divisive choice. Some Ukrainians will urge Kiev to press more vigorously for NATO membership, especially if their own relations with Russia should also worsen. Others will advocate accommodation with Moscow.

The problem of Ukraine cannot be deferred. Ukraine is just too

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big, too important, and its existence too sensitive a matter to both Russia and the West. As NATO expands and seeks to establish a special security relationship with Russia, it will have to consider Ukraine's new relationship to NATO. In doing so, the alliance has to be conscious of Russia's special sensitivity on the Ukrainian question, but also of the West's broader interest in consolidating geopolitical pluralism in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine's secure independence is clearly the most decisive and substantive expression of that post-Soviet pluralism. That is why the allies unanimously agree that Ukraine's long-term survival is in NATO's interest.

Russia has to face the Ukrainian issue as well. For the Kremlin, keeping open the option of the eventual reabsorption of Ukraine is a central strategic objective. Accordingly, Moscow recognizes that it would not be in Russia's interest to intensify Ukrainian insecurity or precipitate conditions in which the eastward expansion of NATO prompts Ukraine to seek early admission into the alliance. That consideration should serve as a powerful incentive to Russia to explore the possibility of joint arrangements with the West that, in Moscow's estimate, might reduce the likelihood of dramatic changes in the geostrategic landscape of the "near abroad."

The overarching NATO-Russian Federation treaty should therefore include a special annex containing a joint, formal, and very explicit commitment by both parties to Ukraine's independence and security. At this stage, such a commitment need neither foreclose nor promise any future relationship between Ukraine and NATO, nor any special and truly voluntary cooperation between Russia and Ukraine. It would provide assurance to Ukraine that its political status is respected, enduring, and in the interest of both NATO and the Russian Federation—irrespective of the innermost fantasies of the Russian signatories.

The NATO-Russian Federation guarantees for Ukraine would be derived from the joint interest of the two parties in a nonantagonistic process of meshing transatlantic and Eurasian security. If that interest exists or can be nurtured through constructive discussions undertaken by a strategically focused U.S. leadership, such an agreement with Moscow is attainable.

At some point in the future—but probably only some years after

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2000—both the European Union and NATO will have to reassess the nature of their relationships with Russia and Ukraine. Assuming that by then the European Union and its security arm, the WEU, will have expanded to encompass several Central European states (perhaps including also the Baltics), it will be natural and timely for the EU to consider more comprehensive ties with its new neighbors to the east. The same will be true of NATO, especially if in the meantime a democratically consolidated and economically reformed Ukraine has successfully enlarged the scope of its participation in the Partnership for Peace and satisfied the criteria for full membership.

It is surely in Russia's interest to become more closely tied to Europe, notwithstanding the complications inherent in Russia's Eurasian geography and identity. It is surely in the long-range interest of Ukraine gradually to redefine itself as a Central European state. The proposed arrangement would provide the needed historical pause and the requisite sense of security for Russia and Ukraine to work out a stable balance between close economic cooperation and separate political coexistence—while also moving closer to Europe as Europe moves toward them.

Ukraine is just too big and too important for Russia or the West to ignore.

Of course, a major disruption in European-Russian or Russian-Ukrainian relations cannot be ruled out. The Russian obsession with big-power status, the growing desire to reconstitute a bloc of at least satellite states within the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the effort to limit the sovereignty of the Central European states could produce a crisis with the West. In such a case, an enlarged NATO would have no choice but to become again a defensive alliance against an external threat.

The resulting disruption in the construction of a wider transcontinental security system would be damaging, especially to Russia itself. Several decades ago, the Soviet Union spurned participation in the Marshall Plan and chose instead to go it alone—until it collapsed from historical fatigue. Threatened by the new Muslim states to the south and facing a possible future conflict in the east, today's Russia is in no position to engage also in a conflict with the West. Moscow

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can perhaps delay somewhat the enlargement of NATO, but it can neither halt Europe's growth nor prevent the concomitant extension of the Euro-Atlantic security umbrella over the wider Europe. It can merely isolate itself again. The Kremlin leaders should realize this.[3] The two-track plan outlined here could help them avoid the basic error made by their Soviet predecessors.

BEYOND CHARLEMAGNE

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, especially given the Republican landslide in the November 1994 congressional elections, would support such a program. Despite the ill-considered negative lobbying by the powerful officials on the seventh floor of the State Department, the Congress, even prior to the recent elections, approved the so-called Brown amendment. (Only 22 senators—21 of them Democrats—voted against it, while 74 supported it.) This law stipulates that henceforth four Central European states are to benefit from the special cooperative privileges in logistics and weapons acquisition otherwise reserved for NATO members. Earlier in 1994, the Senate overwhelmingly approved a resolution favoring the eventual inclusion in the alliance of several Central European states. The 1994 elections reinforced congressional support for early NATO expansion.

The expansion of NATO will bring new responsibilities, and some will argue against it. The proposed expansion is a serious step that should be undertaken with a full appreciation of its additional burdens

[3] Intelligent Russian foreign policy thinkers do. For example, Dmitri Trenin makes the case that "Russia must learn that our country's true objective lies not in suppressing NATO membership for Central Europe, but rather in the stable demilitarization of our relations with the West . . . Consequently, there is no use spending all our energy opposing NATO expansion. Instead of this, we should chart a course toward convergence and close interaction between NATO and the Russian Federation." Warning against Russia's "self-isolation," he goes on to argue that the motives of the Central European countries and of Germany in favoring the expansion of NATO are "understandable" and that "internal stability in Central Europe, like the inclusion of Germany in international security institutions, is in the interests of the Russian Federation" ("Will NATO Expand Eastward—and What Should Russia's Policy Be in this Regard?" *Novoye Vremya*, No. 43, October 1994). The paradox of the current debate is that the Westerners who argue against the expansion of the alliance out of fear of Russian nationalists actually strengthen the hand of the nationalists against moderates like Trenin.

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and even risks. But America's crucial relationship with the larger Europe must be addressed. The Partnership for Peace has already enlarged the scope of the alliance's obligations by stating that each "active participant" in the partnership would be entitled to consultations with NATO if it felt threatened. Partnership for Peace members are thus de facto covered by Article Four, which provides for consultations regarding out-of-area threats. Under Article Five, formal membership in the alliance would guarantee protection against an attack, entailing a major new obligation to which some will doubtless object.

Critics will probably evoke the worst-case scenario in arguing against any new obligations—namely, the risk of U.S. entanglement in a conflict in Central Europe. Although the probability of any such conflict is low, it is fair to counter: could NATO really remain passive if some new form of aggression occurred? Would America and Europe not feel threatened by an invasion of Central Europe? Would there not be massive pressures for a strong reaction? Last but not least, would any such attack be more or less likely if it was known in advance that NATO would be obligated to respond? Paradoxically, the worst-case scenario raises questions that actually reinforce the case for NATO expansion as a form of deterrence—even though the approach advocated here should be pursued not as a hostile initiative but as a part of a larger architectural effort designed eventually to span Eurasia.

At the other extreme, exploiting the approaching 50th anniversary of Yalta, some will argue that the failure to expand the alliance foreshadows Yalta II—a de facto recognition of a special Russian sphere of power within the territory of the former Soviet Union and Central Europe. Continued hesitation and ambiguity regarding America's longer-range vision of Europe's security will fuel these charges. Even though, given the current state of Russia and the new realities in Central Europe, a new Yalta is not even possible, nothing less than a display of presidential leadership will rebuff the growing temptation to engage in demagogy on the sensitive issues of relations with Russia and Europe's future.

A number of European states would support forthwith such an American initiative. Others will hesitate or initially oppose it altogether. Germany will be sympathetic, and that is critical. France has

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been ambivalent, but its desire to retain a commanding position in the EU is enhancing its stake in expanding the current Franco-German liaison into a wider Franco-German-Polish axis, thereby widening the scope of European security cooperation. Britain has its own special reasons for favoring a wider, rather than a deeper, Europe—and it is simply a fact of life that a wider Europe cannot be two-thirds safe and one-third insecure. It will take time and effort to translate these inchoate European attitudes into affirmative unanimity. It can happen over the next several years—but only if America leads.

U.S. leadership, to be resonant, must also provide a longer-range vision of Europe's future, thereby defining the American-European connection by tomorrow's shared goals, not yesterday's fears. In scope, today's "Europe" still evokes Charlemagne's: essentially a Western Europe. That Europe had to be an American protectorate, with European unity forged beneath NATO's umbrella by France and a truncated Germany. But in the post–Cold War era, the territorial reach of the emerging Europe is more reminiscent of the Petrine Europe of the Holy Roman Empire. By 2010, that Europe may also include some southern European states (such as Romania, Bulgaria, and others), which will doubtless insist on admission in the footsteps of their Central European neighbors. Most important, a united and powerful Germany can be more firmly anchored within this larger Europe if the European security system fully coincides with America's.

The progression from Charlemagne's Europe of 1990 through the Petrine Europe of 2010 will set the stage—perhaps by 2020—for seeking Charles de Gaulle's vision of a Europe stretching "to the Urals." At this time, no one can say what precise shape such a Europe might take. Nor can one define what America's relationship with it might be. But one way or another, both America and Russia will have to be engaged in truly cooperative relationships with the European Union to make a Europe to the Urals feasible. The evocation of such a vision—of a plan for Europe—is a powerful incentive to shape a future that will truly benefit the current as well as the next generation of Americans and Europeans.

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Paradigm Lost

Richard N. Haass

FROM CONTAINMENT TO CONFUSION

SENIOR CLINTON administration officials are quick to point out that one reason for their foreign policy difficulties is that the world they inherited is a more complex place than what came before. Although this explanation exaggerates the simplicity and clarity of the past half century—the applicability of "containment" was hotly contested throughout the Cold War, especially during the wars in Korea and Vietnam—it does contain a kernel of truth.

Global changes have undoubtedly complicated the conceiving and conducting of U.S. foreign policy. Ours is a period of "international deregulation," one in which there are new players, new capabilities, and new alignments—but, as yet, no new rules. This international flux is compounded by political anxieties at home. The public is motivated by a pervasive sense that domestic problems warrant the bulk of America's energies. Extensive media coverage and scrutiny have

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increased the pressure on the government to act while making acting more difficult. And the Republican control of both chambers of Congress that resulted from the 1994 midterm elections is certain to aggravate institutional friction between the legislature and the executive. The net result is that domestic support for foreign endeavors is contradictory, weak, and growing weaker.

In these unsettled circumstances, the Clinton administration has sought to articulate a new foreign policy doctrine—a framework for international reregulation. Its principal attempt was National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's September 1993 statement that "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." While arguably useful as a long-term vision, this statement falls short as a practicable doctrine, which, as containment did, must define both interests and intentions. Despite the administration's insistence, it remains unclear that "enlarging" democracy actually qualifies as a paramount American interest. In any event, the objective is difficult—at times impossible—to translate into immediate policy while the process of democratization works its uncertain way.

The need to articulate a doctrine cannot be met by refining Mr. Lake's vision or developing an alternative. Such a conclusion reflects the nature of the world we are entering, one characterized by a diffusion of power in all its forms, whether technological, military, or economic. The immediate future will be one in which the United States faces numerous, if limited, challenges to its interests around the world. Moreover, new and growing problems—from environmental degradation, disease, and population growth to weapons proliferation, nationalism, and the erosion of traditional nation-states—pose serious challenges in their own right to regional stability. No doctrine can hope to provide a lens through which to view most events or a compass by which to decide most policies.

But to say that there can be no single foreign policy construct is not to argue that there can be no structure. To the contrary, intellectual structure is essential if we are to determine priorities and shape policies. Case-by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply inadequate.

The Clinton administration has made the task of formulating and

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implementing foreign policy more difficult than it has to be. This has been done foremost by mistakes—frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals, undue sensitivity to domestic political considerations. But there have also been errors of omission, including an unwillingness to speak out regularly to the American people about foreign policy. Above all, there has been a lack of clarity and consistency about priorities and what the United States should be prepared to do on their behalf.

Vital questions of policy do not lend themselves to ad hoc, short-term approaches. Sizing and shaping U.S. armed forces and foreign assistance programs require sturdy vision and consistent follow-up. International institutions and norms take years to effect. The Congress and the public must be consulted and informed if they are to support international undertakings and not retreat at the first sign of difficulty or unexpected costs. Predictability is essential if allies are going to count on us or if foes are to think twice before challenging American interests. Policymakers need bearings by which to judge international events. Without them, policy is apt to be steered by popular emotions, daily headlines or, increasingly, the latest televised image.

But what is the solution if no all-embracing doctrine is available and particularism is unwise? The answer lies in a foreign policy that is clear about ends—America's purposes and priorities—as well as about means—America's relationship with and approach to the world. The good news is that the potential for fashioning such a structure and applying it exist. Indeed, the elements are in place, to be found among the schools of thought now contending over U.S. foreign policy.

THE CHOICE OF ENDS

AT LEAST FIVE preferences can be identified in the current debate concerning the proper purposes of foreign policy. All five—Wilsonianism, economism, realism, humanitarianism, and minimalism—have their echoes in the current administration and the Congress. These preferences are not mutually exclusive—many people hold to aspects of each—but even those who do embrace more than one bring to them different emphases. Indeed, they are less schools than ten-

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dencies, the real issue being to determine how much weight to give any one over the other four.

Wilsonianism

This most traditional of American approaches to foreign policy reflects a desire to see other countries adopt a form of democratic governance and civil society that our own experience suggests is best for both the individual and the community. It is based upon a Newtonian notion in which authority is distributed among offsetting institutions so that individual liberty is protected. This philosophical preference is buttressed by a practical one, namely, that democracies tend to treat not only their own citizens but also their neighbors with greater tolerance. Moreover, democracies are naturally less brittle and therefore less susceptible to radical and potentially disruptive change. A more democratic world, it is believed, will be not only inherently better but also more peaceful, stable, and prosperous.

The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford. The United States has no choice but to overlook a lack of democracy with friends (such as those in the Persian Gulf) where other interests (such as energy and security) take precedence. At the same time, a foreign policy predicated on spreading democracy can be difficult to implement vis-à-vis our foes, either because we lack the means to influence them or because we have more pressing concerns. Thus, a democratic North Korea would be nice, but in the meantime we had better focus on Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions. Similarly, we would like to see China demonstrate greater respect for human rights, but for now we need China's help with North Korea while we seek access to its enormous market. And even when it is agreed that promoting democracy should take precedence, the fact remains that engineering foreign societies is an always difficult and often dangerous business.

Economism

A second view of American foreign policy emphasizes the centrality of economics and U.S. economic interests. This approach reflects

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a sense that other traditional interests (especially those derived from strategic concerns) have receded and that we have arrived at a juncture where economic concerns need to be paramount. The purpose of foreign policy must therefore be to serve domestic economic considerations. If exports are key to this nation's economic well-being, then foreign policy must be about opening markets and creating jobs.

The main problems with economism are twofold. First, a foreign policy based on economics can all too easily be overwhelmed. Instability in the Korean peninsula, the Persian Gulf, or South Asia can interrupt the emergence of markets and a great deal more. Amid war or revolution, the primacy of economics will come to a sudden end; "geo-economics" will take a back seat to geopolitics. Similarly, the desire to sell for economic reasons can conflict with the need to sanction or isolate a country for political or strategic purposes.

Second, economism can easily come to resemble neomercantilism. A foreign policy based on export promotion runs the risk of degenerating into a search for specified, quantifiable results—so much market share, this level of trade imbalance—that will only increase the role of domestic political forces (often protectionist) in economic relationships. Indeed, it is this inherent impatience and demand for specific, near-term unilateral satisfaction from commerce that characterizes contemporary economism and distinguishes it from more comprehensive, long-term, multilateral approaches to expanding world trade. Failure to meet goals tends to lead to retaliation and protectionism—whose adherents are still strong despite both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such policies are economically self-destructive and inconsistent with efforts to build an open trading order on either a regional or global basis.

A policy of muscular trade promotion is also likely to harm the overall bilateral relationship with the country in question. Such spillover or contamination could well set in motion political and military trends that over time would work against U.S. interests. A Japan or Western Europe that comes to see its relationship with the United States as being more competitive than cooperative will inevitably reorient its foreign and defense policies accordingly.

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Realism

The essence of the realist perspective is its focus on order among rather than within states. Realists emphasize balance-of-power considerations and matters of national interest. Alliances among like-minded governments are a favored vehicle for promoting those interests. Realists are sensitive to the perquisites of sovereignty, fearing that its weakening will only increase the threat or use of military force in international relations. They are mindful of the continuing threats posed by regional military powers and the potential strategic challenges of Russia or even China. Realists are much less concerned with the internal character of foreign societies; they do, however, support liberal trade and multilateral (rather than unilateral) remedies on the grounds that they, too, reinforce orderly interstate relations.

The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm all other policy concerns. Realists are also correct in understanding that dealing with classical forms of interstate aggression is what U.S. military forces do best.

The principal weakness of realism is that it pays scant attention to the internal evolution of societies, something that can affect the external behavior of states. Moreover, realism provides no guidelines for dealing with important (if less than vital) economic, political, and humanitarian problems within states, arguably the potential source of most post-Cold War instability. Not all interests need be vital to be worthy of American protection. In part as a result of this narrowness, realism, with its emphasis on "stability," lacks popular appeal.

Humanitarianism

The humanitarian approach to international affairs comes close to being post-ideological. Those of this perspective see the world less in terms of nation-states per se than as peoples. They tend to view threats less in terms of aggression than chaos. Humanitarianists focus on such concerns—the alleviation of poverty, disease, hunger, overcrowding, environmental degradation, and so on—because they are important in their own right and because these problems can lead to more traditional conflicts if their consequences go untended.

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The problem with the humanitarian view is not so much its accuracy as its adequacy. Humanitarianism underestimates other concerns and threats that are more immediate and important. It is at most a supplementary world view, not an independent one. Moreover, many of the problems that animate humanitarianism are extremely difficult to fix. At the same time, these basic social and developmental problems do not normally directly threaten U.S. interests. It is thus difficult to rally domestic support for expensive efforts to address humanitarian problems abroad, especially when many of the same problems are to be found in this country.

Minimalism

Minimalism is not so much the embrace of a particular set of significant foreign policy goals (and the disavowal of another) as the refusal to embrace any set of foreign policy goals. It is the favored view of those who see only modest U.S. interests in the world (and only weak threats to them) and who take a narrow view of U.S. responsibility and obligation to meet other challenges. Most minimalists see the United States in decline in part because of the costs of decades of international activism and favor shifting resources to domestic needs. The real difference between minimalists (some but not all of whom are adherents of isolationism, best understood as the extreme manifestation of minimalism) of the left and right is just what those domestic priorities are.

Minimalists are correct to point out that the United States faces no threat akin to that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They are also sensitive to the need to right many of the wrongs at home and to the public mood to do the same. But beyond any moral obligations or philosophical commitments stemming from humanitarian or political considerations, there are still problems in the world—crises in the Persian Gulf or northeast Asia, a breakdown of trade, a renewed Russian threat to Europe—that could directly and dramatically affect America's well-being.

Indeed, a posture of minimalism, whatever its near-term savings, could increase the likelihood that critical problems or threats to vital U.S. interests will emerge. U.S. reluctance to act may well encourage

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others to fill the perceived void. If and when they did, the United States could well have no choice but to act—but in a context far less amenable to relatively inexpensive solutions. Also, spending on U.S. foreign and defense policy has declined sharply over the last decade by any measure, and it is doubtful that what ails us at home—crime, illegitimacy, runaway entitlements—would be fixed by further drawing down resources devoted to our presence abroad.

THE CHOICE OF MEANS

THE DEBATE over means—concerning this country's approach to and commitment to the world—is no less important or intense than the debate over ends. Indeed, the existence of each debate tends to reinforce the other. Here it is possible to identify three tendencies—unilateralism, neo-internationalism, and U.S. leadership—that require sorting out if the United States is to be effective in the world.

Unilateralism

Unilateralism is an approach to U.S. involvement in the world that minimizes and wherever possible excludes the participation of other governments and organizations. Those of this tendency are uncomfortable with the compromises necessary for the smooth functioning of alliances and opposed to any transfer of sovereign authority to international organizations.

Unilateralism maximizes freedom of decision-making and implementation. It makes possible rapid decisions, improves the chances for secrecy, and eliminates problems of military interoperability with others. Unilateralism can be the best option for acting when narrow interests are at stake and where the involvement of others is not necessary logistically.

There are, however, considerable problems with the unilateral approach. It reinforces a mode of activism that can easily be emulated and abused by others, leading to spheres of influence, a weakening of alliances, and an undermining of international order. It can also lead to conflict in situations where more than one party is tempted to act. Just as important, unilateralism tends to be more popular in principle

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than in reality. It is costly in terms of both blood and treasure, a reality unlikely to appeal to the Congress and the American people. Few operations abroad can be conducted without at least some form of external assistance—be it intelligence, economic, military, or diplomatic support. In other areas, such as cooperation on global environmental problems, sanctions, or supplier clubs meant to stem arms proliferation, unilateralism is simply impractical and ineffective.

Neo-internationalism

Neo-internationalism, or "assertive multilateralism" in the words of Madeleine Albright, the Clinton administration's permanent representative to the United Nations, describes a foreign policy that seeks to build institutions that are more than the sum of their constituent parts. It reflects a desire that the United States remain involved in the world but at a substantially reduced cost. It also reflects a sense that the potential for international cooperation is great and that the United States can and should work with and through formal alliances and international organizations in almost all instances. Adherents favor a strong United Nations that does not simply lend its authority (and, in their eyes, legitimacy) to interventions but one that would organize or even mount them with its own resources. They also endorse the idea that other organizations could enjoy supranational powers in the legal and economic realms.

The advantage of such internationalism is that it puts into place machinery for coping with a wide range of global problems, from classic aggression to failed states. It thus eases the burdens on the United States while erecting a constraint against unwanted unilateralism by others. The drawbacks stem from the realities that sovereignty and nationalism remain powerful forces, and the United States has good reason not to want to give others—be they states or organizations—a de facto veto over its proposed foreign policy. Moreover, it would be an enormous task to create the institutional capacities—they do not now exist in the security realm—to perform many necessary jobs. Indeed, given the proliferation of weaponry and conflicts and other forms of instability, the United Nations is unlikely to be able to handle challenges beyond keeping peace where it already exists.

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U.S. Leadership

This last approach (for which, alas, no "ism" applies) most resembles that of the Cold War era. It would have the United States acting as the head of formal alliances and, increasingly, informal coalitions to protect a range of interests from countering classical aggression to stemming destabilizing developments within states.

The advantage of U.S. leadership is that it offers a promise of considerable influence (although not necessarily decisive authority) without requiring that the United States bear the entire financial and human burden of action. The leadership approach also brings with it the potential to build consensus and a sense of legitimacy that encourages support for U.S. principles and actions and that discourages opposition.

The problems with the leadership approach stem from the fact that alliances can be constraining. Leadership is not to be confused with unilateralism. A commitment to lead brings with it a readiness to compromise in order to retain the support and involvement of others. Moreover, the resource requirements of leadership are still considerable. American leadership without meaningful American participation risks becoming impotent—but participation may be hard to sustain given the lack of congressional and public support for many international commitments.

CLINTON'S ZIGZAG

THE CLINTON administration, in its words and deeds, has at one or another (and on occasion the same) time reflected the full range of both means and ends. This may come as little surprise, given inevitable divisions and differences stemming from personal and institutional rivalries. On some issues, things worked out fairly well; on others, not. But even if the particular issue at hand appears to have been dealt with satisfactorily, ad hocracy has its cost—in public confusion and alienation, in the uncertainty of allies and adversaries, and in the resulting failure to place political and economic resources behind a sustainable long-term approach to protecting U.S. interests. Public statements by administration officials about the purposes of U.S. foreign policy have been inconsistent or simply ambiguous.

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

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What emerges, then, is an administration that embraces large elements of minimalism, Wilsonianism, and economism alongside doses of realism and humanitarianism.

Even more pronounced has been the inconsistency over the means of policy. Neo-internationalism or assertive multilateralism has been one recurring theme. Early on, senior officials emphasized the importance of working through and with the United Nations. Yet within 18 months this impulse had lost favor, largely on account of difficulties encountered in Somalia. The new coolness was reflected in the administration's May 1994 policy document on reforming multilateral peace operations, which listed no fewer than 17 conditions that needed to be met before the United States would commit American forces to a U.N.-sponsored operation likely to see combat.

Nevertheless, attraction to this approach never disappeared. The United States has been reluctant to break with the United Nations over Bosnia, despite the fact that U.N. participation blunts the potential effectiveness of compelling threats or punitive strikes. The United States thought it necessary to gain a Security Council resolution before invading Haiti, and sought another resolution at the end of the October 1994 crisis with Iraq—a decision that constrained its ability to impose explicit conditions on Iraqi forces in the crisis' aftermath.

Unilateralism appeared on two fronts: in the trade area, where the administration was quick to threaten sanctions against Japan and others (including China, Indonesia, India, and France) in disputes over market access, and in the invasion of Haiti, which was largely an American-only enterprise, despite the U.N. blessing and the token participation of others.

Examples of U.S. leadership were somewhat more common: in the effort on behalf of NAFTA, in the conduct of diplomacy affecting the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and North Korea, in the decision to send forces to Kuwait in October 1994, and in persuading the NATO allies to support the administration's policy (the Partnership for Peace) toward the former Soviet Union and other former Warsaw Pact members.

Sometimes, tensions about ends, means, or both emerged in specific issues. China policy was one, in which an initial bias toward promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to

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export to China and engage it in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside. (That refusing economic benefits might not have been the best way to promote desired political reform is another matter.) Trade is another issue where ends and means have been confused. The realist commitment to liberal trade, embodied in both the NAFTA and GATT accords, had to compete with the more nationalist demands for specified access to foreign markets or denial of access to our own. Closely tied to this debate over ends was another over means, between the more multilateral bias of some and the more unilateralist instinct of others.

Somalia is an instance where the inherited policy of humanitarianism evolved into something more ambitious: nation-building, an extreme form of Wilsonianism. When casualties mounted, the mission there was rolled back quickly—a reflex that exposed the minimalist roots of the administration. Bosnia deserves mention in this regard. During the 1992 presidential election campaign, Bill Clinton was strongly critical of the Bush administration for its relative inaction in the face of Serbian aggression. Once in office, his administration spoke more forcefully but did not act much differently. It was unwilling to forcibly press the allies on behalf of its preferred options, apparently fearing that involvement in Bosnia would prove costly and distracting.

There is a difference between basing U.S. policy upon consensus and building consensus around U.S. policy.

In Rwanda, the humanitarian impulse to do something lost out to caution born of minimalism and a desire to avoid expensive overseas entanglements. The result was the emergence of a gap between what the French were willing to do—create a safe haven within the country—and the U.S. relief effort mounted outside Rwanda for refugees. As for Haiti, policy changed course several times in rapid order. But the administration did undertake an ambitious foreign intervention despite the relative absence of domestic support and interests that were anything more than moderately important. As already noted, it was an essentially unilateral undertaking on behalf of goals that were largely Wilsonian—i.e., to restore a constitutionally elected (if not quite democratic) government to power and to protect people being abused. One

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has to be wary of making too much of this example, however, as domestic politics—the need to do something to stem immigration, satisfy a small but powerful congressional constituency, and buttress the sagging credibility of the president—dominated decision-making.

The temptation exists for most observers to look at these and other examples of Clinton administration foreign policy and voice approval in some areas—say, support for Russian reform, liberal trade, and management of the Middle East peace process—be critical in others (Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda), and suspend judgment in still others (North Korea, Haiti), where it is too soon to know what will become of U.S. initiatives. The problem with this sort of criticism, though, is that it suffers from the same particularism as the administration and has nothing to teach other than how policy might be crafted differently in the matter at hand.

What is more valuable is to look at the sum of foreign policy and not individual parts. What emerges is a pattern of competing ends and, above all, reduced means: a smaller and less ready U.S. military, strained alliances with both Western Europe and Japan, a still weak and underfunded United Nations, and little public or congressional readiness to support costly military interventions should, say, the agreement with North Korea unravel, the occupation of Haiti turn violent, the Bosnian crisis expand to the rest of the Balkans, Cuba explode, or a new Rwanda-like nightmare materialize.

THE CASE FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP

WHAT CAN BE done to forge a more coherent American foreign policy? The ideal is a policy of augmented realism—"realism plus," if you will. America's principal focus should be on threats to interstate order—classic aggression, imbalances of power, acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, protectionism, and state support for terrorism—which pose the greatest danger to the full range of U.S. interests and where it is possible to design and implement policies that address those challenges. Such an approach calls for a continued orientation of U.S. diplomatic and defense efforts toward the Persian Gulf, northeast Asia, and Europe.

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But traditional realism alone is too narrow. In particular, promoting market reforms makes sense not only economically (to expand trade) but also politically (to foster pluralism) and strategically (to foster moderation). Similarly, promoting democracy or human rights ought not be overlooked. Nor should acting to protect people who cannot protect themselves. In times of crisis, however, support for humanitarian and Wilsonian interests must depend on the severity of the problem, the simultaneous existence of overriding strategic interests, and America's ability to do something constructive at an affordable price. In some situations, establishing humanitarian zones or safe havens offers a viable alternative to standing aloof or becoming a full-fledged participant. But any proposed military intervention would have to pass four tests: that it be worth doing, that it be doable, that likely benefits exceed likely costs, and that the ratio of benefits to costs be better than that provided by another policy.

As regards means, the preferred mode is U.S. leadership. This approach offers the best chance to assert influence, retain flexibility, and keep costs manageable. It can often best be accomplished using informal coalitions of countries able and willing to cooperate for a particular task. Such coalitions can be formed for military purposes, such as Desert Storm; to stem proliferation, as many supplier clubs seek to do; or for trade, as regional and even global groupings suggest. More formal alliances, namely NATO, should be preserved (and reserved) for core missions. What defines this approach to the world is that the United States pushes hard for its priorities, works to bring others around to them and retains national control over critical matters. Although leadership requires followers to succeed, it is no less true that the United States is entitled to promote its interests and to conduct a foreign policy that reflects its unique strengths. In today's deregulated world, Washington is first among unequals and should act accordingly.

The two alternatives to the U.S. leadership approach are flawed, although one more than the other. Unilateralism can be valuable in special circumstances—for example, hostage rescues, responding to terrorist attacks, small interventions—but it cannot succeed in the many areas where international cooperation is essential. An à la carte approach to alliances and other international arrangements—the sort

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of behavior manifested by the United States in its November 1994 decision to cease participating in the enforcement of the Bosnian arms embargo or in unilateral retaliation, i.e., protection, in response to trade disputes—will soon result in the demise of these arrangements. Meanwhile, unilateralism in the military sphere is too expensive and impractical in most instances to be sustained; as a result, before long it would come to embrace minimalist goals simply because anything more ambitious would prove beyond our capacity.

The other alternative to U.S. leadership, neo-internationalism or assertive multilateralism, is preferable to unilateralism in that it at least offers a potential means of promoting international order. Indeed, the real choice facing the United States is not between unilateralism and multilateralism but between two versions of the latter: the U.S. leadership approach and neo-internationalism. What distinguishes them are matters of substance and style. Neo-internationalism places far more emphasis on harnessing U.S. activism to formal institutions, especially the United Nations and standing regional alliances. U.S. leadership, by contrast, is based more on informal coalitions and arrangements that bring the United States together with other like-minded parties. It is thus more likely to get things done. Some will argue this lacks legitimacy, but in the final analysis, legitimacy must reside in the policy and derive from the ends and means of the action, not from some international organization.

Second, neo-internationalism, despite its description by some, is inevitably less than assertive. It reflects a greater willingness to allow others to influence policy, which often translates into lowest-common-denominator diplomacy. Emblematic were the U.S. failure to push its European allies to adopt a more robust posture toward the Bosnian crisis in spring 1993 and the embrace of Europe's capitulation to Bosnian Serb aggression in November 1994. There is a fundamental difference between basing U.S. foreign policy upon consensus and building consensus around U.S. policy preferences. Key to being able to do the latter, however, stems from possessing a willingness to act and from having viable alternatives to acting through and with the formal organization in question.

Those who seek expanded internationalism should not underesti-

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mate what it will take to bring it about. Devolving responsibility for order onto international institutions will only be a real alternative if the United States makes it a principal foreign policy objective and devotes the necessary political, economic, and military resources to make it happen. In the first instance, effective neo-internationalism is less an alternative to U.S. leadership than its consequence. The greatest danger comes if the United States refuses to do what is necessary to lead but proves unwilling to make neo-internationalism viable. The result would be drift. It would manifest itself as a mixture of unilateralism and minimalism, in which we are unable or unwilling to do most things except for the few enterprises small enough to be done alone.

But no choice of ends and means will count for much if the United States is not able and willing to act in the world—and do so consistently and reliably. The United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's only superpower. But it will not remain one for long unless it harnesses its power to purpose. What is needed is not a new doctrine to take the place of containment, but a leadership dedicated to forging a new consensus around an augmented realism and what we as a nation will do to achieve it. This will require sustained presidential involvement—in making the case for liberal trade and necessary uses of force to the public, in approaching the Congress for adequate resources to support defense and aid programs, in cultivating political and military relations with key allies. The Republican triumph in the recent elections will make this more difficult for a Democratic president, but the president still enjoys important advantages in the conduct of foreign policy. The question is whether these advantages will be exploited. One hopes that they will, for U.S. leadership without presidential leadership is all but impossible.

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The View from France

America's Unyielding Policy toward Iraq

Eric Rouleau

THE FRENCH are undoubtedly not alone among Europeans in their difficulty grasping American policy in the Middle East. Although clear in its objectives—at least those publicly defined—it invariably raises questions and sometimes suspicions. Part of the problem comes from cultural differences. The French, without necessarily being cynical, tend to be skeptical of the moralism that America traditionally attaches to its policies. General Charles de Gaulle raised no eyebrows in France when he declared, as a self-evident truth, that the primary purpose of the state, which he characterized as a "cold monster," was to defend the nation's interests. Nor did anyone take offense when he set down the rule—still observed—that France recognizes only states, and that the regime governing a state is not its concern. (One might note in passing that observance of this principle has spared France not only the diplomatic complications accompanying changes in regimes but, paradoxically, accusations of hypocrisy and double standards.)

The notion that there are rogue states, then, has no equivalent in the French political vocabulary and continues to be a source of puz-

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zlement. In European eyes, Washington's criteria for categorizing good and bad states would, if applied rigorously, significantly lengthen the list of the latter. Strangely, the guilty parties are almost all relatively small Middle East countries. Nor are these states, accused of similar human rights violations and threats to international security, treated similarly. Syria, to cite the most recent case, was honored with a visit from the president of the United States even as it continues to grace the list of "terrorist states," harbors organizations that subvert friendly countries such as Israel and Turkey, and constitutes a dominant and contested presence in a neighboring country.

The logic of the "dual containment" policy, however elegantly articulated by Anthony Lake of the National Security Council in the March/April 1994 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (which also carried a spirited refutation by F. Gregory Gause III), seems irrational. "Dual containment," Lake writes, "does not mean duplicate containment. The basic purpose is to counter the hostility of both Baghdad and Teheran, but the challenges posed by the two regimes are distinct and therefore require tailored approaches."

In a September 1994 speech, CIA director James Woolsey declared: "The record since [the Islamic revolution in] 1979 of Iranian behavior—to its own people and abroad—is appalling. At home, repression, violence, and terror. Abroad, efforts to undermine the states in the Persian Gulf, to derail the peace process, and to support Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations operating today from Nigeria to Tajikistan. Indeed, Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism." Woolsey continues: "Iran's most important client, [the] Lebanese Hezbollah, has killed more Americans than any other terrorist group and receives support, training, and arms from Teheran. . . Hezbollah weapons have been discovered not only in the Middle East but in Europe and Africa as well." Besides terrorism, Woolsey accuses Iran of trying to build weapons of mass destruction, manufacturing and stockpiling chemical weapons, and trying to acquire pre-fabricated nuclear weapons as well as the materials and technology to produce such weapons. Meanwhile, the CIA director added, the regime "intimidates or threatens its neighbors in the Gulf."

In light of such an overwhelming inventory, Secretary of State

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Warren Christopher's complaints about the international community's indulgence of Teheran would appear justified, as would the American attempt to persuade Japan and the European powers to reduce trade with Iran. More difficult to reconcile is the fact that the United States itself is one of Iran's three principal trade partners, exporting (directly or indirectly) more than a billion dollars worth of goods to that nation in 1993; moreover, U.S. oil companies purchased and marketed a third of Iranian oil production. The United States stops short of selling arms and high-technology products to Teheran, urges Russia to follow its example, and tries to block international loans and financing for Iran. Yet these measures of containment, although modest compared to the crimes and black designs that the U.S. authorities attribute to the mullahs, are accompanied by a standing offer of reconciliation. Thus Lake wrote in this journal: "Nevertheless, the Clinton administration does not oppose Islamic government, nor does it seek the regime's overthrow. Indeed, we remain ready for an authoritative dialogue in which we will raise aspects of Iranian behavior that cause us so much concern."

ABANDON HOPE, IRAQ

IF IRAN is consigned to purgatory, with some hope held out for redemption, Iraq has been irrevocably damned. The military and civilian leaders of Baghdad certainly must bear full responsibility for the savage destruction of Kuwait and the atrocities committed there. But the Iraqi people, who were not consulted about the invasion, have paid the price for their government's madness. Their latest descent into hell began with Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Iraqis understood the legitimacy of a military action to drive their army from Kuwait, but they have had difficulty comprehending the Allied rationale for using air power to systematically destroy or cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry: electric power stations (92 percent of installed capacity destroyed), refineries (80 percent of production capacity), petrochemical complexes, telecommunications centers (including 135 telephone networks), bridges (more than 100), roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives and boxcars full of goods, radio and

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television broadcasting stations, cement plants, and factories producing aluminum, textiles, electric cables, and medical supplies. The losses were estimated by the Arab Monetary Fund to be $190 billion.

If it is true, as Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told me, that then Secretary of State James Baker warned him during their stormy encounter in Geneva on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, "We will bomb Iraq back to the preindustrial age," Baker was as good as his word. But the United States may not have fully anticipated the scope of the economic consequences and suffering the war wrought. It was by all accounts appalling, at least in the months until repairs and reconstruction were finished. To take one example, the paralysis of electric power plants deprived Iraqis of drinking water, interrupted agricultural irrigation through pumping stations, and clogged the sewage system. Garbage and debris accumulated, rats proliferated, and epidemics spread. Hospitals without generators were unable to perform surgery.

The Iraqi people have paid the price for their government's madness.

Iraqi officials refer, with some bravado, to the "miracle" of the rehabilitation. Despite the mass emigration of foreign technicians and advisers and the shortages of raw materials, spare parts, and foreign currency, repairs were made in an astonishingly short time. Electric power stations were working in less than a year, most of the refineries within three months. It should be noted that the repairs are a bit chancy; they have been cobbled together with odds and ends or materials cannibalized from elsewhere. And Iraq has returned to a preindustrial era: its GDP is now lower than it was in 1962, when its population, now over 18 million, was scarcely 7 million.

The collapse of Iraq's economy accelerated with the imposition of U.N. sanctions. Through some 30 U.N. resolutions and numerous other declarations and rulings, Iraq was put in a straitjacket: a multifaceted embargo, an air and naval blockade, two "no-fly" zones inside the country to protect (rather late, admittedly) the Kurds and Shiites after Iraqi forces put down their respective uprisings in March 1991, and a system of permanent surveillance to prevent attempts at nonconventional rearmament. This is to say nothing of the obligation to pay tens of billions of dollars in war reparations. Such draconian

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measures—and there are others—have no precedent in the post-World War II era, even though Iraq is not the only country to have been guilty of grave crimes. By their scope, rigorous implementation, and devastating effects on the economy and Iraqis' living and health standards and social fabric, the sanctions run the risk—despite Western intentions to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity—of undermining the Iraqi state and, consequently, other shaky states in the region.

THE RED LIST

FOR VISITORS who knew Iraq in happier times, it is astonishing to realize that it is possible to die of hunger in one of the world's richest countries, on land covering the largest oil reserves in the world, after those of Saudi Arabia. Theoretically, the Security Council has authorized the unlimited import of food and medical products, the so-called "humanitarian goods." But that has been nullified by the ban on all Iraqi exports, including oil. Export revenues are indispensable to purchasing these goods. Another paradox: Iraqi agriculture, thriving until recently, is collapsing due to shortages in fertilizer, pesticides, seed, and spare parts for agricultural machinery and transport trucks—all articles banned for import by the Security Council's Sanctions Committee. For most Iraqis, who cannot afford exorbitant black market prices, fruits and vegetables are entirely out of reach.

The Sanctions Committee's decisions are not subject to appeal, and it does not have to justify them. Each of the committee's 15 members (representing the countries of the Security Council) can veto import requests. Any one of them can thus reject an import request by Iraq or one of its potential suppliers, even if the 14 other delegates disagree. The American delegate raises objections most often.

The committee has banned more than 300 items using criteria whose logic is not always apparent. Some of the most inexplicable of the proscribed articles on the "red list," which continues to grow, are electric light bulbs, socks, wristwatches, ovens, spare parts for vehicles (including car batteries and tires), sewing machines and needles, mirrors, diskettes for laptop computers, nails, a wide range of textiles, grain mills, and refrigerators.

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These bans have had unexpected consequences. Schools, for example, cannot function normally because of the scarcity of paper, textbooks, maintenance supplies, and pencils (the lead apparently has dangerous military uses). According to U.N. estimates, about one out of every five pupils has dropped out of school. Hospital patients now have minor surgery performed without an anesthetic, which is on the red list because its nitrate content has "military value." Seriously ill patients cannot be flown abroad for treatment since all flights have been suspended by the Sanctions Committee to ensure better enforcement of the embargo. The reasons behind other prohibitions—for example, spare parts for x-ray machines and scientific quarterlies—are even less obvious.

Before the imposition of the oil embargo in August 1990, Iraq imported food and medical products worth $3-4 billion a year. The revenue available today for those types of imports, including those arriving as contraband from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran, does not exceed a billion dollars. To economize, in 1993 the government cut food rations, which had been distributed almost free of charge. According to UNICEF, the calorie deficit among Iraqis is now putting at risk some 3.5 million persons, including 1.58 million children under the age of 15 and 230,000 pregnant or nursing women. Many children, it is believed, will be born mentally handicapped; the infant mortality rate, which has doubled in three years, will continue to rise.

One's natural indignation at the fact that Iraq's president and his entourage are entirely shielded from the embargo's devastating impact—special shops for high officials carry a wide variety of products and luxury goods unavailable elsewhere at heavily subsidized prices—should in no way lessen the responsibility of the civilized world for reducing the Iraqi people's hardships. That much can be done without forsaking the minimal goal of checking Saddam Hussein's ambitions.

SQUEEZING THE BAGHDAD BOURGEOISIE

THE TWO sources of hard currency that could have enabled Iraq to meet urgent needs have been removed, one on the initiative of the United States, the other by a decision of Saddam Hussein. In September 1992 Washington persuaded the Security Council to freeze

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Iraqi bank accounts abroad, which for months had made possible the purchase of humanitarian goods. This measure, which put hundreds of millions of Iraqi dollars out of reach, was in a sense the Security Council's response to Saddam Hussein's refusal to take advantage of the sole exception to the blanket prohibition on exports. Security Council Resolutions 706 and 712 of August and September 1991 would have allowed Iraq to export $1.6 billion worth of oil (a small fraction of its pre-embargo sales), provided the United Nations strictly controlled the purchase, transport, and distribution of the humanitarian goods bought with the resulting revenues. Baghdad still refuses to abide by these resolutions on the grounds that they infringe on the sovereignty and dignity of Iraq—a cruel absurdity when one considers that Iraq is already under a virtual U.N. trusteeship.

The "red list" of banned imports includes socks, wristwatches, pencils, and light bulbs.

The slow asphyxiation of the economy since the Persian Gulf War has brought about the collapse of the dinar and a cumulative inflation rate estimated at 5,000 percent over four years. Salaries, meanwhile, have remained virtually frozen. An entire month's salary of a midlevel functionary, for example, is needed to buy a kilo of meat, two months' for a pair of shoes. The middle class, created by Iraq's industrialization and welfare state, is disappearing. As a consequence, a number of improvised markets have sprung up on Baghdad sidewalks where a pauperized middle class—teachers, office workers, members of elite professions—comes to sell personal belongings, heirloom jewelry and art, kitchen utensils, valuable carpets, silver services, and television sets. Honesty has often given way to the instinct for self-preservation. Government corruption is almost institutionalized from top to bottom; crime has never been so widespread. Thefts, burglaries, and armed holdups are multiplying, while cooperation between criminals and police is reportedly not exceptional. Some businessmen, traffickers, and speculators, dubbed "profiteers of the embargo," have been growing rich in full view of the authorities. So-called Islamic measures taken by the government—the amputation of thieves' hands, the banning of alcohol in public places, the construction of mosques, among others—have not reduced crime or halted the decomposition of society.

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WORD OF HONOR

In November 1993, two years after Resolutions 706 and 712, Saddam Hussein decided in desperation to comply fully with the conditions set by the Security Council to lift the embargo on oil exports. It had already applied Resolution 687, which entrusted to the U.N. the mission to "destroy, remove or neutralize" the centers of nonconventional arms—chemical, biological, and eventually nuclear—as well as ballistic missiles with a range above 150 kilometers. The provisions of Resolution 715, which called for the installation of a permanent surveillance and control system to prevent any attempt at rearming, had not been met. A commission headed by the Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus recognized that the Iraqis had cooperated fully, making available all facilities to help install, to his full satisfaction, 187 observation sites. If the Security Council were to respect the commitment it had clearly made, the oil embargo would have been lifted immediately or, at most, after a probational period set by the Security Council.

Then the United States, backed by the United Kingdom, decided to "change the rules," as a *New York Times* editorial of August 2, 1994, put it. The Clinton administration decided that sanctions would remain in place as long as Iraq did not implement all the U.N. resolutions, particularly those concerning respect for human rights and recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and borders. These new demands, however justifiable, did not appear in the sole U.N. text referring explicitly to the lifting of the oil embargo. Resolution 688, concerning human rights, and Resolution 833, concerning Kuwait's borders, make no mention of the oil embargo. Clearly, the United States deeply distrusts Saddam Hussein—who doesn't?—and is looking for ways to avoid implementing those provisions of the U.N. resolutions that would lift the embargo. But, if only in the interest of U.S. credibility, it would be more productive to respect the U.N. resolutions literally, with the proviso that the embargo and other sanctions would be restored if Iraq did not comply with further international obligations.

In November 1994, under pressure from Russia and France, Iraq recognized the sovereignty and frontiers of Kuwait. As expected, the

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measure, conceived as a political concession to the United States, was not judged sufficient by Washington. The prevailing sense in Paris was that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to change the mind of the Clinton administration, whose determination to follow its own policy had been clear in recent months, particularly since Iraq's military moves in October turned out to be futile (although extremely costly for the Persian Gulf) saber rattling. Washington, which had wanted a stronger Security Council resolution on Iraqi troop presence in the Kuwaiti border zone, had to compromise on a vaguer and less threatening resolution in order to get it passed. The next day, both the Clinton administration and the British government officially warned Baghdad that they would resort to force if Iraqi troops crossed the 32nd parallel. This unilateral step, taken without consulting the Security Council, is a good illustration of Washington's determination to press ahead, if necessary, against the will of the international community. U.S. Ambassador Madeleine Albright declared bluntly: "We recognize this area [the Persian Gulf] as vital to U.S. national interests, and we will behave with others multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must."

Clearly, the United States is looking for ways to avoid lifting the embargo.

This declaration leaves a number of questions unanswered. What are the "vital interests" that the United States must defend, come what may? Are they different from those of the other great democracies? Should not each of these states have the right to interpret and apply an international decision as it sees fit? In these circumstances, how can the cohesion and the credibility of the United Nations and the Security Council be preserved? These questions have not been publicly raised, but they belong at the heart of the debate on the new world order.

Already, differences within the Security Council have given rise to exchanges of a less than lofty level. A French minister suggested that the Clinton administration's unremitting hostility to Iraq was due to electoral factors, while American officials riposted that France's advocacy of a progressive lifting of the oil embargo could be explained in "mercantile" terms. Leaving aside the question of whether it is dishonorable for democracies to be concerned either with catering to

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public opinion or defending economic interests, this dispute was remarkable because it shifted the debate away from the pros and cons of maintaining the embargo indefinitely.

HE ISN'T FADING AWAY

TO JUSTIFY their sanctions policy, the Bush and Clinton administrations often made it understood—implicitly or explicitly—that their objective was to help overthrow Saddam Hussein. Western opinion, especially in the United States, rallied to this hard-line strategy without realizing how unrealistic it was: never in contemporary history have sanctions brought about the fall of a regime, however weak. On the contrary, experience has shown that sanctions often lead to the opposite result.

Iraq has not been the exception that proves the rule. It is widely agreed, even among the Iraqi opposition, that Saddam Hussein's regime is more secure today than it was four years ago. Successive purges within the armed forces and a tightened grip on the security services have led to the uncovering of a number of plots, real or imaginary. Reliable sources in Baghdad now maintain that the Iraqi people, absorbed by the daily struggle to survive the embargo, have neither the desire nor the energy to rise up against their government, which they increasingly perceive as a victim of a superpower's agenda.

Many Arabs and Iraqis, including members of the opposition, believe that the United States never intended to get rid of Saddam Hussein until a suitable alternative had been found. People in the region either are not aware of or give little credence to analyses set forth in postwar books and monographs alleging that Bush was misinformed about the damage inflicted on the Republican Guard, the elite units serving as Saddam Hussein's Praetorian Guard, that Bush was worried about going beyond the U.N. mandate, and so on. Even if these allegations could be proved beyond a doubt, the skeptics argue, the fact is that the United States and its allies remained passive throughout March 1991 as the Republican Guards savagely put down the uprisings of the Shiites in the south and the Kurds in the north. Protective measures by the United Nations were taken long

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after Saddam's bloody repression had crushed the dissidents in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces.

Illustrative of the state of mind of the Iraqi opposition, *Dialogue*, a London-based quarterly published by the "Public Affairs Committee for Shiah Muslims" of the Al-Khoei Foundation, recently carried an editorial which read in part:

> All measures taken by the U.S. against Iraq so far are exclusively designed to contain Iraq's threat to the region but not to free the Iraqi people from the horrors of Saddam Hussein. Despite the no-fly zone, the drying of the marshes in southern Iraq (intended to crush the Shiah dissident population) was closely filmed by U.S. planes for more than a year without any attempt to halt it . . . the old misconception has prevailed yet again amongst U.S. policy makers: a weak Saddam is a better choice than a free Iraq . . . the U.S. failed [*sic*] the appeal to help by top Iraqi officers who planned to topple him in July 1993; it dampened initiatives to hold Saddam as a war criminal following the gulf war, and hence, on all counts, the U.S. chose not to finish the job.

Like most Iraqi opposition groups, this influential Shiite foundation has concluded that it is unjust to punish an innocent population for the crimes of a dictator over whom they have no control. On this basis, *Dialogue* advances two arguments for an immediate lifting of the sanctions: "Saddam Hussein has been the Number One violator of human rights in Iraq, but sanctions are in fact now causing more deaths and suffering than the regime itself . . . if the U.S. cannot or will not help the Iraqis to remove Saddam Hussein, then it must not prolong their suffering and damage their country in the 'indefinite sanctions alone' policy."

Al-Khoei also fears that the sanctions might be maintained even after an eventual change of regime to perpetuate American control over Iraq—despite the fact that the opposition has largely been well disposed toward the United States. Martin Indyk, then President Clinton's special assistant for the Near East and South Asia, undoubtedly contributed to this suspicion when he declared in a May 1993 speech: "We seek full compliance for Security Council resolutions for all Iraqi regimes. We will not be satisfied with Saddam's overthrow before we agree to lift sanctions. Rather, we will want to be satisfied that any successor government complies fully with all U.N. resolutions."

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BAD BLOOD

CONTRARY TO official declarations, American policy in the Persian Gulf is increasing malaise among America's allies. The leaders of the Gulf monarchies, except for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, frequently share misgivings with European friends and sometimes with American diplomats regarding what they see as Iran's growing strength at the expense of Iraq, its traditional counterweight. The United States' direct involvement in the defense of their security, at the slightest alarm, embarrasses them and costs them dearly, especially since they also invest heavily in arms purchases of dubious usefulness. For these reasons, they would much prefer to return to the traditional policy of balance between the two regional powers, a policy whose effectiveness was clear for decades.

Turkey, meanwhile, feels betrayed by its American ally. The embargo has cost Turkey between $10 billion and $20 billion and continues to cause serious losses in a difficult economic and financial situation. The de facto secession of Iraqi Kurdistan—supported by the United States to the tune of a billion dollars a year—constitutes a potential threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey at a time when it is engaged in an implacable war against its own Kurdish separatists. While trying to convince Washington to soften the sanctions, the Turks are strongly tempted to go it alone to defend their vital interests. The European countries—foremost France—together with Russia are resisting this temptation even while trying to persuade the United States to cooperate with them and formulate a more coherent and less risky policy for the stability of the Gulf countries.

A MORE REASONABLE POLICY

THE DIVERGENCE between the Europeans and the Americans has far more to do with the means of solving the problem than with the core of the problem itself. The West should move beyond the immobility created by a policy based exclusively on sanctions to the dynamism of a multifaceted diplomatic action aimed at reaching goals. This strategy would be more in line with that applied by the Clinton

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administration to other states whose behavior it would like to change, such as China or North Korea. A consistent policy based on firmness is often more effective than an exclusive recourse to force or pressure.

Without attempting to suggest a diplomatic program for action, it might be useful to identify a few goals that stand a reasonable chance of being realized. One of these would be the implementation of Resolution 688 on human and minority rights, particularly concerning the Kurds. This resolution is not mandatory, so it could be applied only through negotiation. Baghdad, despite its relative weakness, has expressed readiness to resume the negotiations with Kurdish leaders that were interrupted in 1991 on the advice of Washington. The draft agreement drawn up at the time was undoubtedly unsatisfactory, but it did contain a few positive elements, such as reform of the constitution, and the introduction of a multiparty system and elections. The Kurdish leaders, now in a strong position, could demand guarantees concerning the implementation of a definitive agreement. Representatives of other Iraqi opposition movements could also embark on a normalization process. Baghdad's good faith would then be severely test.

U.S. diplomacy toward Iraq should have the flexibility allowed in Chinese and North Korean relations.

Iraq's integration into the Middle East peace process is an objective that likewise seems worth considering. For all the justifiable skepticism in the West engendered by Baghdad's anti-Israeli rhetoric, not to mention the Scud missiles it fired at the Jewish state during Desert Storm to win Arab support, some Western foreign ministries and certain high Israeli officials are well aware that Iraq for some years has aspired to a role in an eventual Arab-Israeli peace settlement. As far back as 1983, for example, Aziz told then-Secretary of State George Shultz that the Iraqis had no intention of being "more Palestinian than the Palestinians." In 1988, Baghdad did not oppose the decision of the Palestine National Council, the parliament of the PLO, to recognize implicitly Israel's right to exist. That same year, Aziz met secretly on a number of occasions with General Avraham Tamir, director general of Israel's ministry of foreign affairs, who later

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expressed his satisfaction at the Iraqi emissary's open-mindedness. (This meeting, as well as other secret contacts between Israeli and Iraqi representatives over the past few years, have been formally denied by Baghdad.) This summer, when I asked Aziz why his government had not reacted to the peace agreements concluded by Jerusalem with the PLO and Jordan, he replied: "We don't think we have any business getting involved in an affair to which we were not a party. Besides, there is no bilateral conflict between us and Israel; since our Arab brethren have decided to settle their disputes with Israel through negotiation, Iraq no longer considers itself a 'confrontation state'." The minister of information, Hamed Yusef Hamadi, was even more explicit: "Iraq is no longer a belligerent state."

The secret contacts recently established between Israelis and Iraqis, which reportedly caused unhappiness in Washington, indicate that Baghdad is prepared to pay the price for its reintegration into the international community. It would be a mistake not to put its sincerity to the test. It goes without saying, however, that no progress can be made if the Security Council does not at the same time show willingness to soften the sanctions via strict application of the U.N. resolutions. To avoid the drop in crude oil prices feared by Washington, the oil embargo could be lifted gradually to keep pace with world demand (the experts foresee an annual increase of a million barrels a day).

In so complex a situation, nothing is guaranteed. But it would be a pity to renounce the diplomatic means that alone can avoid the worst: a major humanitarian catastrophe for the Iraqi people, and the instability that an ongoing Iraqi crisis cannot fail to create in the region.

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Can Haiti Change?

Sidney W. Mintz

A HISTORICAL CHALLENGE

EVERY NATION IS unique; no two are identical. But Haiti is in a class by itself, not because it is the hemisphere's poorest country or because no one there before President Jean-Bertrand Aristide had ever been elected by popular vote. Poverty and a lack of electoral politics, after all, typify societies spread across a substantial portion of the earth's surface. What makes Haiti unique is that no other nation in world history has ever been created by slaves. Those slaves wrested their weapons from the hands of their masters and then threw the masters out. What Spartacus was crucified for failing to do, the Haitian people did. Haiti's uniqueness inheres in that historical experience, and some features of it still figure in its political present and allow for predictions about its future. Of course background facts do not tell us what to do about Haiti. But not knowing them has led to some plans for Haiti that make relatively little sense of what is possible.

Haiti's current crisis, then, is historical. Even while conceding the very real importance of scanty resources, dilapidated infrastructure, and popular exhaustion, the forces that have helped keep Haiti immobilized (if not immobile) were in place soon after independence. In 1915, when the United States occupied Haiti for the first time, it strengthened those forces. Whether that mistake is repeated is the challenge of the latest American intervention. It is difficult to be anything but pessimistic.

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Haitian stability will depend on fundamental economic change—change in the distribution of power to make economic decisions. That change seems extremely unlikely, not least because it will require time. For the current American intervention to accomplish anything more lasting in Haiti than feeding the hungry, repairing electric generators, and fixing roads will take the kind of extended commitment that a restless American electorate—and a tired Haitian people—may lack.

But looking ahead is difficult; looking back is far easier. What one sees in the past are a number of forgotten relevancies. They have to do with what Haiti once was, and with what its people did about it. So let's put predictions aside for the moment and look back.

GENESIS OF A REVOLUTION

IT IS STRANGE, but true, that Haiti has never been forgiven by the West for refusing to tolerate the social and economic structure European intentions had installed in what was at the time a supremely profitable, seventeenth-century French colony. In 1791, the colony of St. Domingue, ceded to France by Spain in 1697, was the epicenter of a tropical new world. That world had been created by European empires to provide their citizens—especially large new urban laboring populations—with novel foods such as sugar and molasses, and "soft drugs" such as rum, coffee, and tobacco. Novelties in 1700, these were things with which Europe's laboring masses would soon become infatuated. It turned out to be convenient to produce such goods—at enormous profit to bankers, slave traders, plantation entrepreneurs, and the state—by combining factors of production from three different locales. Caribbean land had belonged to American Indians; the labor, most of it African, had belonged to the slaves themselves; the know-how, managerial skill, military power to take and hold colonies, and initial capital all came from Europe.

What the planters, most of them only recently wealthy and powerful, accomplished in the Antilles reverberated powerfully in imperial Europe. During the period 1650-1850, the Antilles became one of the world's key economic areas, a cockpit of international struggle. We are told that just about every critical naval battle during nearly two

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

THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

President Borno in 1922: Haiti's self-styled elite

centuries was fought over Caribbean land. Such passion made good economic sense; the islands, fertilized with the labor, sweat, and blood of slaves, were like gold mines; the gold was agricultural. Not for nothing would Voltaire, commenting on the exchange of Martinique and Guadeloupe for Canada in 1763—imagine, those two tiny islands for Canada!—argue that Canada was, after all, only "a few acres of snow." The Antilles, on the other hand, could produce sugar, together with all those other miraculous healers of torment, such as rum, tobacco, and coffee, that could accompany it.

In the case of French St. Domingue (the western third of the island of Española, today's Haiti), the combination of cheap land, African labor, and European capital was richly productive. More than 864,000 enslaved Africans were imported into the colony by 1791, all but a handful of them after 1697; the entire French fleet was profitably occupied with the St. Domingue trade. Production figures for sugar, molasses, rum, and coffee (as well as indigo and cotton) were astonishing; by the mid-eighteenth century, French St. Domingue had become the zenith of the Atlantic slave system.

But there were odd consequences. Unlike other plantation colonies, St. Domingue developed a distinctive social structure of its own. What

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made it so special was the swiftly emerging class of spirited, vigorous, and clever free people (*gens de couleur*) and their descendants. These people were intermediate in color, status, and power, and socially situated between the *grands blancs* (large planters) on the one hand, and the vast mass of enslaved Africans (their majority African-born) on the other. They were also called "freed people" (*affranchis*), which was inaccurate; many were really the second- or third-generation descendants of freed slaves. The figures for this group are not highly reliable, but they give us some idea of the social order. In 1790, there were supposed to be slightly more than half a million people in St. Domingue, of whom 452,000 were slaves, 40,000 were whites (divided among planters and tradespeople and menials of limited means), while 28,000 were *gens de couleur* or *affranchis*. The poor whites were outstripped socially and financially by the *gens de couleur*, who amply competed with the *grands blancs* in their lifestyle, orientation to French culture, and sophistication.

In Haiti, nothing makes things murkier than misperceptions of the social significance of color.

But where did these in-between people come from, in less than a hundred years? The answer to that question must be sought in the culture, family life, and domestic habits of the French themselves. There is no doubt that the free people, the *gens de couleur*, were mostly the children (and descendants) of the unions of planters with their female slaves. Such offspring were not unusual for the Caribbean. But the children of these unions (in contradistinction to most other cases) were frequently recognized by their fathers, sent to France to be educated, and empowered to inherit. In time, they themselves often became owners of great quantities of land and slaves. It has been claimed that at the outbreak of the revolution in Haiti in 1791, a third of the land and a fourth of the slaves in that unhappy colony belonged to free people of color. Even conservative estimates accord them a fifth of each, land and slaves. These *affranchis* were true creoles, in the older meaning of that word: something of the Old World, born in the New. Neither Europeans nor Africans, they swiftly adjusted as a class to their status as non-European, slave-owning, and power-holding people. Many saw themselves as culturally French.

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Perhaps it was inevitable that, in the second half of the eighteenth century, whites of all ranks in the colony united to find ways to curb the power of free people of color. Indeed, by the time of the French Revolution, a contest for political advantage raged between blancs and *gens de couleur*. But before their struggle ended it became irrelevant—the slaves revolted. We must understand that the *affranchis* were leading no movement for the freedom of persons of African descent—we have no touching pictures of *affranchi* sons in the arms of their African mothers. *Affranchi* interest in civil liberty centered mostly on their own rights in relation to whites; that was the struggle upon which they and the whites were focused.

As of 1791 it no longer mattered; from 1791 until 1804, a seesaw revolutionary war destroyed much of the plantation economy and countryside and, in substantial measure, uprooted the European planter class. The French were driven out; nearly all Europeans went with them. But not all the free people of color; many fought on the side of the revolution. On January 1, 1804, General Jean Jacques Dessalines proclaimed victory. The revolution was triumphant and freedom had come.

VICTORY COSTS

A GREAT DEAL has been written about what was wrong with that freedom. Some of it is even convincing, though it often seems moved mostly by a desire to prove that Haiti always gets what it deserves. But no matter what is said of the Haitian Revolution, it cannot be understood for what it meant to the future, except in the context of the other revolutions of its time. This was, above all, the only revolution of those first three—American, French, and Haitian—that freed the slaves. In view of the sloganeering that has typified the other two revolutions ever since, that simple fact merits reflection.

What the Haitian revolutionaries fought for also deserves thought. Every American schoolchild knows today about taxation without representation, tossing tea into Boston harbor, vowing to choose liberty or death, and the horrors of monarchy. But the freedom the Haitian slaves were after was not of a kind with which either American or French revolutionaries dealt seriously. The Haitian slaves were interested in less

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stirring issues—such as not being someone else's property, not being flogged, not being denied a family or the right to testify in court, not being raped, tortured, murdered, or sold. Yet the Haitian Revolution had no standing (so to speak) in Europe. Most of its leaders could not write well (if at all). Few had any formal education. None could appeal directly to friends, college chums, or political allies in Europe. Accordingly, no members of the European nobility rushed to St. Domingue to stand at the side of its revolutionary leaders, as had Kosciusko, von Steuben, Lafayette, and others, in the North American instance. Those guys simply didn't show up for the Haitian Revolution; figuratively speaking, no European or North American has shown up for it since.

Haiti was a totally unexpected societal achievement, but not even the Haitians really knew it.

It followed that there was a price for winning. Or rather, there were prices. In 1804, a free and independent Haiti was launched in a sea full of the colonies of white European slaveholding states, among them the most powerful nations in the world, for which reason the Haitian people had to be punished. Punishment took the form of substantial indemnities to be paid to France, in exchange for acknowledgment of Haiti's independence. Why the Haitians, who had driven out the French by the sword, should have had to indemnify the French to win their recognition is still absurd; but it was done. Diplomatic and commercial isolation of the new nation was not hermetic—there was, after all, money to be made—but all the slaveholding states were appropriately delicate in their dealings with Haiti. In 1825, 21 years after Haitian independence, Senator Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina whispered that Haiti's freedom could not even be discussed in the United States, so as not to disturb "the peace and safety of a large portion of our union." Recognition by the United States did not come until 1862; the Vatican, ever cautious, did not sign a concordat until 1860. The American Revolution had threatened the crowned heads of Europe; it is easy, then, to imagine what the revolution of half a million enslaved Africans had threatened. The political freedom of like (that is, free and white) persons who had been colonial was repellent enough. That unlike (that is, enslaved and

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black) persons should lay identical claims on the international order was considered intolerable. The second price was the creation of what was for its time a new sort of polity. The remaining people of means in Haiti began to interlace their families connubially with those of the victorious military in order to impose civil order, according to their standards. A grasp of what that polity may have been like is not provided by comparisons with either France or the United States, whose postrevolutionary situations posed different challenges altogether. It was a world all its own.

STANDING STILL

IT WAS IN those early years of Haitian independence that the bourgeoisie (the term is truly inappropriate in its original sense here, since these were people who would never risk money of their own) learned to siphon off every productive effort of the agrarian masses to enhance their personal consumption—and it has always been a consumption that results in zero expansion of domestic production. Credit merchants and moneylenders, import and export commission buyers, storekeepers and processors and tax collectors positioned themselves astride the economy of distribution and exchange, even while the newly free were becoming independent cultivators.

There were efforts at first to garner the labor of the ex-slaves by coercion. The Emperor Christophe had imposed order in the north by reinstalling the plantation system, and for half a dozen years, his regime prospered, but the empire ended in 1820 with his silver bullet. Indeed, the plantation system never really returned to Haiti, despite a U.S. attempt to remake Haiti as a sugar producer during the occupation (1915-34), and yet again (this time for rubber), early in World War II. Haiti's uniqueness in this regard also figures. It is one of the few places in the New World where plantations worked, but where they disappeared while still profitable to people in Europe.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean, freed people were forced back into plantation labor after emancipation by a happy mixture of contrived land scarcity and contract labor immigration, the two jaws of post-emancipation planter power. But these devices couldn't be applied in

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Haiti. With all its faults, it was a free country. It was also an impoverished country. By the time the Haitian Revolution ended, the plantation system lay nearly in ruins; many thousands had died, thousands of others had fled. In the absence of the coerced labor of nearly half a million slaves, Haiti's resources were largely limited to the land itself, and the freely given labor of its people. No other country in modern times has confronted freedom under such discouraging circumstances.

While the United States began its sovereign career with the highest percentage of college graduates of any country in the world, Haiti began its national life with most people illiterate, with nowhere to expand except Spanish Santo Domingo—and indeed they tried that—and with limited natural resources other than land. No one was disposed to immigrate to Haiti. In the United States, on the other hand, land resources seemed utterly inexhaustible, as long as there were Indians to pen up. Expansion into new lands was feasible, and large numbers of newcomers were readily attracted from elsewhere.

Had the plantations been restored in Haiti, they could have produced wealth. But those who would have done the work could not be driven back onto the plantations. In truth, then, Haiti was a totally unexpected societal achievement; but nobody, including the Haitians, really knew it. Lacking coercible labor and any economic class prepared to raise productivity at a risk to itself, Haiti could only stand still. Being Haiti, it stood still in its own way.

Squatting on the land by ex-slaves and government land partition began soon after the revolution, but especially under President Alexandre Pétion (1807-18), who distributed or sold more than 150,000 hectares, much of it to military officers. His successor, President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-43), sought in vain to tie rural labor to large holdings by means of his famous Rural Code; but he also ended up selling off land, beginning around 1825.

Over time, Haitian rural society became typified by what were at first the large farms of ex-officers, the smaller farms of ex-soldiers, and the scattered holdings of thousands of freeholders and squatters. Homesteads (*lakou*) were built around patrilineal, patrilocal stem families (ideally, a man and his wife, their sons, their sons' wives and children), who produced coffee for export, numerous products for the local markets, and

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the lion's share of family subsistence. A religious system that involved ancestor worship in a distinct variant form, vodoun (called "voodoo" by foreigners), tied land, family fate, and the African past together by seasonal ceremonies, ancestral invocations, and propitiatory rituals.

Though violence marked changes in government from nearly the very beginning of sovereignty in 1804 until the U.S. occupation, and 1843 even brought a kind of revolution, the countryside remained relatively stable from the 1830s through the rest of the nineteenth century. Ragtag regional armies would march to seize central power, then repeatedly make their peace with the center. Such struggles were chronic, but they had relatively little effect on the daily life of most Haitians. It was a century when the Haitian people were able to enjoy some prosperity, based on the expansion of small-scale agriculture. Only toward the end of the century did population growth begin to overtake available land, so that the size of average holdings would decline more sharply.

It was in the absence of overwhelming coercion that the Haitian people had created the only truly post-Columbian peasant society in the New World. The land reform that Latin America would later clamor for had been achieved here a century earlier. But the eventual economic fate of the society was grimly predictable because no encouragement to raise productivity—other than regressive taxes—originated with the ruling class. The Napoleonic legacy of equal inheritance would mean smaller average holdings each generation, as long as population increased. The peasant "class" of Haiti was not really a class, but a stratified subsystem of landholders, plus a growing number of the landless. Most labor was carried out on a familial basis, or by means of cooperative groups made up of relatives and neighbors. Little if any farm labor was done for wages, even by the landless, during most of the century. Though there was enough pressure on the land to cause local disturbances, those who were called "peasants" (*habitants*) were, as a whole, politically inactive. Indeed, in their long-standing lack of interest in a national politics, Haiti's peasants remind one of Marx's comment that a peasantry is organized only in the sense that potatoes in a sack are organized. For all intents and purposes, political activity was concentrated in the capital. The Haitian rural masses expected little from their government—and they got less. But they were taxed in

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every way that a city-bound, aristocratic, and authoritarian ruling class could think of, which is still the case today.

WHAT REALLY DIVIDES HAITIANS

PERHAPS NO aspect of Haitian history confuses us more than the physical appearances of its people. Haiti is supposed to be divided by "color," but that is certainly inexact. It may be closer to the truth to say that there is wide situational variability in consciousness of color and that for many people lightness is symbolically important. For North Americans, the issue of color raises special questions of perception. Both North Americans (and in a different manner, Europeans, too) think they can see Haiti better if they keep track of what everybody's "color" is. But the truth is that in Haiti nothing makes things murkier than misperceptions of the social significance of color.

The emergent ruling group in Haiti after the revolution was surely lighter in complexion than the Haitian population's average complexion at the time—that is, lighter than were the foot soldiers of the revolutionary armies. But that group was also probably no lighter on balance than the color of the average population called "black" in the United States—and more likely darker. What "color" people are must be seen as part of a perceptual whole that is a good deal larger, and includes hair type, nose type, lip type, eye color, ear size, and other physical features, such as amount of body and face hair, and body type. But it also includes things that are not "physical" in the same way, such as the appearance of one's siblings and their in-laws, one's wife and her family, and so on. Yet more important, it is not at all certain that "color" figured in that early emergence of a ruling group half so much as did education, military record, and personal connections with the people. It is not that "color" and other physical denotata were irrelevant. But they were not then, nor are they now, so neatly defining that social groups can safely be described in terms of them.

Color aside, in looking at how Haitian social structure works, it is useful to take its historical development into account. The bulk of the Haitian people are rural (though less so now than ever before), agricultural (though agriculture has been declining for at least half a cen-

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tury), and illiterate. Their language is Creole, which is not mutually intelligible with French and, until the last twenty years or so, was rarely written (and never read). Their religion is a form of ancestral cult, though they view themselves as being Catholic (as well, rather than instead); these days, a growing number of people in the towns are Protestants, usually in nonecumenical denominations.

A modest minority—no more than ten percent—speaks and reads some French and has twelve or more years of education, lives in cities, works in professions, service trades, and the government, and attends Catholic (and Protestant) services. Such people differ quite dramatically from those described above. They will probably be somewhat disdainful of vodoun; they may refer condescendingly (or quite venomously) to the poor; and they feign disinterest in questions of cultural origin—that is, what is or might be "African." Often the gap between such people and other Haitians seems absolutely unbridgeable; in certain ways, it is. At the same time, though, Haitian culture is a more clearly definable system, top to bottom, than is American culture. There are no real ethnic divisions in Haiti; everybody understands and speaks Creole; everybody eats the same kind of food; everybody dances the same way (or knows how to). Hence the content of "being Haitian" is widely shared, even if the life and fate of Haitians varies (as it does) from quite rarefied luxury to terrible misery and suffering. Without some attention to such features of Haitian life—making comparisons with the United States is not instructive—there can be no basis upon which to ask questions related to social policy. Some observers have said that Haiti is divided into two castes; that is inaccurate. Haiti is divided by economics, language, education, religion, and ideological awareness.

THE PERCEPTION GAP

NORTH AMERICAN politics with regard to Haiti has always sprung, first of all, from inattention. How could the North Americans have been expected to take seriously a nation that entered the modern world in 1804 populated entirely by—need I write the word out to make the point, or does it come easily to mind? This tiny land, born of a strug-

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gle for liberty that anticipated a comparable struggle in the United States by nearly a century, had nothing the United States wanted (except, perhaps, a harbor or two). Why the United States actually occupied Haiti in 1915 is still debatable. It has never been established whether the Americans arrived in order to protect Chase National Bank assets, to halt mob violence, or to prevent the German community there from extending its influence at a time when war with Germany seemed more and more likely. Whatever the case, we stayed nearly twenty years and accomplished relatively little. Americans eagerly sought opportunities for investment in Haiti (Franklin Roosevelt was particularly zealous), but were profoundly discouraged by the average Haitian's lack of interest in expanding his consumption. The American financial adviser was clear: "The peasants, living lives which to us seem indolent and shiftless, are enviably carefree and contented; but, if they are to be citizens of an independent, self-governing nation, they must acquire, or at least a larger number of them must acquire, a new set of wants."[1] In fact, it is maddening to us, who believe that increasing one's standard of living (measured, of course, by what people buy) is a universal good, to have to confront a people who fail to share that belief.

By creating a modern army, the American occupation changed Haitian politics forever.

As the American occupiers undertook to "develop" Haiti, many peasants were conscripted by force into road-building crews, with the connivance of local politicians, and the effects were terrible. In resisting such oppression—and the Haitians fought back—they suffered thousands of casualties. Corvée labor clearly brought back images of slavery. Yet the Americans were angered and hurt by the apparent unwillingness of the Haitians to accept a North American conception of what was desirable and good.

Numerous anecdotes convey the feeling tone of the occupation; just one will do. When Franklin Roosevelt's friend John McIlhenny (of the Tabasco sauce family) attended a luncheon in honor of Haitian Presi-

[1] Arthur C. Millspaugh, quoted by Hans Schmidt in *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971, p. 158.

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dent Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, he later told Roosevelt he hadn't been able to eat much. He was so impressed, he said, by the Haitian secretary of agriculture who sat opposite him that: "I couldn't help saying to myself that that man would have brought $1,500 at auction in New Orleans in 1860 for stud purposes." This is, after all, only a (thoroughly documented) anecdote; but it speaks to the enormous gap between North American perceptions and Haitian realities. There have been positive evaluations of the U.S. occupation, during which schools, hospitals, roads, and an agricultural school were built, a police force and army trained, and the national budget put right. These accomplishments were real. But some of the most negative achievements were of a human kind. As the occupation identified those persons in the society with whom we thought we could deal—who talked our language, literally or figuratively speaking—it sent a message to ordinary Haitians.[2]

The occupation had the effect of increasing government centralization, and of making it more efficient. By creating a modern army, it changed Haitian politics forever. The armed forces became the one way—other than the priesthood—for poor Haitians to rise within the system. There is no doubt that U.S. measures in the period 1915-34, and the care shown the Haitian military since, have been of crucial importance to the perpetuation of traditional power.

PICK A SIDE

Now we Americans are back; and the situation is as murky as before. That any Haitians at all wanted us in there is a good measure of the desperation that daily and viciously arbitrary thuggery could inspire among poor decent people. But what seems clear is that our estimates of the capacity of the Haitian masses to act always in a manner we would consider fittingly democratic means that we choose to ignore Haiti's history and recent suffering. President Clinton has urged Aristide not to incite class warfare. But it needs to be fully understood that the existing terrible asymmetry of economic power in

[2] Perhaps it is worth remembering that our army then was not only one without Haitians or creole-speakers; it was also an army without black soldiers. Lynching in the United States was still a common occurrence at that time.

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Haiti is just what has kept the vast majority of the Haitian people utterly defenseless for centuries. There is no need to incite class warfare; the present situation is the outcome of 200 years of a war of attrition against the people by a ruling class. U.S. rule early in this century confirmed, sustained, and underwrote that asymmetry. U.S. power now is being called upon to maintain it anew. Under such circumstances, President Aristide is clearly constrained in what he is able to do. Indeed, he may end up doing things rather differently, if he is made to feel that the time he has—apart from the end of his term—is minimal. In certain ways, then, the hard decisions become ours.

Under the best of circumstances, Haiti cannot be changed structurally without some yielding of power by the haves. The rural sector cannot be expected to increase its own productivity without massive, long-term assistance. Using its traditional techniques, the peasantry needs to be educated as well as helped. The nation has become food-importing in recent decades because it systematically plundered its own people. The national infrastructure is in tatters. The origins of these difficulties lie in the past; but not all of them are by any means solely Haiti's fault.

In today's world, even the reconstruction of Haitian society on a peasant basis cannot restore the country. Haiti's rulers have siphoned off surpluses for two centuries without contributing even minimally to the education of the people or the growth of new sources of income. Rulers who profit from stasis are disinclined to risk change. What has passed for change before now in Haiti—extracting blood plasma, making sausage, selling peasants to the Dominican Republic's sugar industry—is a measure of the daring and patriotism of those rulers. Unless there is to be some investment in Haiti's human capital, real change will prove impossible. If it is to be our policy to sustain at all costs the present distribution of economic power in Haiti, hardly anything can be done that could have a long-range beneficial political consequence. In that case it behooves us to make this clear, and to face the international assessment of our policies. What ought not be permitted is to sustain a constellation of forces that will lead inexorably to renewed terror upon our departure, and to call it impartiality.

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Why Russia's Politics Matter

Michael McFaul

THE NIGHTMARE THAT WASN'T

THE RESULTS of Russia's first post-communist election in December 1993 sent a shock wave through the world. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the nationalist demagogue of the Liberal Democratic Party, captured almost a quarter of the popular vote. The pro-reform bloc, Russia's Choice, came away with only 15 percent. Provoked by this dramatic outcome, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin promised a new economic course, declaring that the election marked "the end to market romanticism." In resigning as finance minister, Boris Fyodorov predicted the new course would result in rampant inflation, the return of price controls, and the arrest of privatization, leading to the collapse of the Russian economy by the end of 1994.

A year later, this nightmarish scenario has yet to unfold. Backing away from earlier threats, Chernomyrdin has refrained from reintroducing price controls. Meanwhile, privatization has marched furiously forward, transferring 100,000 enterprises into private hands by the end of 1994. A booming stock market suggests that not all of these privatizations are mere paper transfers. Perhaps most surprisingly, inflation rates remained in the single digits for most of the year. Admittedly, industrial production continues to decrease, gross domestic production is contracting, and serious enterprise restructur-

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ing has just begun. Nonetheless, the performance of the Russian economy in 1994 has exceeded almost everyone's expectations.

What is going on in Russia? How is it that the election of nationalists and communists to the Russian parliament coincided with the beginning of economic stability? Are politics and economics in Russia related at all? Or is this period of stability the calm before the storm?

A REVOLUTION IN MIDSTREAM

THE DISINTEGRATION of the Soviet Union made old theories about that part of the world irrelevant. In the void, neoliberal models of economic reform began to dominate discussions of change in post-communist Russia. Monetarist stabilization measures and structural adjustment programs used in the developing world emerged as the guiding principles for transforming communism into capitalism.

The neoliberal framework, however, is insufficient in two critical respects. First, the word reform does not capture the magnitude of change required to replace the Soviet system with a market economy. Rather than amend or improve the Soviet command economy, Russia must dismantle it and develop a market economy. Economic reform formulas based on preexisting private property and markets offer little guidance for dismantlement or creation.

Second, the economic reform theorists discounted politics. They focused on inflation, deficit spending, and exchange rates and considered political issues a distraction. When compelled to comment on political reform, neoliberals in both Russia and the West simply called for shrinking the Russian state, without addressing what kinds of state and nonstate political institutions might help their economic reforms. The belief that economic reform could proceed without political reform was a costly mistake.

Political analysts trying to counter this focus on economic reform have relied too much on analogies to historical transitions to democracy.[1] Change in Russia is distinct from democratic transitions in southern

[1] This analysis draws heavily from Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

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Europe and Latin America in two critical respects. First, in contrast to the transitions in Spain and Chile, the terms of Russia's transition were not negotiated between outgoing autocrats and incoming democrats. Rather, after intense polarization, the Soviet ancien régime collapsed, leaving the rules of the game ambiguous, uncodified, and subject to constant manipulation. Second, unlike democratic transitions in capitalist economies, Russia's political transformation is taking place simultaneously with economic transformation. Its budding trade unions, civic organizations, and political parties have difficulty articulating what groups and interests they represent. The "transition to democracy" analogy, therefore, captures neither the logic nor the magnitude of the political change required in Russia.

Russia is in the throes of a social revolution: a rare moment in history in which challengers to the ancien régime attempt to transform the polity and the economy abruptly and simultaneously. Russia's current revolution is similar in scale and scope to the French Revolution begun in 1789 and the Russian Revolution in 1917. Only its relative peacefulness distinguishes the current revolution from its predecessors.

Understanding change in Russia today as a peaceful revolution in progress is both useful for analysis and relevant for policy because it captures the magnitude and abruptness of the transformation. For Russia to consolidate a market economy and a political democracy requires the demolition of the Soviet ancien régime and the creation of a completely new political and socioeconomic system. The revolutionary model also highlights the relationship between those changes. Political reform cannot be put on hold while economic reform is carried out, nor can economic change be frozen to allow political reform. Rather, economic changes affect political transformation and political changes shape economic transformation. Missing this point has handicapped both an analysis of Russia and reform.

GAIDAR: NEW ECONOMICS, OLD POLITICS

NEGLECT OF the political aspects of Russia's transformation was most apparent during the first two years after the Soviet collapse. The economic aim was clear—transform the Soviet command economy,

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based on state ownership of the means of production, into a Russian market economy based on private property. Toward that end, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed Yegor Gaidar as deputy prime minister in charge of the economy. Like all good revolutionaries, Gaidar and his economists were guided by an ideological blueprint consisting of three stages of policy initiatives: price liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatization. The program acquired the unfortunate label of "shock therapy."

The plan made sense as a blueprint for economic transformation, but Gaidar's program lacked a political strategy. After all, Yeltsin, Gaidar, and Russia's first post-Soviet government inherited not only a collapsing economy but a collapsing state. Yeltsin did take some important steps toward transforming the Soviet political system immediately after the August 1991 coup, when he banned the Communist Party, subordinated several Soviet institutions to the Russian state, and, most dramatically, in December 1991 dissolved the U.S.S.R. itself. Yeltsin, however, failed to take several other key steps: he did not push for the ratification of a new constitution, he did not call for new elections for either the parliament or local government officials, he failed to create his own political party, and he left in place many Soviet political institutions, including first and foremost the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. Failure to take those steps resulted in the emergence of a hybrid state—an incompatible conglomeration of post-communist institutions grafted onto lingering Soviet-era institutions—that could not execute radical economic reforms.

The greatest achievement of the Gaidar government was price liberalization. When Gaidar abolished price controls in January 1992, almost everyone predicted riots, strikes, and general social unrest. None of those scenarios came to pass. The peaceful transition toward free prices was a monumental step for a state that had controlled prices for over 60 years.

Price liberalization was possible in large part because of the political context. After his brave defiance of the coup plotters in August 1991, Yeltsin's tremendous popularity gave his government unchallenged legitimacy and authority. The Soviet Army and the KGB, which might have challenged him, were paralyzed or in disarray after the

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putsch. Yeltsin's political opponents were dwarfed by pro-Yeltsin movements like Democratic Russia. The Congress of People's Deputies granted Yeltsin the power to rule by decree in November 1991, giving Yeltsin near-authoritarian power. These political conditions made this first step of economic reform possible.

Freeing prices, however, is a relatively straightforward act that requires neither time nor strong governmental administration. Stabilization and privatization are much more complicated, requiring sustained political support and an effective state bureaucracy. Neither existed in Russia in 1992. As expected, the January 1992 price liberalization produced a sharp rise in inflation. In retrospect, however, it is striking how low inflation rates were during those first few months of reform in comparison with later on. Monthly inflation rates steadily declined from 38 percent in February 1992 to 9 percent in August 1992.

Gaidar's strategy for privatization was undermined by politics.

Bad politics, not bad economics, unraveled those initial successes. Tight government expenditures threatened directors and workers of large state enterprises. These groups worked through the Congress of People's Deputies to launch an assault against Gaidar and his reform plan and pressured Yeltsin to add three of their allies to his government. From that moment on, radical reformers no longer controlled government spending. Soon thereafter, government transfers to state enterprises and unpaid debts between enterprises increased dramatically.

Worse, Gaidar's government lost control of monetary policy. Under the 1977 Soviet Constitution, it was unclear which branch of government controlled the bank. Such ambiguity allowed Viktor Gerashchenko, who was appointed head of the Russian Central Bank in the spring of 1992 as part of a compromise with industrialists, to define his own monetary policy. Gerashchenko promptly cleared debts between enterprises and provided cheap credit for state enterprises. Monthly inflation soared to 25 percent by the end of the year.

Gaidar's strategy for privatization was also undermined by politics. The original privatization program drafted by Gaidar and his colleague, Anatolii Chubais, gave insiders—directors and workers—a

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minority stake in their enterprises and then allocated to outsiders the majority of shares in each enterprise through a voucher system. In making outsiders the majority owners, this plan aimed to discipline enterprise directors to pursue profits for shareholders rather than job stability for themselves and their workers.

Gaidar's team had hoped to implement their privatization program by presidential decree. Opposition forces in the Congress countered that such an important act must have legal force. In the end, Yeltsin decided to submit the program for parliamentary approval. Before it became law, over 100 amendments were added, including two new options for privatization that allowed managers, in cooperation with their workers' collectives, to acquire majority ownership in their enterprises.

Not surprisingly, 75 percent of all privatizing enterprises chose those options. As Gaidar candidly admitted in June 1993, "I cannot say that we are satisfied with the scheme adopted by my government, as two-thirds of privatized enterprises are controlled by workers' groups." The combination of inside ownership and continued state subsidies—amounting to 22 percent of Russia's gross national product in the summer of 1993—meant that the structure of property rights changed little in the first two years of economic reform.

The failure to consolidate a new political order in Russia culminated in what Yeltsin in September 1993 called "the loss of authority of state power as a whole." By then, the Russian state had little capacity to carry out even modest economic reforms. Tragically, this paralysis of state power ended only after armed struggle between the Congress and the president in October 1993.

CHERNOMYRDIN: FINALLY, NEW POLITICS

LESS NOTICED than Zhirinovsky's success in December 1993 was the fact that Russian voters also ratified a new constitution. Compared to Western ones, Russia's constitution grants inordinate power to the executive branch. Nonetheless, the new document has delineated, regulated, and normalized relations between the president, his ministers, and the new Federal Assembly. This new polit-

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ical context has helped in implementing further economic reform.

The new constitution gives the president the authority to shape the government and economic policy. President Yeltsin, not the parliament, determines who serves in the Russian government. The State Duma, the lower and more influential chamber of the Federal Assembly, can hold votes of no confidence, which it did for the first time in October 1994. Yet successful votes of no confidence do not compel the president to dismiss the government. On the contrary, after two consecutive no-confidence votes, the president can dissolve the Duma.

The new constitution also clarifies the central bank's role. The central bank can no longer use the promise of cheap credit to conduct its own industrial policy. Since October, transfers to enterprises are controlled by government ministries. Under the new constitution, the president appoints the head of the bank and—as shown after the ruble collapse in October 1994—has the de facto power to dismiss the bank's chief.

Nominally, the Duma has the power of the purse. But executive control over writing the budget, the lack of transparency regarding budget items, and executive control over all off-budget expenditures has shifted control of financial policy from the parliament to the executive. The government's budget must still withstand a rigorous parliamentary review. Compared to the previous two years, however, the process of approval and amendment has become clearer, suggesting that the 1995 budget debate will not be as politically or economically destabilizing as earlier ones.

Within its limited jurisdiction, the new Russian parliament's participation in economic policy has been more organized and productive. The Duma has adopted important market-supporting laws. In July 1994 it passed the second reading (of three) of a new civil code, establishing the legal and economic institutions to guarantee private property rights and enforcement of contracts. Progress in parliament on this monumental code suggests that the agenda has changed fundamentally; the question is no longer whether to develop a market economy, but what kind.

In this new political context, the government has resisted pressure from newly elected parliamentary representatives and maintained the

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tenets of Gaidar's economic reform. While communists in parliament claim to have an electoral mandate to roll back Gaidar's policies, the new divisions of authority make it virtually impossible for the Duma to prescribe new price controls. To almost everyone's surprise, the Russian government has maintained the general liberalization policy outlined by Gaidar in January 1992.

Chernomyrdin's government has also achieved real progress toward monetary stabilization. The prime minister tightened monetary and fiscal policy, established positive real interest rates for government credit issued by the Russian Central Bank (a policy first pursued by Gaidar and Fyodorov in October 1993), and curtailed government subsidies to state enterprises. Rather than responding to expenditure requests from the Duma, Chernomyrdin submitted a federal budget to the Russian legislature in spring 1994 that the Duma approved with only minor amendments. The government's 1995 budget is even more fiscally conservative, with targets of one percent monthly inflation and an annual budget deficit of eight percent.

Of course, writing a tight budget is easier than keeping to one. In recent months, pressure from the agriculture, coal, and heavy industry lobbies has resulted in much higher government expenditures. Moreover, the violent gyration of the ruble last October highlighted the fragility of the government's stabilization policy and raised doubts about the long-term viability of the current economic policy. Nonetheless, no matter how the year ends, the annual inflation rate will be much lower for 1994 than for the previous two years and considerably lower than predicted a year ago. Even with increased year-end spending, Russia's deficit will still fall below ten percent of gross domestic product for 1994.

The campaign to privatize has also benefited from Russia's new political framework. In October 1993, the Congress of People's Deputies threatened to halt privatization altogether. Yeltsin's decision to dissolve the Congress, however, provided a new stimulus toward privatization. Former opponents of privatization, especially directors of large enterprises, rushed to privatize to ensure that they got their piece of the pie before the voucher phase of the program ended in July 1994. By the end of that first phase, over 100,000 enterprises had been privatized.

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Approval of a new law to guide the second stage, or cash phase, of privatization has proved difficult. The process of adoption, however, has underscored the new preeminence of the president and his administration in making economic policy. After heated debate, the Duma failed to ratify Yeltsin's bill on privatization before its summer recess in July. The day after it adjourned, Yeltsin decreed what the Duma had rejected. As a conciliatory signal, Yeltsin incorporated into his decree several amendments suggested during parliamentary debate. Moreover, Yeltsin said that his decree would serve as an interim measure. With the decree in place, however, it will be difficult for the Duma to change the law without confronting Yeltsin and his ministers. The two-thirds majority needed in both chambers of Russia's parliament to override a presidential veto makes it unlikely that a fundamentally different privatization law will be adopted in 1995.

THE ECONOMIC NEED FOR POLITICAL REFORM

RUSSIA STILL lacks many market-supporting state institutions. While greater institutional clarity between the president, government, and parliament has created more propitious conditions for radical economic reform, many other political and state institutions still need revamping or creation to secure Russia's economic transformation. Russia's reformers still have not created a new system of social security, an effective retirement system, a welfare program, a jobs training program, or a system of unemployment compensation. Without such a social safety net, the Russian labor market lacks fluidity. Workers still rely on their enterprise directors to provide all their social services. Directors in turn demand state subsidies to cover such expenses as wages, housing costs, and retirement benefits. In nonproductive enterprises, state transfers for wages essentially serve as unemployment compensation from the state. If the state delivered unemployment checks through an independent institution, bankruptcies would be less socially explosive, and unemployed workers might be encouraged to find new employment.

The state also has not institutionalized a legal system to protect property rights, govern bankruptcy procedures, enforce contracts, pro-

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tect consumers, and ensure competition. Contracts must be totally self-enforcing to work because the state cannot enforce them. In the area of corporate law, disclosure statutes are weak and unenforced, general accounting procedures have not been codified, procedures for shareholder and proxy voting are ambiguous, and no institution governs the payment of dividends. Consequently, stockholders have little access to information about their investments. Adoption of the civil code by parliament is only the first step toward creating these institutions.

Some private market institutions such as banks, commodities exchanges, and stock markets have begun to emerge in Russia spontaneously, but unregulated stock markets have led to abuses. In Russia's nascent stock markets, insider trading is the rule, not the exception. The absence of a state capable of protecting private and public property rights has also resulted in an explosion of mafia activity and unbridled environmental degradation. Given the weakness of the state, Russian entrepreneurs are compelled to turn to the only force that can protect their property—the mafia. The situation for public property is even worse, as no private individual or group has an incentive to protect or regulate the use of Russia's commons.

Elections could threaten economic reform unless new political institutions are created.

Political reform at the local level will also influence future economic progress. While Russia's territorial integrity, save Chechnya, now seems secure, important questions about Russia's federal structure remain, including taxation policy and revenue transfers between different levels of government. Prolonged uncertainty regarding these issues impedes local investment, hampers franchising of Moscow-based banks and firms, and encourages local government corruption.

If relations between central and local government institutions have finally begun to stabilize, the process of dividing power among various local branches of government has barely started. To guarantee the support of local administrators after he dissolved the Congress of People's Deputies in October 1993, Yeltsin allowed oblast and city heads of administrations (the equivalents of American governors and mayors) to dissolve their local legislatures as well. Some regions have

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
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

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created new legislative bodies called oblast and city dumas. To date, however, poor voter turnout for elections of these new bodies, coupled with the absence of oblast-level constitutions, has undermined the power and legitimacy of these new legislatures. Other regions have not even bothered to create new legislative institutions, while the most ruthless governors, such as Evgenii Nazdratenko in Primorskii Krai, have removed elected officials from office by force.

A few of these local authoritarians have used their power to push the pace of economic reform. However, the consolidation of regional fiefdoms threatens sustained market development. Because the line dividing public and private economic activity is still blurred, especially in the regions, local state governments retain tremendous power to intervene in private-sector affairs. Arrests of businessmen, the confiscation of private property, and the reintroduction of price controls by many regional governments demonstrate that the authoritarian powers reformist leaders use to push through radical economic reform could also allow conservative dictators to halt it.

Another underdeveloped component of Russia's political transformation is an independent judiciary. Russia's first Constitutional Court relinquished its authority as arbitrator between the president and parliament in 1993 when the head of the court, Valerii Zorkin, sided with the White House's defenders during the October 1993 crisis. Since then, the court has ceased to function. In October 1994, Yeltsin submitted for parliamentary approval new nominations for the court, indicating that this institution may soon be revived. Russia's disappointing first experience with a Constitutional Court and nascent legal culture, however, suggest that institutionalizing a judicial check on executive and legislative power will be a long process.

Finally, the next election could pose the most serious threat to economic reform unless new political institutions, including political parties, are created soon. Russian social and class interests are still in flux, making representation by political parties difficult. Voters in 1995 and 1996 will still be choosing between individuals, not party platforms. Moreover, Russia has held only one post-communist election, thus far relegating parties to a minor role in the development of the new political system. Neither President Yeltsin nor

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Prime Minister Chernomyrdin are members of political parties, nor has either leader promoted their development. The combination of a weakly articulated civil society, a nascent party system, and continued economic hardship for most Russian voters creates opportunities for demagogues and populists, as Zhirinovsky proved a year ago. Law-and-order candidates who run against both the communist past and the status quo will be difficult to defeat even if the economy rebounds next year.

SUPPORT POLITICAL REFORMS

UNTIL NOW, American assistance to Russia has focused almost exclusively on promoting market reforms. But without political reform Russia's revolution will almost certainly fail. Of the $24 billion pledged by the United States in 1992 to support Russian reform, only a fraction has been devoted to promoting political reform. Moreover, most of those funds were channeled through multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which have neither the inclination nor the mandate to promote political reform. Technical assistance programs implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development are also skewed toward economic reform. Of the $2.1 billion allocated for assistance programs through AID in 1994, only $30 million was earmarked for "democratic pluralism initiatives."

Greater support for democratic assistance programs appears unlikely. During his meeting with Yeltsin in October, President Clinton championed trade and investment as the new cornerstones of Russian-American relations; discussion of how to strengthen Russian democratic institutions was not a summit agenda item. U.S. foreign policy makers continue to trumpet democracy as an objective of American policy toward Russia, but the Clinton administration has focused almost exclusively on promoting economic reform, a necessary but insufficient objective for American assistance programs to Russia. To thrive, capitalist-oriented economies require capitalist-oriented states. It is naive to pour millions of dollars into promoting privatization when the legal framework and political support for pro-

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tecting private property do not exist. Political reform in Russia has helped, not impeded, economic reform. Progress in economic reform requires progress in political reform.

In other post-communist transitions, regimes that consolidated democratic states early on (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) have been more successful in undertaking and sustaining real economic transformation than countries that have not (Romania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan). Surveys of recent economic reform attempts worldwide have demonstrated that authoritarian regimes are no better at sustaining economic reform than democratic regimes.[2] When praising authoritarian reformers in Taiwan or Singapore, one forgets about the economic disasters in Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, or in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev.

America's overemphasis on economic assistance to Russia is inefficient. Assistance programs for Russian economic reform often subsidize activity that should be paid for by the private sector. Why should American taxpayers pay for feasibility studies of joint telecommunications ventures when AT&T could? Why should the U.S. government train Russian oil technicians when Gasprom could? The private sector, however, will not directly finance programs designed to promote political reforms. Funding for such programs, therefore, must be facilitated by public, as well as U.S. government, support.

The United States, in sum, has no national interest in promoting economic reforms in Russia that are not accompanied by a transformation of the political system. America's greatest national security nightmare would be the emergence of an authoritarian, imperialist Russian regime supported by a thriving market economy.

[2] Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Democracy*, October 1994, pp. 104-118.

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The Pacific Way

Kishore Mahbubani

A CULTURAL FUSION

THE SIGNIFICANT difference between the 21st century and the preceding centuries is that there will be three centers of world power (Europe, North America, and East Asia) as opposed to two in the twentieth (Europe and North America) and one before that (Europe). For centuries Europe set the course of world history: it colonized distant parts of the world, it shook up other empires and societies (including China, India, Japan, and Islam), and its people occupied relatively empty places (North America and Australasia). In the twentieth century the two World Wars and the succeeding Cold War were essentially European struggles. East Asia, by contrast, had little impact on the rest of the world.

The world is greatly indebted to Europe. The huge creative burst there over the past five centuries has carried mankind to where it is today. Conceivably (judging from the progress made between the tenth and fifteenth centuries), we could still be only a few steps away from the Dark Ages. Europe has carried the world on its shoulders.

Now East Asia has arrived on the world stage. Its sheer economic weight will give it a voice and a role. As recently as 1960, Japan and East Asia together accounted for 4 percent of world GNP, while the United States, Canada, and Mexico represented 37 percent. Today

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KISHORE MAHBUBANI is Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Dean of the Civil Service College. These are his personal views.

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

both groups have about the same share of the world's GNP (some 24 percent each), but, with more than half the world's economic growth taking place in Asia in the 1990s, the economies of North America and Europe will progressively become relatively smaller.

Western thinkers are having considerable difficulty finding the right paradigm to describe a world where non-Western powers are emerging. Their natural impulse is to assume that, as they succeed, these powers will become more like Western societies (an assumption implicit in the "end of history" thesis) or that there will be a

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"clash of civilizations." Neither is likely. The difficulty that Western minds face in grasping the arrival of East Asia arises from the fact that we are witnessing an unprecedented historical phenomenon: a fusion of Western and East Asian cultures in the Asia-Pacific region. It is this fusion, not a renaissance of ancient Asian glories, that explains the explosive growth of the Pacific and provides the possibility of continued peace and prosperity in the region.

ASIA'S TIME IN THE SUN

MOST STRATEGIC analysts assume that Europe's experience provides the only good basis from which to extrapolate East Asia's future. Consequently, conventional wisdom on East Asia's prospects carries more pessimism than optimism. Richard K. Betts says that "one of the reasons for optimism about peace in Europe is the apparent satisfaction of the great powers with the status quo," while in East Asia there is "an ample pool of festering grievances, with more potential for generating conflict than during the Cold War, when bipolarity helped stifle the escalation of parochial disputes."[1] Aaron L. Friedberg says, "While civil war and ethnic strife will continue for some time to smoulder along Europe's peripheries, in the long run it is Asia that seems far more likely to be the cockpit of great power conflict. The half millennium during which Europe was the world's primary generator of war (as well as wealth and knowledge) is coming to a close. But, for better or for worse, Europe's past could be Asia's future."[2]

Many Asians fear that such passages are not merely analytical predictions, but indicate the wish of status quo powers that East Asia not surpass them. This tendency to extrapolate the future of East Asia and the Pacific from the past of Europe reveals an intellectual blindness: the inability to see that non-Europeans may have reached a stage of development where they can progress without having to repeat Europe's mistakes.

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[1] "Wealth, Power and Instability," *International Security*, Winter 1993/94, p. 64.
[2] "Ripe for Rivalry," *International Security*, Winter 1993/94, p. 7.

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It cannot be an accident that the Pacific region, which has experienced some of the greatest wars of the twentieth century, is now the most peaceful. Deeper forces must be at work. The most important is the growing realization of East Asians that their moment in history has come; they can finally join the league of developed societies. They also know that, having missed this boat before, they could well do so again if they get entangled in war or conflict.

KEEPING UP WITH THE CHENS

IT IS DIFFICULT for a European or North American to understand the momentousness of the psychological revolution in East Asia because they cannot step into East Asian minds. Their minds have never been wrapped in colonialism. They have never struggled with the subconscious assumption that perhaps they were second-rate human beings, never good enough to be number one. The growing realization of East Asians that they can do anything as well as, if not better than, other cultures has led to an explosion of confidence.

This confidence is bolstered by their awareness that the time needed to catch up with the developed world is getting shorter. The period that nations require to double economic output per person is shortening: Britain took 58 years (from 1780), the United States 47 years (from 1839), Japan 33 years (from the 1880s), Indonesia 17 years, South Korea 11 years, and China 10 years. The reasons are complex but include the faster spread of technology, ideas, techniques, and capital across borders.

East Asians are also increasingly aware that, in contrast to many European nations, they are getting their fundamentals right. Many European thinkers celebrate the implantation of democracy in their societies as an unmitigated good, especially since it prevents wars. But democracies can be resistant to change and, as demonstrated by Russia, even prevent rapid economic development. Europe's heavy welfare burden cannot be shed easily, especially since it is often passed to future generations. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office recently forecast that for an American infant born in 1994, the tax requirement needed to pay for existing programs will be 82 percent of his lifetime

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earnings. William Rees-Mogg notes that "this figure is obviously unsupportable," but adds that "government spending in Europe is actually higher than it is in the U.S."[3] The inability of democratic systems to shed welfare burdens suggests that in future economic competition, Western Europe and North America will be hobbled by this competitive disadvantage.

If East Asia's great economic success had occurred in the nineteenth century, there would have been a natural impulse to see it, as Japan did, in terms of acceptability in the then-premier Club of Europe. Today East Asians have moved away from that assumption. They realize that it will be a struggle to work out social, political, and philosophical norms that best capture their peoples' aspirations. It will not be easy to develop new concepts in sensitive areas like democracy, human rights, and freedom of the press. But to continue to progress, East Asia will have to do so. The stupidest thing that any East Asian society could do is to turn away from these overwhelming challenges and engage in military rivalries: to snatch failure one more time from the jaws of victory.

EUROPE'S MISTAKES

CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC thinkers are likely to be unmoved by the great human drama unfolding in East Asia. They focus either on ancient and smoldering rivalries or arms races in the Asia-Pacific region.

Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal recently said that "Asia is in danger of heading back to the future," one fraught with tension and conflict. They add that "Europe, in particular, and the West, in general, constitute advanced and richly developed international societies. What is distinctive about Asia is its combination of several industrialised societies with a regional international society so impoverished in its development that it compares poorly with even Africa and the Middle East."[4]

There is a kernel of truth in this portrayal. No West European

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[3] "Money Moves East, as Welfare Goes West," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), July 9, 1994, p. 35.

[4] "Rethinking East Asian Security," *The IISS Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 15.

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country faces the imminent prospect of a border war. By contrast, the prospect of war remains alive in East Asia. But when a broader perspective is taken, a different picture emerges. The guns are virtually silent in the Asia-Pacific region, while Europe as a continent is surrounded by a "ring of fire" stretching from North Africa to the Caucasus. From the conflict in Georgia to the explosions waiting to burst in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, more lives are lost daily on the periphery of Europe than in the entire Asia-Pacific region, which has a much larger population.

The contrast between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region is not an accident of history: it is a product of three mistakes made by Europe. The first is Europe's assumption that it can secure peace by concentrating on internal unification while detaching itself from its periphery. Yet all the efforts to either deepen unification via the Maastricht treaty or widen it by including similar European countries are tantamount to rearranging the living-room furniture while floodwaters are seeping in from the rising tides just outside the door. It is puzzling that Europe is trying to cut off its neighbors, excluding them from growth and prosperity. By contrast, the impulse in East Asia is to draw societies into the region's dynamism, starting with Myanmar and Vietnam and eventually including even North Korea.

The second European assumption is that others will model themselves after Europe, that the natural progression of history will lead to all societies becoming liberal, democratic, and capitalist. This assumption creates an inability to accept that other cultures or social forms may have equal validity. An essay in *The Economist*, "Islam and the West," for instance, assumes that for Islamic societies to progress, they must become more Western.[5] Not once does it suggest that the West may have something to learn from Islam. In contrast, although both the world's most populous Islamic state (Indonesia) and its most economically successful (Malaysia) are in the Asia-Pacific region, no one there suggests that they should be remade into some other model. A belief in the universality of one's ideas can lead to an inability to accept the principle of diversity. The Asia-Pacific region is used to diversity; Europe is not.

[5] *The Economist*, Aug. 6, 1994.

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A third flaw is Europe's effort to lock in its relatively high living standards by raising clever new barriers to free trade and sustaining high subsidies. Here the contrast between American and European strategies is striking. The United States has taken the bold step of crossing a cultural and socioeconomic divide by entering into a free trade agreement with Mexico. The only permanent solution to the inevitable long-term problem of illegal immigration is for Europe to do the same.[6]

In pursuing such flawed approaches, Europe may be accentuating the contrast between the continent and its neighborhood, thus developing potentially destabilizing geopolitical fault lines. By contrast, the geopolitical fault lines in the Asia-Pacific region are gradually being stabilized.

A TWO-WAY STREET

THOSE WHO live and travel in the Asia-Pacific region can feel that they are moving into a new epoch in which the incomes of most will double or treble in their lifetimes. They can fly from Hong Kong to Vancouver, from Seoul to Los Angeles, from Tokyo to Hawaii, or from Kuala Lumpur to Sydney and yet not feel that they have crossed a cultural divide. They feel at home in most corners of the Pacific. A sense of community is emerging. But to many it seems like an apparition. Robert A. Manning and Paula Stern capture this skepticism: "Yet even now, as the Asia-Pacific's regional institutions are in embryonic form, a host of economic, political, military, and psychological trends suggests that the cherished aspiration—a common psychology of belonging, reflecting shared interests, responsibilities, values and mutual respect—may prove to be a chimera."[7]

It is perfectly understandable for Manning and Stern to experi-

[6] On October 19, 1994, the European Commission proposed an economic and security pact with countries of the Middle East and North Africa to stem the threat of political instability and mass migration. This ambitious strategy would face hurdles as lofty as its intentions.

[7] "The Myth of the Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994, p. 80.

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ence difficulty nailing down the sense of community in the Pacific. There is still a long way to go before it is fully realized. Nothing like it has been experienced before. The Pacific community will be a completely new creation. It will not be an Asian community, nor will it be an American community. If the Pacific has emerged as the most dynamic region of the world, it is because it has drawn on the best practices and values from many rich civilizations, Asian and Western. If this fusion continues to work, there could be explosive creativity on a scale never before seen.

The glue that holds Asian societies together has not eroded with modernization.

Some explosions have already occurred. Japan provides the best example. Culturally, it remains quintessentially Japanese, but its civil administration (with arguably the most powerful Westernized bureaucracy in the world), business, science, and technology are among the best. It has modernized and is no longer a feudal society. Several key imperial ceremonies are conducted in European coattails. But there is no doubt that the Japanese remain Japanese. Their homes are Japanese. Their souls are Japanese. Although many Japanese teenagers look like their European or American counterparts, their value systems, though changing, remain fundamentally Japanese. They bow deeply and behave reverentially toward their elders. There is relatively little juvenile delinquency or crime. The glue that holds Asian societies and families together has not been weakened by modernization.

To many, this is an economic and industrial miracle. But this success is due neither to Japanese culture nor Western methods; it is the result of the combination of both. In the long run, American society will do as well as Japan when it undergoes a similar osmosis, absorbing the best of Asian civilization.

The real success of the Pacific community will come when the learning process in the Pacific becomes a two-way street rather than a one-way street. It took a long time for China and other East Asian societies to accept the commonsensical advice of Yukichi Fukuzawa, the Meiji-era reformer: to progress, learn from the West. Many American intellectuals still believe that all the deep wells of learning

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are in Europe. Those who travel across the Pacific come to learn about, but not from, East Asia. There is a profound difference between these two approaches. In the past few years, many Americans have been disconcerted by lectures from East Asians, as have many East Asians by American preachings on democracy and human rights. It will take time for both sides to learn to listen to each other.

Learning requires humility. Fortunately, Americans are an open-hearted and compassionate people. They carry no hubris from history, as Europeans do. This explains why the United States has been the most benevolent great power in history. Any European nation with such power would have used it to advance its national interests. America pushed an idea, and it has contributed in a sterling fashion to uplifting East Asian society. East Asia could not be where it is today if not for the generosity of the American spirit. The bright young East Asian minds driving the region's economic effervescence come increasingly from American universities. They will be the human bridges between East and West in the Pacific. There are now hundreds of thousands of them scattered all over the Asia-Pacific region, creating and strengthening the networks that are driving the region's prosperity.

History teaches us that trade and investment bring not just money and goods, but also ideas. The explosion of two-way trade and investment cannot leave the two cultural universes across the Pacific intact. Over time a fusion will take place. When such fusion is perceived by the American body politic as positive and reinvigorating, it will strengthen America's commitment to the region's security. Good economics leads to good security, especially when all the major powers perceive that they have a common vested interest in the rising economic tide.

CREATING ASIAN NETWORKS

IT WOULD be foolish to deny that the region faces serious problems: the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Cambodian conflict, the China-Taiwan tension, the disputes over the Spratly Islands, and, in the long run, the triangular balance of power between the United States,

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China, and Japan. These are difficult issues that are not likely to be settled quickly. If the powerful combination of NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been unable to resolve the problems of Algeria or Bosnia, relatively new institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Regional Forum (ARF) are clearly not able to solve any major conflict that may surface.

Fortunately, the threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region is receding. The North Korean nuclear crisis has been defused for now. Longer term, it is inevitable that the region will draw North Korea away from its Stalinist isolation to become more like China or Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge have not disappeared, but they stand out more and more like debris left behind on a beach by the ebbing tide. Their moment has come and gone.

The discomfort between China and Taiwan has risen in the past few months. The potential for misunderstanding is always there. But this has to be balanced against the dramatic growth of trade, investment, and human contact across the Taiwan Straits. The chemistry of the China-Taiwan relationship has changed irrevocably. Similarly, while the territorial issues in the Spratly Islands will not be resolved easily, there is virtually no danger of a military conflict there.

In short, the trend on each particular Asia-Pacific problem demonstrates that a larger dynamic is working to defuse and dissolve tensions. Two sets of examples demonstrate how much has changed in the Asia-Pacific region. Five years ago, neither Algeria nor Bosnia were in the news. Myanmar and Cambodia were then perceived to be insoluble. Today the reverse is true. Surely some of the explanation for this must be the different regional dynamics. That a country as large and distant as India has finally become excited about joining the Pacific community, shaking a deep-seated historical tendency to look west rather than east, suggests that the Pacific region is experiencing a new historical phenomenon.

A different dynamic is evolving in the Atlantic and the Pacific regions. The Atlantic believes in building strong institutions: NATO, the EU, and the CSCE. Together they ensure that none of their mem-

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bers is threatened by a military invasion. But in an era when such outright military invasions are inconceivable outside the usual tinderbox regions of the world (the Middle East and South Asia), these powerful institutions seem powerless to either defend their members from nontraditional sources of insecurity, such as rising immigration or terrorism, or snuff out nearby conflicts, such as those in Algeria or Bosnia.

The Pacific has no comparable institutions. Instead, it is creating networks that are inclusive rather than exclusive. And contrary to the conventional wisdom in many European textbooks on international relations, the formation of these networks is driven not by the major powers but by medium-sized or small powers. None of the recent regional initiatives were either conceived or developed in major capitals. Indeed the leadership has come from the smaller or medium powers. APEC was conceived and driven by Australia and ARF by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In both cases, their corporate cultures are very different from those of their Atlantic equivalents.

APEC and ARF are likely to experience difficulties as they grow. In both, there is tension between the institution-building impulses of the Anglo-Saxon participants and the consensus-building impulses of the Asian participants. But those who assume that East-West differences will be the main divide may be in for a surprise. Indonesia has joined Australia and Singapore in pushing for faster progress in APEC. Japan, China, and Malaysia want to hold back. But in ARF, Japan joins the United States in pushing for a faster pace of evolution. In APEC and ARF, the interest of all participants in sustaining economic dynamism, peace, and stability leads to a pragmatic spirit of accommodation and consensus. The corporate cultures evolving in both trade groups are neither exclusively Western nor Asian. A unique blend is emerging.

A NEW RELATIONSHIP

THE ROAD ahead may not be smooth. No historical road has ever been. There will be many a stumble before the Pacific community is perceived to have arrived, and each stumble will bring out a chorus of

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skeptics. But the long-term direction has been set. Across the Pacific, the traffic on trade, investment, information, aviation, cultural, and educational highways is increasing by leaps and bounds. The growing interest in sustaining this economic boom is sweeping aside intractable problems like China's most-favored-nation status, and it is forcing Beijing and Washington to behave rationally toward each other.

So far, it is mainly East Asians that are experiencing the fruits of the cultural fusion of East and West, while North Americans and Australians are being drawn to the region by sheer economic logic. But the explosion of contacts must eventually lead to a two-way process of cultural osmosis. That day is coming. An even more intriguing prospect is the possibility of Europe and East Asia coming together in a new spirit. It is conceivable that the three new centers of global power—Europe, North America, and East Asia—will come together in cooperative arrangements in the 21st century. But each will have to make significant adjustments to get there.

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Profile

Mitterrand's Legacies

Ronald Tiersky

THE DE GAULLE OF THE LEFT

FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND is entering his final months as French president after a long and full run. Some believe him to be a statesman; others call him a lucky careerist. By turn, Mitterrand is described as either a past-master Machiavellian and France's most detested politician or one of contemporary Europe's most durable, original, and successful leaders.

On the evidence, both judgments are valid reflections of the man and his legacy. In French politics, 14 years as a Gaullist "republican monarch" is plenty of time to make enemies, and Mitterrand already had more than his share when elected president in 1981. Internationally, his anti-Soviet stand and role in the Euromissile crisis marked East-West relations in the 1980s; so did his subsequent hesitations on German unification and the collapse of the U.S.S.R. as the wheel advanced from Cold War verities into post-Cold War uncertainties. When set against the dislike of leaders in Western countries such as the United States, Britain, and Italy, criticism of Mitterrand's shortcomings seems part of a Western political cycle still running on recession-made fuel.

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

A long and full run

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Only by taking a historical perspective can Mitterrand be appreciated in his *fin de règne.* From such a standpoint, the French president—now 78 years old and struggling against a life-threatening cancer to finish out his term—presents a balance sheet with several striking successes as well as a few black marks and blind spots.

Without question, Mitterrand has been the most important French political leader since Charles de Gaulle. The fact that, after following a winding road, he ended up a genuine man of the left has importance beyond the issue of what remains of the old "left." It is key to understanding how Mitterrand was able to reinvigorate France as a nation capable of a continuing important international role—just as de Gaulle, coming from the right, did in his time.

Mitterrand was elected as the first Socialist president of the Fifth Republic but became president of all the French—itself an important legacy coming from the left. Against a history of shaky European left-wing attitudes in East-West relations and defense and security issues, Mitterrand's demonstration that a Socialist French president could be solid on both counts was crucial. His European policies were not mere Machiavellianism. By masterfully serving not only French but international interests, his record verges on statesmanship. Mitterrand's three main achievements—clarifying the issue of socialism, fostering domestic legitimacy, and negotiating France's central place in the European Union—are, if not historic, then on the historical scale.

ENDING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

THE GENUINENESS of Mitterrand's socialism has understandably been suspect. He came belatedly to the Socialist Party (PS) in 1971, already in his fifties and with three heavy careers—in the wartime Resistance, the Fourth Republic, and the Fifth Republic—as baggage. Whatever his electoral rhetoric, he was never an ideological socialist. As the Socialist leader, he stressed that although Marxism had historically been a major influence in French socialism, the PS was not a Marxist party.

Despite his origins, it is hardly open to doubt that Mitterrand as president has been a genuine man of the left. Mitterrand's family

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milieu, student politics, and initial actions in World War II were right-wing, although never fascist or anti-Semitic. Mitterrand later became a liberal, and more solidly so because it was a genuine conversion. This liberal temperament, including his long personal engagement with rule-of-law and civil and political liberties issues, is much of what makes him a leftist. In Tocquevillean terms, one could say that Mitterrand has loved liberty more than equality, that he is more liberal than socialist.

In 1981, clearly, Mitterrand was elected president as a leftist. Whether or not he was really a socialist, he behaved as one. His "Union of the Left" government tested socialist policies on a larger scale than had any other West European socialist leader since Britain's Clement Attlee during 1945-47. Mitterrand also made the Communist Party part of his government, which, as he planned, paradoxically precipitated its decline by putting it to the test.

The 1981-82 legislative agenda of the "Union of the Left" included "Keynesian socialist" reforms, a wave of nationalizations of banks and industrial companies, a successful decentralization of the centralized Napoleonic state structure, and modest expansion of union rights. The result was monetary and budgetary disaster and a politically humiliating retreat. By actually testing socialist policies, the "Mitterrand experiment" discredited the French left's old ideological outlook.

The resultant new realism made possible a historic left-right accommodation, expanding the heretofore contested legitimacy of the Fifth Republic's political institutions and liberal economy. The willingness of both right and left to abandon France's two-century-old "silent civil war" inspired historians in the mid-1980s to declare that "the French Revolution is finally over." Weakening the communist movement and getting a modernized left to accept France's political institutions and market economy was a crucial work of legitimation and national reconciliation. A conservative could not have done it. Only a leader of the left could have managed it, acting with exceptional political cunning and the huge powers of the Gaullist presidency. De Gaulle, having crafted both the new regime in 1958 and the divisive acceptance of Algerian independence in 1962, convinced the right (or most of it) to accept both the republic's legitimacy and the

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necessity of decolonization. Mitterrand, in turn, reconciled the French left to the Gaullist institutions and downgraded socialism's ideological threat to France's economy and society.

In the last year of his presidency, Mitterrand helped Frenchmen reconcile themselves on another front—their collective past during the difficult years of World War II. Opening his files and explaining in personal interviews his Vichy and Resistance experiences illustrated that a Vichy past is not in itself proof of collaboration, let alone fascism or responsibility for Vichy's crimes.

Mitterrand took serious risks all during the war, as a prisoner who made dangerous escapes, as a Vichy civil servant who transformed himself into an agent of the Resistance, and finally as an underground Resistance leader. Mitterrand's path may have been a winding one, but he finally took the right turns, and his late-in-life disclosures turned out to be important gestures that helped France move forward.

EUROPEAN BEDFELLOWS

IN EUROPEAN politics today, France still faces dilemmas that, as in the Cold War, involve choosing the lesser of two evils. Autonomy and independence would naturally be Paris' first preference. But France, like Germany, is bound to the paradoxical 21st century principle of furthering the national interest through interdependence. The French problem is to find the policy combining maximum advantages with minimum disadvantages. Mitterrand's presidency has been crucial in developing a rough consensus in France favoring a European policy that combines federalist leanings with a *gaullien* emphasis on the European Council's centrality—that is, on the nation-state as decision-maker.

Mitterrand has advanced France's European stakes past the point of no return. No French politician who seriously hopes to be president can be frankly against Europe. Jacques Chirac, the neo-Gaullist presidential candidate, is the first case in point. Voters of his Rally for the Republic party (RPR) are about one-third in favor of Europe, and the center-right voters of the Union for French Democracy—whom any neo-Gaullist candidate needs to win—are nearly all in favor of Europe. So Chirac's unexpected proposal for a referendum on the

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third phase of monetary union affronts French opinion as well as contradicting the 1992 Maastricht referendum's commitment to a single European currency. German leaders are beginning to worry out loud that France may renege on commitments to further integration, but Chirac's idea is highly unlikely to win out.

The real questions for France are what kind of Europe and how much Europe. If it is not clear what exactly is ruled in, it is not doubtful what is ruled out. Even Chirac agrees that more Europe is necessary so that France and its partners do not disappear against the North American and Asian blocs that are forming.

France's key strategic relationships are with unified Germany and the United States. Germany is France's first partner, and the quality of France's relationship with Germany defines France's successes in the European Union (EU) as a whole. Although less clearly perceived, the same is true for Germany's relationship with France.

For decades, participants at Paris conferences anxiously asked, "What will the French do if Germany ever unifies?" After Mitterrand, the answer is now clear: they will do the best they can. This may well prove sufficient, especially if the Germans cooperate by overextending themselves and if a secondary Franco-British axis—albeit not one as strategic as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would wish—takes form.

In radically changed circumstances, Mitterrand has maintained de Gaulle's priority of rapprochement with Germany. But there are important differences. In the 1960s, because he was de Gaulle and because of Germany's special circumstances, de Gaulle was always in the driver's seat with Chancellors Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard. Mitterrand has dealt with a very different Germany—much richer, more accepted, emerging into "ordinariness," diplomatically assertive, and suddenly unified. Differences separating French and German policies are no longer automatically solved by German deference, and France's permanent German preference in the EU restricts any pretense of an alternative first partner, any *alliance de revers.*

The issue for post-Mitterrand France's European policy is whether European integration, as the French want it, moves forward or unravels. There are two specters: a (highly unlikely) reversion to a simple

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free-trade zone or a (less unlikely) German slide eastward. The practical issues are thus EU enlargement, where German policy is more expansive; "variable geometries" and "hard cores" in monetary union and beyond, where Mitterrand, like German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union, thinks "concentric circles" of commitment are unavoidable; and NATO's relations with the Western European Union, where the French want a freestanding European defense entity as the long-sought "second pillar" of NATO.

From the time he abandoned socialist economics and "chose Europe" by reaffirming the franc's fidelity to the European Monetary System in 1983, Mitterrand has assumed that France must commit itself irrevocably to European integration and Germany. A Franco-German axis anchors French prosperity and self-confidence, and thus France's international presence and influence in the next century.

After Mitterrand, no French politician who wants to be president can be against Europe.

Mitterrand's legacy in European affairs thus can seem paradoxical, but it is only an appearance. Integration has become necessary to the French national interest and the goal of world rank. It is a grand ambition for France, even if some RPR politicians, who are more neo-Gaullist but less *gaullien* than Mitterrand, ask for a retreat to confederation—that is, to an EU council with less qualified majority voting and a softer monetary policy, meaning a softer French currency and more succor to French unemployment.

Mitterrand surely would prefer that a great debate over federalism not occur in France, either in the coming presidential campaign or in the 1996 intergovernmental conference to update the Maastricht treaty (itself another Mitterrand achievement). His outlook, which seems federalist when compared to neo-Gaullist ideas, is less so compared to German policy in the Kohl era. Mitterrand thinks this difference about whether the EU should be frankly federalist or not is a matter of deep-seated cultural and political differences between French and German traditions. His insight is that the conflict need not be settled so long as it does not present practical obstacles to "Europe." If and when the matter does need to be settled, differences

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may have eroded—as they did before on national sovereignty and majority voting—to a point of synthesis.

IN THE COLD WAR MAELSTROM

FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP with the United States defines French opportunities for a world role. In the United Nations, in NATO, and in ad hoc operations, France knows that America will often set the parameters. Mitterrand has frequently taken contrarian positions, as on the Bosnian embargo. In the long run, however, the theme of his American policy was not to play solo above all else to trumpet France's presence, but to be important enough to be a first-rank partner for other world powers.

Mitterrand's legacy here includes a striking desire for a warm relationship with President George Bush—partly out of loyalty kindled during Bush's Paris visit in June 1981, when the then vice president helped smooth over the issue of communist government membership with Ronald Reagan, but more importantly because of Mitterrand's decision to consult more closely with the United States about changes in Europe as the Cold War ended. From the Euromissile crisis to his courtship of Bush, Mitterrand laid out a general line that is unlikely to be changed by either Gaullist or left-wing governments. In the Gulf crisis, after a diplomatic controversy that went on until the very last minute, the frank French engagement in Operation Desert Storm put oil and commerce with Iraq into parentheses and again demonstrated France's permanent interests.

Nevertheless, Mitterrand has been a typical French president in his geopolitical unease with American power. Even with the Soviet Union gone, power is power, and geopolitical concerns endure even among friendly states. Americans exasperated by French policy will find it less puzzling if they consider France's constant struggle with greater German dynamism next door, greater American strength internationally, and the lurking "eastern question" of Russia.

France is the key European NATO country in determining how close American-European relations can become. London usually backs American policy, while Bonn always tries to avoid having to choose

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between Washington and Paris. France, a bridge and sometimes an obstacle between Germany and the United Kingdom, thus tends to determine whether there will be a "European" policy at all, rather than a collection of bilateral policies toward the United States. Here Mitterrand's legacy is the statesmanlike one of having kept matters open. He erased any doubts that a French Socialist could know the value of the United States for European security while retaining the Gaullist emphasis on the dangers for Europeans of American interests.

What France does in Eastern Europe will affect not only various French and European eastern questions, but also France's relationship with Germany—and thus the future of the EU. Mitterrand's sure strategic touch with Cold War problems was shaken by communism's collapse and the sudden uncertainties of post-Gorbachev Europe. He misjudged both German unification and Soviet collapse.

But how damaging ultimately were Mitterrand's hesitations and miscues during the U.S.S.R.'s demise? France, though an important European country, was not on the front line or in control of decisions about German unification or negotiations about the Soviet Union's European retreat. French policy did fail, however, in accepting that the Yugoslav state was unsalvageable in European Community negotiations over whether to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.

Mitterrand also leaves a legacy from the Euromissile crisis, in which he unexpectedly became "America's best European ally" and NATO's staunchest European pillar. Mitterrand called the Euromissile drama "the most serious since the Cuban missile crisis and the blockade of Berlin," and it defined his first-term foreign policy. "I notice," he said memorably of NATO's responsibility for the crisis, "that the pacifists are in the West, whereas the missiles are in the East."

Mitterrand spent important political capital on the Euromissile deployments. The high point was his 1983 speech in the West German parliament. A German electoral campaign was genuinely shaken up by the socialist French president's message that a renewed conservative government, rather than his Social Democratic Party comrades, would be preferable for Germany and peace. Skeptics said that Mitterrand had the easy *beau rôle.* But he took serious risks at home among his PS activists and voters and with his reputation in the history books.

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Mitterrand was not always so statesmanlike. Nowhere was the conflict between good words and *raison d'état* more apparent than in his Africa policy. Mitterrand arrived in office calling for an end to France's neocolonial relationships with French-speaking African states and France's cynical tradition of intimate dealings with African dictators, but will leave with the old traditions largely intact. No longer willing or able to finance its role of neocolonialist patron, France is slashing its subsidies of African government budgets—after decades when those subsidies fueled African wars, the most recent case in point being the Hutu-dominated and French-supported government in Rwanda.

APRÈS MITTERRAND

FROM AN international perspective, the legacy of Mitterrand's presidency is, overall, his strength and endurance writ large, and the legitimacy he has been able to work. He made the institutions work for the left and turned the constitutional success of "cohabitation" into a French form of bipartisanship that buttressed the system's legitimacy. His foreign policy embodied the message that France still counts and, therefore, the quality of French leadership remains important. France continues to play its autonomous part—at times frustrating Americans and others—in international negotiations on issues from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Bosnia, Rwanda, and Iraq, and above all in negotiating the European Union. Under Mitterrand's leadership, France, though often a gadfly, nonetheless won its share of negotiations.

Will the Franco-German symbiosis hold together in a common vision of European unity, or are Germany's eastern connections bound to lead it away from its erstwhile partner? How will Britain and countries such as Italy and Spain figure in French diplomacy? Is there a chance, as Thatcher's memoirs strongly urge, for a Franco-British axis to balance Germany's strength? How can France and the European Union deal with America in a way that not only addresses world problems but also safeguards French autonomy? These are the complex issues for post-Mitterrand France. It is Mitterrand's legacy that his successor can face them with a certain amount of confidence.

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Europe's Map, Compass, and Horizon

Dominique Moïsi and Michael Mertes

WHERE? WHY? WITH WHOM?

HOPES FOR A Europe united by democracy from west to east are fading. They are being erased by the ongoing, if not expanding, Balkan war, unusually high sustained unemployment, and a loss of faith. Five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European nations are united only by their identity crises: they share narcissism, self-doubt, and a weariness with democracy. In former Warsaw Pact countries, with the notable exception of the Czech Republic, ex-communists have regained power, although they are more "ex" than communist. In western Europe, with the notable exception of Germany, scandals have tarnished the public's belief in democratic principles.

Since the Pyrrhic victory of the Maastricht referendum in France in 1992 (an acrimonious campaign that left the country nearly deadlocked, 51 percent for the treaty, 49 percent against, and aroused skepticism among prospective member nations), Europeans seem more afraid of what they may lose to the European Union (EU) in terms of sovereignty and identity than comforted by their prospects for more opportunities

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and influence in the world. West European governments seem mired in technocratic, soulless discussions of ways to build on the three pillars of the EU—institutional reform, economic and monetary union, and common foreign and security policies. Fixated on how to "do" Europe, they have lost sight of the moral values and fundamental cultural and political objectives that constitute the "why" of it.

Europeans are painfully aware that their priorities are increasingly divergent. Around France, countries to the south are looking across the Mediterranean to the Maghreb with a growing sense of vulnerability and fear. Countries to the north, around Germany, are giving priority to the enlargement of the EU in east-central Europe. On Bosnia, Europeans have exposed their divisions (rather than sending them), their lack of political will, and their failure to perceive the moral and symbolic cost of overcautiousness in the face of suffering of other Europeans. They have not been able to count on America to stop the fighting. Worse, the protracted war has strained and divided the Atlantic alliance. Europeans are ultimately the only ones responsible for other Europeans. The cost of nonintervention and indifference is proving higher than that of political and military interference.

A fin-de-siècle mood had set in even before 1989, but the collapse of communism added a dramatic disorientation to the uncertainty and trouble in major West European countries. Communism's funeral brought only a brief respite from the shared sense of loss over the lack of common goals, dreams of new frontiers, and unifying visions. This mood has been renewed by depressing experiences, of which Sarajevo and Bihać are only the saddest.

West Europeans once took for granted that their economic growth would continue indefinitely. That is why they did not notice the gradual deterioration of their competitiveness and economic performance vis-à-vis ascendant non-European economies. Amid recession and mass unemployment, the fledgling post-communist democracies were suddenly perceived as tough low-wage competitors in agriculture and steel production, fields traditionally dominated by West European countries.

In 1989 East Europeans celebrated their "return to Europe" and got a warm welcome from their western brothers and sisters. Today we

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are again confronting the old question of who belongs in the European family. For a moment, it seemed, West Europeans realized that they had finally received the epochal project they needed: the heroic task of reunifying Europe. Alas, the details turned out to be troublesome. Since the years of wonders, 1989–91, Europe has shown that it still deserves the label "Old Continent."

Yet this somber and increasingly popular description corresponds to only part of the reality. Contrary to what some Asians proclaim, Europe is not about to succumb to a suicidal combination of trade protectionism and warfare at its periphery. A shift toward optimism and self-confidence is perceptible. The economic recovery of the United States is slowly affecting Europe. New countries are joining the EU with neither enthusiasm nor alternatives, but a club gaining new members cannot be all that bad. Appraising the performance of the EU on trade and security issues, European elites can come to only one conclusion: when the EU speaks with one voice, as during the negotiations for the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it ceases to be just a market and becomes an actor with worldwide influence. When, as in the Balkans, there are 12 foreign ministries and no foreign minister, the EU's impotence resounds. The lessons of the war in the former Yugoslavia are clear and painful.

DEFINING EUROPE

DEFINING WHERE Europe begins and ends is essential to building the EU and an Atlantic partnership for the post-Cold War world. The new era in Europe was heralded by a breathtaking proliferation of institutions. New institutions evolved, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Baltic Cooperation Council, and the Black Sea Council. Existing institutions expanded, most notably the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its indiscriminate and immediate acceptance of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian successor republics of the former Soviet Union and the post-Yugoslavia states, and the long-standing Council of Europe, renewed by its

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admission of central, eastern, and southern European democracies.

The proliferation and expansion of these interwoven institutions, the jumble of agreements, organizations, and committees (criticized by some as an alphabet soup whose lack of mission creates "a mishmash of universalist slogans" instead of working proposals) have made an even worse mess. What counts is not the number of networks, but how closely they are knit and whether they cover, in geographic and practical terms, the crucial political and economic issues. Without such cohesion, there is a danger that each state will pick and choose the institutions or forums that it believes will best serve its purposes. This could reinforce the "renationalization" of foreign policies in Europe, encouraging unilateralism disguised as multilateralism.

Cohesion among European institutions now matters more than proliferation.

Defining where Europe proper begins should not be too difficult. We know what institutions have survived the end of the East-West antagonism uninjured and should be protected and developed despite the present strains: the European Union plus the Western European Union (WEU), a Sleeping Beauty security association that has been kissed awake by the Maastricht agreements; NATO, the clearest possible manifestation of the indissoluble security partnership between the democracies of Europe and North America; and the Council of Europe, representing the continent's cultural unity via its common human and civil rights standards.

The real question is where Europe ends—or, more precisely, how far European integration can stretch. It is obvious that the EU can no longer arrogate the unqualified title "Europe," which seemed justified by the post-Yalta dichotomy. The collapse of the Soviet empire has left a security vacuum between Germany and Russia, the area where European wars have historically started. So far, the EU and NATO have responded cautiously to that challenge. But whereas NATO's Partnership for Peace refrains from drawing a line, the EU has given hints of its preferences by singling out the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states as partners for association agree-

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ments—some planned and some already concluded—which open the door to their eventual EU membership.

Taking into account that, of the 12 EU members, 11 belong to the Atlantic alliance (in an EU of 15, the ratio will be 11:4), these enlargement plans will directly affect the alliance. The accession of Finland will make Russia a next-door neighbor of the European Community for the first time, with a common border several hundred miles long. This border may be lengthened by the acces-

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sion of Poland, Latvia, and Estonia. EU membership for Baltic republics, belonging to Russia's western "near abroad," would transform these countries' tensions with Russia over their considerable ethnic Russian minorities into an EU issue.

Membership for Hungary and the southeast European candidates, Romania and Bulgaria, would make Serbia, whose future policies lie in the dark, another neighbor of the EU and confront it with a host of minority problems, including those of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. Furthermore, the EU's enlargement plans would shift the vacuum between Germany and Russia eastward to Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, that is, Russia's western "near abroad" minus the Baltic republics. In a nutshell, enlarging the EU with east-central, east, and southeast European countries dictates an enormous Common Foreign and Security Policy agenda and close coordination of policies between the EU and the United States within the NATO framework.

The first steps have already been taken. The EU has intensified the political dialogue with several accession candidates and offered them an "associate partnership" status in the WEU. The question remains whether more can be done. Fortunately, a threat to the security of the accession candidates is still a hypothetical case. But we may have only a temporary window of opportunity. The EU should therefore anticipate full political membership for these countries—at least the east-central European ones—and long-term economic aid and transition arrangements. The European Community took similar steps for Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the former East Germany after they became free democracies. Why not do it again by substantially upgrading the association agreements?

To be manageable, the transition to membership in the EU must proceed in stages. Including the EU's economically and structurally more advanced eastern neighbors around the year 2000 does not mean the long-term exclusion of other post-communist countries, discrimination against them, or discouragement of their efforts to achieve political and economic stability. Would it not encourage these countries to see what other fledgling democracies have achieved?

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CHALLENGES TO MEET

WEST EUROPEANS' lack of courage, particularly in defining NATO's future, seems to be the main obstacle to solving the foreign, security, and defense problems of enlargement. Another is their notorious reluctance to open their markets to the products of low-wage competitors. The EU's plans for trans-European networks in the transportation, energy, and telecommunications sectors are more than symbolic. But trans-European free trade is more important, especially in terms of fairness: The EU has profited more from post-Cold War trade than the post-communist countries have. The latter's low labor costs should not be seen as unfair competitive advantages, but should be welcomed as forces driving economic growth and trade.

West European protectionism sets up a vicious circle: no accession to the EU without economic recovery, no lasting economic recovery without better access to the EU. Thus a first-order task for West European political leaders is to convince their constituents that the short-term disadvantages (alleged or real) from eastern competition will be outweighed by medium- and long-term benefits. This may seem politically very difficult, given that two or three governments of EU nations per year are being lame-ducked by national election campaigns.

Western Europe benefits from new markets emerging to its east. More important, though, is the healthy pressure to tackle overdue reform of its economies, where structural dislocation has weakened West European competitiveness in recent decades. The exceedingly high non-wage costs of labor in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark are just one example. By accepting the challenge from new competitors in the east—by not shutting itself off—Western Europe will also improve its position vis-à-vis the fast-growing economies of the Asia-Pacific area.

To enlarge to the north and the east does not require neglecting the south. The European Council in June 1994 decided to include Cyprus and Malta in its enlargement plans, thus making countries such as Israel and Egypt future neighbors of the EU. For a Europe that feels threatened by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb and

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the Middle East or excluded from the Middle East peace process by U.S. diplomacy, developing an association with countries on the other side of the Mediterranean complements a strategy of post–Cold War enlargement. The EU can do much more in this regard. New treaties to further economic links must be signed with Israel and Arab countries, now engaged in a courageous process of reconciliation. These countries would understand that maintaining links with the EU entails respecting international norms of conduct and promoting regional peace. The EU must also be concerned with the Algerian quagmire, for it is more than a French postcolonial backyard; it could confront the EU with destabilization, violence, and attacks on human rights.

As the EU widens, competition for money and power are bound to increase.

A third obstacle to the EU's eastward enlargement is the loss of cohesion and efficiency that will accompany its growth to 20 or 25 member states. A solution must be found during the EU's 1996 Intergovernmental Review Conference. Every major enlargement carries a risk of dilution and institutional paralysis. Transition agreements will lead to a tangle of complex structures. The more economic and security interests there are to be reconciled, the less the member states will agree.

Competition for financial resources and political influence is bound to increase. The controversial system of allocation of subsidies under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy will probably have to be redesigned. Net beneficiaries of the EU budget—especially some Mediterranean member states—will object to the unavoidable reallocation of regional funds, which could even transform some of those countries into net payers. Current net payers will object to contributing much more, especially because strict budget discipline at the national level is a sine qua non for membership in the planned Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

The decisive issue is whether the EU will be able to develop a new consensus on the direction and speed of deepening integration, thus preparing the road to a successful widening by inclusion of new members. The Maastricht debate showed the division between advocates

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of a supranational and an intergovernmental approach—in other words, between those who are prepared to transfer considerably more national sovereignty to Brussels and those who are not. A compromise—a resort to opting-out and opting-in clauses—made the two philosophies pragmatically compatible. Reconciling the two views has been postponed to the 1996 Intergovernmental Review Conference; whether the answer will be easier to find in an EU of 15 members than in an EU of 12 is doubtful.

Safeguarding and improving the EU institutions' efficiency will necessitate a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting and new veto rules with regard to qualified majority voting. This presupposes readiness on all sides to give up more bits of national sovereignty. Should the 1996 conference fail to meet the deepening requirements of an eastward widening, the advocates of a supranational approach would certainly find further enlargement unacceptable.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

SUCH AN outcome could prove fatal, not least from the German point of view. It is vital to Germany to border stable democracies in all directions, and postwar history has shown that European integration is an efficient stabilizer, politically and economically. United Germany sees its future as inextricably bound up with that of adjacent nations, of which it has more than any other country in Europe. The overwhelming majority of its political elite agree that German-Polish relations must never again be subordinated to German-Russian relations. Germany's endorsement of the eastward enlargement of NATO indicates that its politicians have dropped the bad habit, adopted in Cold War *Ostpolitik* times, of worrying how hawks in Moscow will react.

It is vital to Germany to be part of an ever-closer union. As a prospective member of the EMU (in 1997 or, more likely, in 1999), it will have to ensure that monetary integration, including a single European currency, is supported by closer political integration among EMU participants. History shows that a monetary union without a strong political backbone is doomed.

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More important, the "German question" has not been fully answered by the reunification of 1990. Fitting this colossus into the European environment remains a problem. The EMU is not only an economic project, but also a means to overcome what some perceive as the monetary hegemony of the German Bundesbank. European integration and Atlantic ties have become central elements of Germany's raison d'état and the cosmopolitan mindset of its postwar generation; they have also been a means to build international confidence and get foreign support for restoring national unity. United Germany needs its neighbors' and partners' confidence to prevent them from envisaging coalitions to balance and contain its demographic, economic, and political overweight. Its fear of coalitions is not paranoia as long as European leaders still believe in nineteenth-century-style balance-of-power politics.

Some Europeans, especially in Britain, argue that the only remaining major issue for the EU is its eastward enlargement and that a closer union would only help Germany achieve the European hegemony for which it reached in two world wars. Most French political observers, however, believe that widening the EU without deepening it would weaken France's position and strengthen Germany's. The more member states the EU has, the smaller each share of the power pie becomes. But in terms of influence, Germany—surrounded by countries that regard Bonn (or Berlin) as the center of gravity—would probably be the only major beneficiary. Yet Germany's political class is prepared to give up some of the sovereignty it has acquired through unification, believing almost unanimously that it is the only way to escape the foreign policy traps of the past. Such an opportunity should be seized by Germany's European partners while it is available.

THE VIEW FROM FRANCE

FOR MORE than 40 years, the special relationship between France and Germany has been the vital ingredient in Europe's spectacular reconciliation after World War II and its increasing unification. There are growing strains, however, in the relationship. In the past, it was held together by a common threat, the Soviet empire. Neverthe-

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less, it had a delicate equilibrium: France's international clout as an independent nuclear power and permanent member of the U.N. Security Council made it the dominant political and strategic member of the pair. France could therefore accept the German economy's superior dynamism. As long as the East-West antagonism maintained the division of Germany, the French bomb could balance the German mark. Of course, one should not idealize the past. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, France had suspicions about Germany's motives, and Germany was often disappointed by France's inability to transcend Germany's aggressive past.

This fragile balance of imbalances has shifted. Germany is united and aware of its new centrality in Europe. It has stopped behaving as an economic giant and a political dwarf, though it has not yet fully overcome its tendency to believe that good intentions matter more than good deeds. It is slowly learning to take the political initiative. A more secure Germany is now facing a France that is less secure in its identity and European orientation. It is less that French elites distrust Germany than that they are insecure about their ability to balance Germany within Europe. Since German reunification, France can only dwell on its demographic inferiority. France's destabilizing political debates on the eve of presidential elections exacerbate its insecurity over its international standing and the rationality of its European choice.

For France, backing the EU was a way to gain power and influence. France, by itself, could not maintain its policy of grandeur. It could only do so through Europe. Today many within France's political and economic elite wonder openly whether they have been mistakenly working to further German interests. They see Germany's support for accession of east and central European nations to the EU as proof of Germany's efforts to enlarge its sphere of influence, if not control, in Europe. A recent working paper published by the German Christian Democrats' parliamentary group that contained a reference to federalism—to which France could never accede—is described by some elements of the French nationalist right as an attempt to create an alibi for German moves toward nationalism and unilateralism. When the socialist former defense minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, denounces Jacques Delors, an erstwhile candidate to succeed

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François Mitterrand, as the "candidate of the German CDU," it reminds France of the worst years of its political history.

Yet despite such suspicions, manifest at the time of Germany's reunification, the majority of the French is convinced that there are no alternatives to the Franco-German special relationship and its role as the "hard core" of the European Union. This policy recognizes the necessity and inevitability of enlargement. But it also notes the risks of the dilution of Europe and the danger of slowing down the European network, which would result in the less dynamic members imposing their rhythm on the more dynamic ones. Of course, the French do not wish to be left alone in the hard-core group with the Germans. But alternatives do not abound.

Britain, as a midsize nuclear power with a tradition of military intervention, may be the natural strategic ally of France. But this may be difficult to translate into concrete measures, even if a rapprochement is perceptible between the two permanent members of the U.N. Security Council who fought next to each other in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia. Britain may slowly realize that its special relationship with the United States is over and that its initial ambition of becoming an Athens to the new Rome—an enlightened and cultured mentor for a callow king—has not brought the expected benefits. The United States is banking on an EU strategy of both widening and deepening, as advocated by Germany and France. Britain's only alternative today is to pursue further integration into the EU, not merely as a participant in a free trade area, but as a key political force in this supranational political project. The European dilemma today is that one cannot deepen the EU with Britain, but one cannot without it either.

Germany has stopped behaving like an economic giant and a political dwarf.

Italy's precarious political situation and economy does not allow it to be either an early full-fledged partner in the planned EMU or a strategic partner for France. The neofascists in the current coalition government in Rome may be less worrisome than their future diplomacy. Irredentists would like to reclaim Istria from Slovenia, and their statements have caused concern. Those tendencies, which are not

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confined to Italy, underscore the idea that the importance of boundaries should be reduced, not emphasized, in the new Europe.

Spain, another potential partner for France, is also preoccupied with domestic problems. Other EU countries are too small to be influential. They could be so only through the leadership of an exceptional personality, and such a person is nowhere present.

A DIVERSIFIED EUROPE

IF NO BASIC consensus on deeper integration can be reached during the 1996 Intergovernmental Review Conference, the only option may be the "variable geometry" enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht. For example, not all EU members would join in the Economic and Monetary Union. Not all would participate in defense integration under the WEU. Some states, such as Turkey, would join the WEU as fully participating associate members without belonging to the EU. Some EU members, such as France and Germany, would be found in all circles and build a de facto nucleus, or "hard core," whereas others would not, whether by choice or because they do not meet certain requirements. That nucleus could stabilize the EU in the transition period, while a variable geometry could easily lead to a Europe à la carte—an EU more like a supermarket of options than a standard package.

The EU will certainly continue to attract new members. The Swedish referendum in favor of the EU was a happy surprise for those Europeans who favor more integration—and they are still in the majority. During the Cold War, one feared the Finlandization of Western Europe. Today we can look forward to a "Scandinavization" of the EU, which will add new spice to Europe's politics, societies, and cultures.

The Europeans do not have to look for fascinating goals; they are at hand. But they need to recognize that the fate of their continent depends on whether their old continent is rejuvenated or founders in passivity, pessimism, and old rivalries, whether it learns the lessons of the twentieth century in its last decade or repeats past errors. European integration plus transatlantic partnership was the key to success in Western Europe during the postwar era, and it should be so in the post–Cold War future.

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The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered

Barton J. Bernstein

THE QUESTIONS AMERICA SHOULD ASK

FIFTY YEARS AGO, during a three-day period in August 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, killing more than 115,000 people and possibly as many as 250,000, and injuring at least another 100,000. In the aftermath of the war, the bombings raised both ethical and historical questions about why and how they were used. Would they have been used on Germany? Why were cities targeted so that so many civilians would be killed? Were there likely alternative ways to end the war speedily and avoid the Allies' scheduled November 1, 1945, invasion of Kyushu?

Such questions often fail to recognize that, before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the use of the A-bomb did not raise profound moral issues for policymakers. The weapon was conceived in a race with Germany, and it undoubtedly would have been used against Germany had the bomb been ready much sooner. During the war, the target shifted to Japan. And during World War II's brutal course, civilians in cities had already become targets. The grim Axis bombing record is well known. Masses of noncombatants were also intentionally killed in the later stages of the American air war against Germany; that tactic was developed further in 1945 with the firebombing of Japanese cities.

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Such mass bombing constituted a transformation of morality, repudiating President Franklin D. Roosevelt's prewar pleas that the warring nations avoid bombing cities to spare civilian lives. Thus, by 1945, American leaders were not seeking to avoid the use of the A-bomb on Japan. But the evidence from current archival research shows that by pursuing alternative tactics instead, they probably could still have obviated the dreaded invasion and ended the war by November.

SHIFTING FROM GERMANY TO JAPAN

In 1941, urged by émigré and American scientists, President Roosevelt initiated the atomic bomb project—soon code-named the Manhattan Project—amid what was believed to be a desperate race with Hitler's Germany for the bomb. At the beginning, Roosevelt and his chief aides assumed that the A-bomb was a legitimate weapon that would be used first against Nazi Germany. They also decided that the bomb project should be kept secret from the Soviet Union, even after the Soviets became a wartime ally, because the bomb might well give the United States future leverage against the Soviets.

By mid-1944, the landscape of the war had changed. Roosevelt and his top advisers knew that the likely target would now be Japan, for the war with Germany would undoubtedly end well before the A-bomb was expected to be ready, around the spring of 1945. In a secret September 1944 memorandum at Hyde Park, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill ratified the shift from Germany to Japan. Their phrasing suggested that, for the moment anyway, they might have had some slight doubts about actually using the bomb, for they agreed that "it might *perhaps*, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese" (my emphasis).

Four days later, mulling over matters aloud with a visiting British diplomat and chief U.S. science adviser Vannevar Bush, Roosevelt briefly wondered whether the A-bomb should be dropped on Japan or whether it should be demonstrated in America, presumably with Japanese observers, and then used as a threat. His speculative notion seemed so unimportant and so contrary to the project's long-standing operating assumptions that Bush actually forgot about it when he pre-

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

When civilians became targets

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pared a memo of the meeting. He only recalled the president's remarks a day later and then added a brief paragraph to another memorandum.

Put in context alongside the dominant assumption that the bomb would be used against the enemy, the significance of F.D.R.'s occasional doubts is precisely that they were so occasional—expressed twice in almost four years. All of F.D.R.'s advisers who knew about the bomb always unquestioningly assumed that it would be used. Indeed, their memoranda frequently spoke of "after it is used" or "when it is used," and never "*if* it is used." By about mid-1944, most had comfortably concluded that the target would be Japan.

The bomb's assumed legitimacy as a war weapon was ratified bureaucratically in September 1944 when General Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project, had the air force create a special group—the 509th Composite Group with 1,750 men—to begin practicing to drop atomic bombs. So dominant was the assumption that the bomb would be used against Japan that only one high-ranking Washington official, Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson, even questioned this notion after V-E Day. He wondered whether the defeat of Germany on May 8, 1945, might alter the plans for dropping the bomb on Japan. It would not.

THE ASSUMPTION OF USE

THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, costing nearly $2 billion, had been kept secret from most cabinet members and nearly all of Congress. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, a trusted Republican, and General George C. Marshall, the equally respected army chief of staff, disclosed the project to only a few congressional leaders. They smuggled the necessary appropriations into the War Department budget without the knowledge—much less the scrutiny—of most congressmen, including most members of the key appropriations committees. A conception of the national interest agreed upon by a few men from the executive and legislative branches had revised the normal appropriations process.

In March 1944, when a Democratic senator heading a special investigating committee wanted to pry into this expensive project,

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Stimson peevishly described him in his diary as "a nuisance and pretty untrustworthy . . . He talks smoothly but acts meanly." That man was Senator Harry S Truman. Marshall persuaded him not to investigate the project, and thus Truman did not learn any more than that it involved a new weapon until he was suddenly thrust into the presidency on April 12, 1945.

In early 1945, James F. Byrnes, then F.D.R.'s "assistant president" for domestic affairs and a savvy Democratic politician, began to suspect that the Manhattan Project was a boondoggle. "If [it] proves a failure," he warned Roosevelt, "it will be subjected to relentless investigation and criticism." Byrnes' doubts were soon overcome by Stimson and Marshall. A secret War Department report, with some hyperbole, summarized the situation: "If the project succeeds, there won't be any investigation. If it doesn't, they won't investigate anything else."

Had Roosevelt lived, such lurking political pressures might have powerfully confirmed his intention to use the weapon on the enemy—an assumption he had already made. How else could he have justified spending roughly $2 billion, diverting scarce materials from other war enterprises that might have been even more useful, and bypassing Congress? In a nation still unprepared to trust scientists, the Manhattan Project could have seemed a gigantic waste if its value were not dramatically demonstrated by the use of the atomic bomb.

Truman, inheriting the project and trusting both Marshall and Stimson, would be even more vulnerable to such political pressures. And, like F.D.R., the new president easily assumed that the bomb should and would be used. Truman never questioned that assumption. Bureaucratic developments set in motion before he entered the White House reinforced his belief. And his aides, many inherited from the Roosevelt administration, shared the same faith.

PICKING TARGETS

GROVES, EAGER to retain control of the atomic project, received Marshall's permission in early spring 1945 to select targets for the new weapon. Groves and his associates had long recognized that they were considering a weapon of a new magnitude, possibly equivalent to the

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"normal bombs carried by [at least] 2,500 bombers." And they had come to assume that the A-bomb would be "detonated well above ground, relying primarily on blast effect to do material damage, [so that even with] minimum probable efficiency, there will be the maximum number of structures (dwellings and factories) damaged beyond repair."

On April 27, the Target Committee, composed of Groves, army air force men like General Lauris Norstad, and scientists including the great mathematician John Von Neumann, met for the first time to discuss how and where in Japan to drop the bomb. They did not want to risk wasting the precious weapon, and decided that it must be dropped visually and not by radar, despite the poor weather conditions in Japan during the summer, when the bomb would be ready.

Good targets were not plentiful. The air force, they knew, "was systematically bombing out the following cities with the prime purpose . . . of not leaving one stone lying on another: Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Yawata, and Nagasaki . . . The air force is operating primarily to laying [sic] waste all the main Japanese cities . . . Their existing procedure is to bomb the hell out of Tokyo."

By early 1945, World War II—especially in the Pacific—had become virtually total war. The firebombing of Dresden had helped set a precedent for the U.S. air force, supported by the American people, to intentionally kill mass numbers of Japanese citizens. The earlier moral insistence on noncombatant immunity crumbled during the savage war. In Tokyo, during March 9-10, a U.S. air attack killed about 80,000 Japanese civilians. American B-29s dropped napalm on the city's heavily populated areas to produce uncontrollable firestorms. It may even have been easier to conduct this new warfare outside Europe and against Japan because its people seemed like "yellow subhumans" to many rank-and-file American citizens and many of their leaders.

In this new moral context, with mass killings of an enemy's civilians even seeming desirable, the committee agreed to choose "large urban areas of not less than three miles in diameter existing in the larger populated areas" as A-bomb targets. The April 27 discussion focused on four cities: Hiroshima, which, as "the largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list," warranted

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serious consideration; Yawata, known for its steel industry; Yokohama; and Tokyo, "a possibility [though] now practically all bombed and burned out and . . . practically rubble with only the palace grounds left standing." They decided that other areas warranted more consideration: Tokyo Bay, Kawasaki, Yokohoma, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kure, Yawata, Kokura, Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi, Kumamoto, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Sasebo.

The choice of targets would depend partly on how the bomb would do its deadly work—the balance of blast, heat, and radiation. At their second set of meetings, during May 11-12, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos laboratory, stressed that the bomb material itself was lethal enough for perhaps a billion deadly doses and that the weapon would give off lethal radioactivity. The bomb, set to explode in the air, would deposit "a large fraction of either the initial active material or the radioactive products in the immediate vicinity of the target; but the radiation . . . will, of course, have an effect on exposed personnel in the target area." It was unclear, he acknowledged, what would happen to most of the radioactive material: it could stay for hours as a cloud above the place of detonation or, if the bomb exploded during rain or in high humidity and thus caused rain, "most of the active material will be brought down in the vicinity of the target area." Oppenheimer's report left unclear whether a substantial proportion or only a small fraction of the population might die from radiation. So far as the skimpy records reveal, no member of the Target Committee chose to dwell on this matter. They probably assumed that the bomb blast would claim most of its victims before the radiation could do its deadly work.

The savagery of World War II made civilians premeditated targets for terror bombing.

In considering targets, they discussed the possibility of bombing the emperor's palace in Tokyo and "agreed that we should not recommend it but that any action for this bombing should come from authorities on military policy." They decided to gather information on the effectiveness of using the bomb on the palace.

The Target Committee selected their four top targets: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura Arsenal, with the implication

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that Niigata, a city farther away from the air force 509th group's Tinian base, might be held in reserve as a fifth. Kyoto, the ancient former capital and shrine city, with a population of about a million, was the most attractive target to the committee. "From the psychological point of view," the committee minutes note, "there is the advantage that Kyoto is an intellectual center for Japan and [thus] the people there are more apt to appreciate the significance of such a weapon." The implication was that those in Kyoto who survived the A-bombing and saw the horror would be believed elsewhere in Japan.

Of central importance, the group stressed that the bomb should be used as a terror weapon—to produce "the greatest psychological effect against Japan" and to make the world, and the U.S.S.R. in particular, aware that America possessed this new power. The death and destruction would not only intimidate the surviving Japanese into pushing for surrender, but, as a bonus, cow other nations, notably the Soviet Union. In short, America could speed the ending of the war and by the same act help shape the postwar world.

By the committee's third meeting, two weeks later, on May 28, they had pinned down matters. They chose as their targets (in order) Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata, and decided to aim for the center of each city. They agreed that aiming for industrial areas would be a mistake because such targets were small, spread on the cities' fringes, and quite dispersed. They also knew that bombing was imprecise enough that the bomb might easily miss its mark by a fifth of a mile, and they wanted to be sure that the weapon would show its power and not be wasted.

The committee understood that the three target cities would be removed from the air force's regular target list, reserving them for the A-bomb. But, the members were informed, "with the current and prospective rate of . . . bombings, it is expected to complete strategic bombing of Japan by 1 Jan 46 so availability of future [A-bomb] targets will be a problem." In short, Japan was being bombed out.

THE RATIFICATION OF TERROR BOMBING

On May 28, 1945, physicist Arthur H. Compton, a Nobel laureate and member of a special scientific panel advising the high-level

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Interim Committee newly appointed to recommend policy about the bomb, raised profound moral and political questions about how the atomic bomb would be used. "It introduces the question of mass slaughter, really for the first time in history," he wrote. "It carries with it the question of possible radioactive poison over the area bombed. Essentially, the question of the use . . . of the new weapon carries much more serious implications than the introduction of poison gas."

Compton's concern received some independent support from General Marshall, who told Secretary Stimson on May 29 that the A-bomb should first be used not against civilians but against military installations—perhaps a naval base—and then possibly against large manufacturing areas after the civilians had received ample warnings to flee. Marshall feared "the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force." A graduate of Virginia Military Institute and a trained soldier, Marshall struggled to retain the older code of not *intentionally* killing civilians. The concerns of Compton the scientist and Marshall the general, their values so rooted in an earlier conception of war that sought to spare noncombatants, soon gave way to the sense of exigency, the desire to use the bomb on people, and the unwillingness or inability of anyone near the top in Washington to plead forcefully for maintaining this older morality.

Truman hoped the bomb would end the war and intimidate the Soviet Union.

On May 31, 1945, the Interim Committee, composed of Stimson, Bush, Harvard President James Conant, physicist and educator Karl T. Compton, Secretary of State designate James F. Byrnes, and a few other notables, discussed the A-bomb. Opening this meeting, Stimson, the aged secretary of war who had agonized over the recent shift toward mass bombing of civilians, described the atomic bomb as representing "a new relationship of man to the universe. This discovery might be compared to the discoveries of the Copernican theory and the laws of gravity, but far more important than these in its effects on the lives of men."

Meeting, as they were, some six weeks before the first nuclear test at Alamogordo, they were still unsure of the power of this new

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weapon. Oppenheimer told the group that it would have an explosive force of between 2,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT. Its visual effect would be tremendous. "It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet," Oppenheimer reported. "The neutron effect [radiation] would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile." He estimated that 20,000 Japanese would be killed.

According to the committee minutes, the group discussed "various types of targets and the effects to be produced." Stimson "expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning; that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant, the secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses."

Directed by Stimson, the committee was actually endorsing terror bombing—but somewhat uneasily. They would not focus exclusively on a military target (the older morality), as Marshall had recently proposed, nor fully on civilians (the emerging morality). They managed to achieve their purpose—terror bombing—without bluntly acknowledging it to themselves. All knew that families—women, children, and, even in the daytime, during the bomb attack, some workers—dwelled in "workers' houses."

At the committee's morning or afternoon session, or at lunch, or possibly at all three times—different members later presented differing recollections—the notion of a noncombat demonstration of the A-bomb came up. The issue of how to use the bomb was not even on Stimson's agenda, nor was it part of the formal mandate of the Interim Committee, but he may have showed passing interest in the subject of a noncombat demonstration. They soon rejected it. It was deemed too risky for various reasons: the bomb might not work, the Japanese air force might interfere with the bomber, the A-bomb might not adequately impress the Japanese militarists, or the bomb might incinerate any Allied POWs whom the Japanese might place in the area.

The discussion on May 31 had focused substantially on *how* to use

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the bomb against Japan. At one point some of the members had considered trying several A-bomb strikes at the same time and presumably on the same city. Groves opposed this notion, partly on the grounds that "the effect would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular air force bombing program." Like the others, he was counting on the dramatic effect of a single bomb, delivered by a single plane, killing many thousands. It was not new for the air force to kill so many Japanese, but this method would be new. And the use of the new weapon would carry, as stressed by American proclamations in early August, the likelihood of more nuclear attacks on Japanese cities—a continuing "rain of ruin."

"We didn't know beans about the military situation," Oppenheimer later complained.

Two weeks after the Interim Committee meeting, on June 16, after émigré physicists James Franck and Leo Szilard and some colleagues from the Manhattan Project's Chicago laboratory raised moral and political questions about the surprise use of the bomb on Japan, a special four-member scientific advisory committee disposed of the matter of a noncombat demonstration. The group was composed of physicists Arthur Compton, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Ernest O. Lawrence. By one report, Lawrence was the last of the four to give up hope for a noncombat demonstration. Oppenheimer, who spoke on the issue in 1954 and was not then controverted by the other three men, recalled that the subject of a noncombat demonstration was not the most important matter dealt with during the group's busy weekend meeting and thus did not receive much attention. On June 16, the four scientists concluded: "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."

At that time, as some members of the scientific panel later grudgingly acknowledged, they knew little about the situation in Japan, the power of the militarists there, the timid efforts by the peace forces there to move toward a settlement, the date of the likely American invasion of Kyushu, and the power of the still untested A-bomb. "We didn't know beans about the military situation," Oppenheimer later remarked pungently.

But even different counsel by the scientific advisers probably could

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not have reversed the course of events. The bomb had been devised to be used, the project cost about $2 billion, and Truman and Byrnes, the president's key political aide, had no desire to avoid its use. Nor did Stimson. They even had additional reasons for wanting to use it: the bomb might *also* intimidate the Soviets and render them tractable in the postwar period.

Stimson emphasized this theme in a secret memorandum to Truman on April 25: "If the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we should then have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved." Concern about the bomb and its relationship to the Soviet Union dominated Stimson's thinking in the spring and summer of 1945. And Truman and Byrnes, perhaps partly under Stimson's tutelage, came to stress the same hopes for the bomb.

THE AGONIES OF KILLING CIVILIANS

DURING 1945, Stimson found himself presiding, with agony, over an air force that killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians. Usually, he preferred not to face these ugly facts, but sought refuge in the notion that the air force was actually engaged in precision bombing and that somehow this precision bombing was going awry. Caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of noncombatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war, Stimson could neither fully face the facts nor fully escape them. He was not a hypocrite but a man trapped in ambivalence.

Stimson discussed the problem with Truman on June 6. Stimson stressed that he was worried about the air force's mass bombing, but that it was hard to restrict it. In his diary, Stimson recorded: "I told him I was anxious about this feature of the war for two reasons: first, because I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities; and second, I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the air force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength." According to Stimson, Truman "laughed and said he understood."

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Unable to reestablish the old morality and wanting the benefits for America of the new, Stimson proved decisive—even obdurate—on a comparatively small matter: removing Kyoto from Groves' target list of cities. It was not that Stimson was trying to save Kyoto's citizens; rather, he was seeking to save its relics, lest the Japanese become embittered and later side with the Soviets. As Stimson explained in his diary entry of July 24: "The bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus . . . be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely, a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria."

Truman, backing Stimson on this matter, insisted privately that the A-bombs would be used only on military targets. Apparently the president wished not to recognize the inevitable—that a weapon of such great power would necessarily kill many civilians. At Potsdam on July 25, Truman received glowing reports of the vast destruction achieved by the Alamogordo blast and lavishly recorded the details in his diary: a crater of 1,200 feet in diameter, a steel tower destroyed a half mile away, men knocked over six miles away. "We have discovered," he wrote in his diary, "the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied." But when he approved the final list of A-bomb targets, with Nagasaki and Kokura substituted for Kyoto, he could write in his diary, "I have told Sec. of War . . . Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic . . . [t]he target will be a purely military one." Truman may have been engaging in self-deception to make the mass deaths of civilians acceptable.

Neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki was a "purely military" target, but the official press releases, cast well before the atomic bombings, glided over this matter. Hiroshima, for example, was described simply as "an important Japanese army base." The press releases were drafted by men who knew that those cities had been chosen partly to dramatize the killing of noncombatants.

On August 10, the day after the Nagasaki bombing, when Truman

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realized the magnitude of the mass killing and the Japanese offered a conditional surrender requiring continuation of the emperor, the president told his cabinet that he did not want to kill any more women and children. Rejecting demands to drop more atomic bombs on Japan, he hoped not to use them again. After two atomic bombings, the horror of mass death had forcefully hit the president, and he was willing to return partway to the older morality—civilians might be protected from A-bombs. But he continued to sanction the heavy conventional bombing of Japan's cities, with the deadly toll that napalm, incendiaries, and other bombs produced. Between August 10 and August 14—the war's last day, on which about 1,000 American planes bombed Japanese cities, some delivering their deadly cargo after Japan announced its surrender—the United States probably killed more than 15,000 Japanese.

THE ROADS NOT TAKEN

BEFORE AUGUST 10, Truman and his associates had not sought to avoid the use of the atomic bomb. As a result, they had easily dismissed the possibility of a noncombat demonstration. Indeed, the post-Hiroshima pleas of Japan's military leaders for a final glorious battle suggest that such a demonstration probably would not have produced a speedy surrender. And American leaders also did not pursue other alternatives: modifying their unconditional surrender demand by guaranteeing the maintenance of the emperor, awaiting the Soviet entry into the war, or simply pursuing heavy conventional bombing of the cities amid the strangling naval blockade.

Truman and Byrnes did not believe that a modification of the unconditional surrender formula would produce a speedy surrender. They thought that guaranteeing to maintain the emperor would prompt an angry backlash from Americans who regarded Hirohito as a war criminal, and feared that this concession might embolden the Japanese militarists to expect more concessions and thus prolong the war. As a result, the president and his secretary of state easily rejected Stimson's pleas for a guarantee of the emperor.

Similarly, most American leaders did not believe that the Soviet

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entry into the Pacific war would make a decisive difference and greatly speed Japan's surrender. Generally, they believed that the U.S.S.R.'s entry would help end the war—ideally, before the massive invasion of Kyushu. They anticipated Moscow's intervention in mid-August, but the Soviets moved up their schedule to August 8, probably because of the Hiroshima bombing, and the Soviet entry did play an important role in producing Japan's surrender on August 14. Soviet entry without the A-bomb *might* have produced Japan's surrender before November.

Whatever one thinks of Hiroshima, bombing Nagasaki was almost certainly unnecessary.

The American aim was to avoid, if possible, the November 1 invasion, which would involve about 767,000 troops, at a possible cost of 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days and a total estimated American death toll of about 25,000. And American leaders certainly wanted to avoid the second part of the invasion plan, an assault on the Tokyo plain, scheduled for around March 1, 1946, with an estimated 15,000-21,000 more Americans dead. In the spring and summer of 1945, no American leader believed—as some later falsely claimed—that they planned to use the A-bomb to save half a million Americans. But, given the patriotic calculus of the time, there was no hesitation about using A-bombs to kill many Japanese in order to save the 25,000-46,000 Americans who might otherwise have died in the invasions. Put bluntly, Japanese life—including civilian life—was cheap, and some American leaders, like many rank-and-file citizens, may well have savored the prospect of punishing the Japanese with the A-bomb.

Truman, Byrnes, and the other leaders did not have to be reminded of the danger of a political backlash in America if they did not use the bomb and the invasions became necessary. Even if they had wished to avoid its use—and they did not—the fear of later public outrage spurred by the weeping parents and loved ones of dead American boys might well have forced American leaders to drop the A-bomb on Japan.

No one in official Washington expected that one or two atomic bombs would end the war quickly. They expected to use at least a third, and probably more. And until the day after Nagasaki, there had

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never been in their thinking a choice between atomic bombs and conventional bombs, but a selection of both—using mass bombing to compel surrender. Atomic bombs and conventional bombs were viewed as supplements to, not substitutes for, one another. Heavy conventional bombing of Japan's cities would probably have killed hundreds of thousands in the next few months, and might have produced the desired surrender before November 1.

Taken together, some of these alternatives—promising to retain the Japanese monarchy, awaiting the Soviets' entry, and even more conventional bombing—very probably could have ended the war before the dreaded invasion. Still, the evidence—to borrow a phrase from F.D.R.—is somewhat "iffy," and no one who looks at the intransigence of the Japanese militarists should have full confidence in those other strategies. But we may well regret that these alternatives were not pursued and that there was not an effort to avoid the use of the first A-bomb—and certainly the second.

Whatever one thinks about the necessity of the first A-bomb, the second—dropped on Nagasaki on August 9—was almost certainly unnecessary. It was used because the original order directed the air force to drop bombs "as made ready" and, even after the Hiroshima bombing, no one in Washington anticipated an imminent Japanese surrender. Evidence now available about developments in the Japanese government—most notably the emperor's then-secret decision shortly before the Nagasaki bombing to seek peace—makes it clear that the second bomb could undoubtedly have been avoided. At least 35,000 Japanese and possibly almost twice that number, as well as several thousand Koreans, died unnecessarily in Nagasaki.

Administration leaders did not seek to avoid the use of the A-bomb. They even believed that its military use might produce a powerful bonus: the intimidation of the Soviets, rendering them, as Byrnes said, "more manageable," especially in Eastern Europe. Although that was not the dominant purpose for using the weapon, it certainly was a strong confirming one. Had Truman and his associates, like the dissenting scientists at Chicago, foreseen that the A-bombing of Japan would make the Soviets intransigent rather than tractable, perhaps American leaders would have questioned their decision. But precisely

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because American leaders expected that the bombings would also compel the Soviet Union to loosen its policy in Eastern Europe, there was no incentive to question their intention to use the atomic bomb. Even if they had, the decision would probably have been the same. In a powerful sense, the atomic bombings represented the implementation of an assumption—one that Truman comfortably inherited from Roosevelt. Hiroshima was an easy decision for Truman.

THE REDEFINITION OF MORALITY

ONLY YEARS LATER, as government archives opened, wartime hatreds faded, and sensibilities changed, would Americans begin seriously to question whether the atomic bombings were necessary, desirable, and moral. Building on the postwar memoirs of Admiral William Leahy and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, among others, doubts began to emerge about the use of the atomic bombs against Japan. As the years passed, Americans learned that the bombs, according to high-level American military estimates in June and July 1945, probably could not have saved a half million American lives in the invasions, as Truman sometimes contended after Nagasaki, but would have saved fewer than 50,000. Americans also came slowly to recognize the barbarity of World War II, especially the mass killings by bombing civilians. It was that redefinition of morality that made Hiroshima and Nagasaki possible and ushered in the atomic age in a frightening way.

That redefinition of morality was a product of World War II, which included such barbarities as Germany's systematic murder of six million Jews and Japan's rape of Nanking. While the worst atrocities were perpetrated by the Axis, all the major nation-states sliced away at the moral code—often to the applause of their leaders and citizens alike. By 1945 there were few moral restraints left in what had become virtually a total war. Even F.D.R.'s prewar concern for sparing enemy civilians had fallen by the wayside. In that new moral climate, any nation that had the A-bomb would probably have used it against enemy peoples. British leaders as well as Joseph Stalin endorsed the act. Germany's and Japan's leaders surely would have

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used it against cities. America was not morally unique—just technologically exceptional. Only it had the bomb, and so only it used it.

To understand this historical context does not require that American citizens or others should approve of it. But it does require that they recognize that pre- and post-Hiroshima dissent was rare in 1945. Indeed, few then asked why the United States used the atomic bomb on Japan. But had the bomb not been used, many more, including numerous outraged American citizens, would have bitterly asked that question of the Truman administration.

In 1945, most Americans shared the feelings that Truman privately expressed a few days after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings when he justified the weapons' use in a letter to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ. "I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war," the president wrote. "The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast."

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Review Essay

Misinterpreting the Cold War

The Hard-Liners Had It Right

Richard Pipes

The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War. BY RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994, 834 pp. $44.95.

Forty years ago the foreign policy debate in the United States revolved around the question, "Who lost China?" Today one of its most contentious issues is, "Who won the Cold War?" Advocates of the hard line feel that the events of the past five years have vindicated their strategy. They claim that it was the policy of containment, reinforced by a technological arms race, economic denial, and psychological warfare, that brought down the Soviet Union and communism. Advocates of the soft line will have none of it. They contend that, far from contributing to the demise of communism, the hard-line strategy prolonged the Cold War by arousing deep-seated anxieties in the Russians and making them even more truculent. As for the causes of communism's demise, they are less certain.

Raymond Garthoff's account of the final phase of the Cold War is meant to justify the soft line. By virtue of its massive research, it is likely to acquire the status of a primer for adherents of this approach. The book, which traces the course of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan and Bush administrations, picks up, with some overlap, where its predecessor, *Détente and Confrontation*, left off. The two volumes, similar in approach and format, complement one another, surveying in minute detail relations between the two superpowers from 1969 to 1991. They are imposing treatises, totaling some two thousand fact-filled pages, nearly every one supported by references to the sources.

Mr. Garthoff identifies three basic approaches to communism and the

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Soviet Union, each with corollary policy implications. The first, of which President Ronald Reagan was the outstanding champion, he labels "essentialist." This approach assumed that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state driven by a militant ideology and hence intrinsically expansionist; such a power could be restrained and rendered harmless only by determined confrontation. The second, "mechanical" approach, while conceding that the Soviet Union was indeed expansionist, viewed it above all as a pragmatic power that could be "managed" by the astute application of rewards and penalties. The third, "interactionist" approach made light of both Soviet ideology and behavior, focusing instead on the conflict between the two superpowers, which it saw as propelled by a dynamic of its own. For this school, the ultimate reality was the competition itself; to reduce tensions, it was necessary above all to understand and allow for the concerns of the adversary. Mr. Garthoff, whose mission is to enlighten readers about the motives behind Soviet actions, makes no secret that his sympathies lie with the third school. Although he has some good words for the proponents of the mechanical approach, he has nothing but scorn for the "ideologues" espousing the essentialist cause.

Faithful to his premise, Mr. Garthoff depicts in his two histories the complex story of U.S.-Soviet relations from Nixon to Bush as a series of interacting moves by the contending parties. In *Détente and Confrontation*, he seemed to perceive no difference between the United States and Russia: they were simply armed camps wrestling for global supremacy. In the present volume, written after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., he is willing to concede, rather discreetly, that perhaps, after all, communist ideology, by positing the inevitability of a global conflict between socialism and capitalism, influenced Soviet behavior. Even so, his narrative consists of a succession of episodes, each dominated by a pattern of action, reaction (or overreaction), confrontation, and resolution. None of these conflicts is seen as possessing any substance; each originates in a misunderstanding of the opponent's intentions coupled with misguided views on one's own security. There are no contending values or even interests; there are only misperceptions and fears. Almost all Soviet aggression is explained in this fashion. Explanation used in this manner amounts to justification: Mr. Garthoff's methodology enables him to justify every Soviet aggression, be it the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the crushing of Poland's Solidarity movement, or the shooting down of a Korean airliner in 1983.

A good example of Mr. Garthoff's apologetic treatment of Soviet Cold War policies can be seen in his account of the December 1981 events in Poland. He gives no credit to Solidarity for its remarkable success in peacefully challenging the Communist Party's dictatorship. Nor does he try to explain why Solidarity arose and what its emergence meant. His treatment is coldly geopolitical: the rise of democratic forces in Poland posed a threat to the Soviet regime and left it no choice but to react by either invading Poland to suppress Solidarity or deputizing its Polish surrogates to do so. It chose the second, less

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violent alternative. Although regrettable, the imposition of martial law in Poland was understandable and justifiable. It was how both sides played the game.

Now admittedly, Solidarity endangered the Soviet regime, but its threat was of a moral, not military, nature. The Polish trade union demonstrated to the world the hollowness of communist claims to represent the working class and showed how workers, in collaboration with intellectuals, could circumvent the seemingly fail-safe internal security precautions of communist regimes. Its ability to do so aroused panic in Moscow, which feared that Russian workers might be tempted to copy the Polish example. This fear served as a stimulus for reform. Clearly, Solidarity was more than a pawn in the geopolitical contest. But Mr. Garthoff refuses to acknowledge the impact of Solidarity on the evolution of communism because he treats all internal dissent in communist countries as a sideshow. Thus, the Czechoslovak Charter 77 movement rated no more than a footnote in the first volume, Solidarity has no separate index entry in the present one, and the Soviet Helsinki Monitoring Group goes unmentioned in both. It is such superficially realistic thinking, blind to human aspirations, that has led most Sovietologists to grievously underestimate the weaknesses of communism and then to be surprised by its collapse.

What renders this book anachronistic is the author's persistent justification of Soviet aggression in terms that echo the official Soviet line of the time, terms that have been publicly repudiated by Russia's own democratically elected leaders from President Boris Yeltsin on down. In a speech to the U.S. Congress in June 1992, Yeltsin implicitly aligned himself with Reagan's view of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and the primary instigator of the Cold War when he declared: "The world can sigh in relief. The idol of communism, which spread everywhere social strife, animosity, and unparalleled brutality, which instilled fear in humanity, has collapsed." These are not the words of someone who sees no significant difference between the parties involved in the Cold War. During the past several years, other ex-Soviet political and military figures have openly admitted their country's aggressive intentions and manipulation of Western liberal opinion. Although newly released archival materials confirm these revelations, Mr. Garthoff, unfortunately, finds no room in his narrative for this evidence.

In the Russia of today, the only public figures who share the author's benign interpretation of Soviet Cold War policies are the reactionary nationalists of the "red-brown" coalition. How paradoxical that an American liberal should find himself in the camp of unregenerate Russian communists and fascists, while the elected president of Russia makes common cause with Western cold warriors!

REAGAN VINDICATED

Proceeding from the premise that in the Cold War the Soviet side acted almost exclusively out of fear for its security, Mr. Garthoff heaps scorn on Reagan and the "ideologues" in his entourage, who, he claims, drove the president to engage the Soviet Union in military and rhetorical confrontations. He does not address the question of why the conciliatory policies

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of Presidents Nixon or Carter were accompanied by a relentless military buildup and foreign intervention that culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan. He depicts Reagan as a passive accomplice of policies orchestrated by others, an ignoramus driven by a visceral anticommunist sentiment.

Admittedly, Reagan showed little curiosity about the kind of data that Mr. Garthoff has accumulated with such tenacity. Nevertheless, he displayed great discernment and the instinctive judgment of a true statesman, being inspired by a strong moral sense and a sound understanding of what it is to live under tyranny. As someone involved in the formulation of Soviet policy in the first two years of the Reagan administration, I can attest that the direction of this policy was set by the president and not by his staff, and that it was vigorously implemented over the objections of several more dovish secretaries. It rested on a keen grasp of the vulnerabilities of the Soviet regime.

Mr. Garthoff claims that in the early and mid-1980s no one "expect[ed] or fores[aw] that within a decade the Cold War, communist rule, and the Soviet Union itself would come to an end." The statement certainly holds true for him and his colleagues in the Sovietological community. It is demonstrably wrong when applied to President Reagan. Reagan acted with the conviction that the Soviet Union was not strong but weak, that its power rested on police terror at home and nuclear blackmail abroad, and that, being in the profoundest sense unnatural, it did not have long to live. In a speech at Notre Dame in May 1981, to cite but one example, Reagan asserted that "the West will not contain communism; it will transcend communism," and dismissed the whole communist experiment as a "sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."

Such pronouncements, which ran counter to the academic consensus and earned Reagan in some circles the reputation of a dangerous right-wing fanatic, did not rest entirely on intuition. In the early 1980s the U.S. government occasionally received intelligence reports that depicted in stark terms the internal crisis afflicting the Soviet Union—intelligence not all that different from the "unvarnished internal reporting of the KGB," to which Mr. Garthoff gives much credit for informing the Soviet leaders that their country was in trouble. The grand strategy of the Reagan administration with regard to the U.S.S.R. was to exploit this crisis by every available means in order to push Moscow toward reform.

In 1984, after leaving government service and shortly before Gorbachev came into office, I summarized this strategy in an article in this journal, where I depicted the Soviet Union as a country in the throes of a "revolutionary situation," whose leaders had no alternative (except war) but to carry out drastic internal reforms.[1] These arguments paraphrased National Security Decision Directive 75, a still classified document dating to December 1982 that spelled out Reagan's Soviet policy.

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[1] "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, pp. 47-61. I elaborated on this idea in my book, *Survival Is Not Enough*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.

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Subsequent events corroborated these assumptions and the soundness of this strategy. At the beginning of Reagan's second term, Moscow entrusted its leadership to a man convinced that the Soviet Union urgently needed to liberalize at home and adopt a less aggressive stance abroad. As soon as Mikhail Gorbachev proceeded from words to deeds, President Reagan embraced him and, in the author's words, gradually moved from an "essentialist" to an "interactionist" position. Of course, the shift was not a change of heart by Reagan but an adaptation to the altered conditions in the U.S.S.R.

The fundamental weakness of Mr. Garthoff's case is his failure to account for the emergence of a Soviet soft-liner in the midst of the most hard-line of all American administrations. According to his interactionist model, the Soviet leadership responded tit for tat, meeting belligerence with belligerence and accommodation with accommodation. This theory failed to explain why the U.S.S.R. behaved more rather than less aggressively during the era of détente. The theory also fails to explain why the Politburo chose, in response to Reagan's anticommunism, a man committed to perestroika and disarmament. The author's unwillingness to confront this problem subverts the whole theoretical underpinning of his treatise.

GORBACHEV: DEUS EX MACHINA?

Having painted himself into a corner, Mr. Garthoff can offer no plausible explanation for the collapse of communism. If it was neither Western containment nor domestic dissent, then what brought about its demise? And why did the disintegration of the Soviet Union end the Cold War? Since he cannot quite avoid dealing with such questions, he resorts to a single, implausible explanation: Gorbachev. The mere appearance of the new first secretary, descending on the stage of history like some deus ex machina, changed everything. It is a remarkably simplistic conclusion to come out of such impressive research, an extreme version of the old theory of great men as movers of events, long ago abandoned by historians.

Gorbachev, the shining hero of *The Great Transition*, emerges from nowhere. No satisfactory rationale is offered to explain why a typical product of the Soviet nomenklatura, a man who to this day affirms his faith in the ideals of communism, on being elevated to head both the party and state in March 1985, chose to change the course of his country's internal and external policies so radically. Mr. Garthoff's focus is entirely on the minutiae of the internal party intrigues and the comings and goings of U.S. and Soviet diplomats. He ignores the central question raised by his methodology, namely, why, after four years of Reagan's relentlessly confrontational policies, the Soviet Union did not respond in kind (as the interactionist theory would have it) by appointing a similarly hard-line, belligerent first secretary, but settled on a man of compromise. Something is clearly wrong with the interactionist model. The possibility that Reagan's anticommunism may have had something to do with the Soviet change of course is not even raised. So, for all the diligently compiled facts, for Mr. Garthoff the causes of the "Great Transition" are shrouded in mystery.

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U.S. POLICY MATTERED

Earlier this year there appeared a book called *Victory* by Peter Schweizer, a fellow at the Hoover Institution.[2] It is a fraction of the length of Mr. Garthoff's opus and lacks scholarly rigor. The references are mainly to interviews with officials of the Reagan and Brezhnev administrations, many of which cannot be verified. There is no table of contents or index. Yet this journalistic account comes closer to explaining the end of the Cold War than Mr. Garthoff's treatise, with its 1,794 footnotes.

Victory contends that the Reagan administration formulated and implemented a systematic policy of subverting the Soviet Union, largely through the use of the CIA, and that this policy made a decisive contribution to the collapse of communism. Mr. Schweizer opens with quotations from three high Soviet officials supporting his view, one of them the former Soviet foreign minister, Alexander Bessmertnykh, who conceded publicly that Reagan's programs, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, "accelerated the decline of the Soviet Union."

Among the many illustrations of Mr. Schweizer's thesis is new information on the successful effort of CIA Director William Casey in 1982 to persuade Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the United States in lowering oil prices. These moves shattered Soviet hard currency earnings in the 1980s, which depended heavily on energy exports, and adversely affected the entire Soviet economy. The author also provides fresh evidence of Washington's clandestine support of Solidarity after the 1981 crackdown and its help to the Afghan partisans.

Of course, the effect of the hard-line Reagan policies on the collapse of the U.S.S.R. will not be known until all the Russian archives are opened to scholars, notably the so-called Presidential Archive, which holds the minutes of the Politburo sessions of the 1980s. Even then the question may not be incontrovertibly resolved, since, as historians well know, the most important decisions of state are often not committed to paper. Still, one can say with confidence that U.S. policies played an important role in compelling reforms and that the reforms, once launched, unraveled the system. That much is known from statements of ex-Soviet officials and generals. Mr. Garthoff would have done well at least to contemplate this possibility.

THE SINS OF SOVIETOLOGY

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophe for Sovietologists and, more broadly, the entire discipline of political science. Never has so much money been allocated to study one country; never have so many academic and government specialists scrutinized every aspect of a country's life from evidence provided by published and unpublished sources as well as eavesdropping devices and satellites. Yet when the end came, the experts found themselves utterly unprepared. To the extent that political science wishes to be treated as scholarship, it clearly behooves its practitioners to confront this failure.

Obviously, this is not the place to undertake such an analysis. Yet Mr. Gar-

[2] New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994.

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thoff's volume invites some remarks on this subject, for it is a serious work, based on a thorough study of a wide range of sources and filled with interesting information. Why would such a massive, earnest effort fail equally to predict what would happen and to explain convincingly what did happen?

The fiasco of Sovietology—something its practitioners have yet to acknowledge—may well have had its root cause in the determination of political scientists to act like physicists or biologists in order to earn the kind of prestige accorded to natural scientists. But, as demonstrated well over a century ago by German and Russian philosophers, the study of mankind differs fundamentally from the study of nature, in part because the observer is identical with the object observed and in part because, unlike molecules and cells, human beings have values and objectives that preclude their being analyzed in a value-free, unteleological manner. Thus the investigation of social and political organizations calls for a methodology closer to that employed in history and even literature.

Unfortunately, modern political scientists, ignoring this counsel, have proceeded to dehumanize the study of state and society, turning it into an arid discipline that at its worst resembles medieval scholasticism in its remoteness from life, self-verifying methodology, and self-confirming conclusions. The Sovietologists refused to read Soviet novels and poetry, or at any rate to take them into account, on the grounds that they were "soft" sources, incapable of being assessed scientifically. They ignored history as irrelevant. They treated information supplied by dissident émigrés from the Soviet Union condescendingly because it could not be evaluated according to accepted sociological standards. As a result they missed everything that was vital in that society and that, in the end, made it unworkable: human aspirations and human discontent.

When the study of state and society was called "politics" rather than "political science," it did much more than contemplate the mechanics of "social structures" and the "functions" of institutions. Aristotle began his *Politics* with a description of the household and concluded it with a disquisition on the role of music in the education of children. Hobbes opened *The Leviathan* with a lengthy discussion, "Of Man," and Machiavelli, whom Mr. Garthoff cites in the epigraph of his new book, insisted that understanding human nature was essential to the statesman. Their twentieth-century followers have forgotten this reality.

These founders of political theory would probably have understood much better than modern political scientists what went on in the Soviet Union by observing the regime's treatment of its citizens and their reactions to this treatment. Is it too much to ask of those who study politics to bear in mind that their subject is, first and foremost, not "structures," "models," "functions," or geopolitical aspirations and conflicts, but concrete human beings, both in their eternal substance and as molded by their particular history and environment? And that their discipline, for all its use of scientific techniques, belongs not with science but with the humanities?

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Review Essay

Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy

What the New Documents Show

David Fromkin

The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power. BY H. W. BRANDS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 304 pp. $27.50.

Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968. EDITED BY WARREN I. COHEN AND NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 320 pp. $54.95 (paper, $16.95).

L.B.J. and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. BY GEORGE C. HERRING. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994, 228 pp. $29.95.

The Johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable. EDITED BY TED GITTINGER. Austin: Lyndon Baines Johnson School for Public Affairs, 1993, 192 pp. $15.00 (paper).

Lyndon Johnson should have been a great president. He was better than anybody alive at getting things done in Washington. He proved it in his first few years as president, when he persuaded the hitherto squabbling branches of government to work together. Freed for a time from checking and balancing, the president and Congress dealt with a long overdue domestic agenda; the result was the more than 200 laws and programs constituting the "Great Society" initiative. The United States witnessed the rare spectacle of its system of government actually working. A Republican business leader remarked, "Now that Americans have seen what a really professional politician can accomplish, they'll never elect an amateur again."

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A broad consensus supported the goals to which Johnson devoted his amazing energies and persuasive powers. At home, he acted to eradicate poverty and racial discrimination and to improve education—a closely related goal. Abroad, he tried to achieve a working relationship with the Soviet Union so the two superpowers could conduct their disagreements peacefully. In L.B.J., the United States seemed to have found a leader who knew both where to go and how to get there.

WHAT WENT WRONG?

What went wrong was Johnson's foreign policy: foremost, the disaster of Vietnam. That seemed evident at the time. Now, recent and forthcoming studies question that verdict. Not everybody regards the outcome of the Vietnam War as a complete loss. Some point to the successes that (arguably) flowed from the U.S. stand in Southeast Asia: the failure of the attempted communist takeover of Indonesia in 1965 and the fact that the fall of much of Indochina was not followed by other dominoes: Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore. There is even the view that, in losing the Vietnam War, the United States actually won. General William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, has made that case recently, saying that America's strategic goal in Indochina, in the end, was achieved. That goal was and is to establish a strong buffer state to protect the nations of Southeast Asia from the threat posed by China. Westmoreland says that Vietnam, ironically, has fulfilled that objective. So it turns out that Hanoi's triumph was in the best geopolitical interest of the United States. That far one can go with Westmoreland, but no further along the tortuous road that ultimately leads him to credit the Johnson administration for that result. There are many points that may be reconsidered in Johnson's favor, but this is hardly one of them: it clearly never occurred to L.B.J. that letting North Vietnam win might be a good thing.

In 1993, attempting a reassessment of Johnson's foreign policy, a group of historians posed 31 unresolved questions to a panel of Johnson administration officials. The recollections of the participants at times emphasized the gulf that separates practitioners of international relations from its students. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote in response to one written inquiry, Question No. 13, "Anyone who asks such a question should have his head examined." To Question No. 14: "My answer is the same as that given to Question 13."

This past year, the academics had their turn: nine leading U.S. scholars contributed to *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World*, an outgrowth of their research at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Texas that provides, in the words of one coeditor, "the first comprehensive examination of foreign policy making in the Johnson years." Its other coeditor explains that although the government documents for the period are only beginning to be published, an enormous amount of material has been declassified and is available at the L.B.J. Library, and so great has been the helpfulness and archival support of the library that "we concluded that a scholarly examination of the record of Lyndon Johnson's foreign policy was not only needed, but practicable."

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H. W. Brands, a history professor at Texas A&M University, decided paradoxically that this was the time to reassess. A revisionist on the post-World War II history of U.S. foreign policy, he is publishing his book now because, as he sees it, there is no point in waiting until later. "Anything approaching a comprehensive account of Johnson's foreign policy," he writes, "remains years off. The Johnson Library in Austin has opened many of its files, but much high-level material is still classified. Available records of the State and Defense Departments are even thinner. If the CIA ever releases the bulk of its working papers for the 1960s, many researchers, including this one, will be surprised."

CARRYING ON AFTER J.F.K.

It was and is commonly agreed that Johnson lacked many of the instincts and sympathies required to conduct foreign policy. He neither liked nor understood foreigners: "Foreigners are not like the folks I am used to," he remarked in the early days of his presidency. It seemed sensible for him, therefore, to rely on his cabinet officials and professional advisers—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy—to deal with these matters. They had conducted foreign policy for Kennedy before the assassination, and allowing them to continue was symbolic: it reassured a world whose confidence in American stability had been shaken by the tragedy in Dallas. It showed that nothing fundamental had changed and that there would be continuity. Morally, too, it seemed right for Kennedy's political heir to retain Kennedy's foreign affairs team and let it pursue Kennedy's policies. Until 1965, Johnson did not have a popular mandate of his own. The people had not yet elected him president; during his first 14 months in office he was merely filling out another man's term. Of course, in 1945, Harry Truman took a different approach. As soon as he succeeded to the presidency, he replaced F.D.R.'s secretary of state with his own, which F.D.R.'s intimates thought only right. Roosevelt's closest adviser, Harry Hopkins, urged the whole F.D.R. circle in government to resign so that the new president could choose his own people.

In any event, once Johnson was elected president in his own right in November 1964, he earned the right to dismiss Kennedy's officials and appoint his own. It was not that he did not have associates from his days as an up-and-coming congressman and then a supremely powerful senator whom he could have chosen in place of McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy. But he opted instead to stay with Kennedy's men and measures. That, basically, was his foreign policy decision. The recently opened archives do not call for a revision of that judgment. Johnson was not a "hidden hand" president like Eisenhower, who appeared to let his cabinet make policy while in fact doing so himself. L.B.J. was what he seemed at the time: a president ill at ease in foreign policy who chose to rely on the judgment of the Kennedy team he inherited.

DISTRUSTING HIS OWN SIDE

Johnson's decision was partly rooted in his experience at the Democratic National Convention in 1960. Kennedy was the

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LBJ and his advisers: should he have fired them?

front-runner for the nomination that year, but a broad coalition in the party opposed him: he seemed too young and inexperienced to be entrusted with the highest office in the land, and no Catholic had ever been elected president. It was reasonable to suppose that he would be stopped.

What was unreasonable was Johnson's belief that he could be nominated instead. The smart money was betting that, in a brokered convention, Stuart Symington would emerge as the compromise choice, while Adlai Stevenson would be the sentimental favorite. Johnson was not in the picture. The national party was dominated by liberals, labor unions, and big-city political organizations sensitive to the concerns of ethnic and racial minorities; a seemingly conservative oil-state southern politician was unacceptable. In the industrial states of the North and Midwest, the Texas senator was not regarded as a contender. Apparently, Johnson compared himself, the most effective person in the Senate, to young Kennedy, who was perhaps the least effective, and persuaded himself that a convention filled with political professionals was bound to turn to him. When that never materialized, Johnson sometimes blamed it on the superiority of Kennedy's staff. Grumbling that brilliant intellectuals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., worked for the other side, he demanded of one of his advisers: "Why doesn't anyone who wears glasses work for me?"

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When Kennedy won the nomination and tapped L.B.J. for his running mate, many of Johnson's close associates broke with him. Harboring personal, business, and political feuds with the right-wing, anti-Semitic, pro-appeasement Joseph P. Kennedy that went back to the 1930s, they regarded Johnson as a traitor for lending his strength to the presidential candidacy of Kennedy's son. When the Democratic ticket won, some of L.B.J.'s remaining loyal supporters, seeking careers in public service, turned to the newly elected president and his circle for jobs. Cyrus Vance, who had campaigned for Johnson in West Virginia, took a position in McNamara's Defense Department. Even Johnson's personal assistant Bill Moyers—regarded, it was said, almost as a son by the newly elected vice president—left to follow his ideals in the newly created Peace Corps headed by Sargent Shriver.

Shut out of the glittering Camelot that Washington had become, Johnson admired, as did so many, the brilliance of the court the Kennedys had assembled at their round table. And then suddenly those courtiers were his. When he inherited the presidency in November 1963, Kennedy's staff and appointees came with it, for a sense of duty kept them at their posts. They were the members of the A-team he had long coveted. In years to come he showed that he wanted them, not those who had been his own people; and he entrusted his foreign policy to them.

INHERITING CAMELOT

From the vantage point of 1995, it appears that in a number of areas Rusk and the Kennedy foreign policy team did a good job for Johnson, vindicating his decision to follow where they led in foreign policy. In Africa, for example, America took some sound stands on principle: against South Africa in the matter of southwest Africa, against mercenaries in the Congo, against the white rebellion in Rhodesia. At the same time the United States wisely avoided involvement in some of the murkier power struggles in new states such as Ghana, Zanzibar, and Nigeria.

The administration was sometimes skillful, sometimes lucky, in its dealings with the Middle East. During 1963-64, and again in 1967, L.B.J.'s envoys headed off a Turkish invasion of Cyprus that could have provoked a war with Greece. In June 1967, the Israelis' lightning victory in the Six Day War relieved the American government of its onerous pledge to reopen the Gulf of Aqaba by force if need be.

Luck and skill were evident, too, in policy toward Latin America. A crisis touched off by riots in Panama was resolved by an agreement between both sides to negotiate. What Washington perceived as a danger from the left in Brazil disappeared when a military junta took power. An American military intervention in the Dominican Republic that might easily have misfired resulted in the election of an American-backed president.

Where Washington's policy did fail, it was not due to flaws that were uniquely Johnson's. His leading officials—whether of Kennedy or Johnson affiliation—were far more educated than Johnson and better informed about the history and customs of the outside world. But in at least one important respect they were as lim-

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ited as he was: they shared with him an inability to appreciate the importance to other nations of their own foreign policy objectives and the unimportance to them of ours. Thus Johnson continued Kennedy's unsuccessful policy of seeking to ally with both India and Pakistan, despite the foreign policy priorities of both countries. The American objectives, neither of which was achieved, were to keep the peace between the two and enlist both in a coalition against China. They did not share America's overriding fear of communist China, which they thought exaggerated; they were preoccupied with their fear of one another. In turn, their fears of one another seemed exaggerated ("almost psychotic," in the words of an American ambassador to India) to the United States. In both countries, peoples and governments alike turned against the uncomprehending or unsympathetic Americans, and India and Pakistan went to war in 1965.

VIETNAM OVERSHADOWS ALL

To the extent that Johnson personally conducted foreign policy, he sometimes did it well, for his native caution proved valuable. When in the mid-1960s French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated NATO military command structure, Rusk, presidential adviser Dean Acheson, and State Department Undersecretary George Ball urged a denunciation of him, but Johnson overruled them. Denying de Gaulle the public confrontation that would have solidified the French people behind him, Johnson said, "We love France . . . The French will not always feel about us as their government now feels."

The most revisionist case that Brands is willing to make is that, Vietnam apart, the Johnson administration's foreign policy record was not bad compared to that of others. However, the central flaw in Johnson's policy makes that argument unpersuasive. A glance at the essays in the Cohen-Tucker volume confirms that the foreign policy of the Johnson administration cannot be judged apart from Vietnam. The president, showing no sense of the relative importance of America's various goals in the world, allowed the war in Southeast Asia to overshadow them all. The authors contributing to the Cohen-Tucker volume tell how the United States sacrificed its agenda in Europe (Frank Costialiola), East Asia (Nancy Bernkopf Tucker), South Asia (Robert J. McMahon), Latin America (Joseph S. Tulchin), and Africa (Terrence Lyons).

The evidence emerging now adds to the picture formed at the time of an administration that had lost sight of America's national interests abroad. And no new evidence from the archives is needed to remind us what a disaster the Vietnam War turned out to be at home: inflation that wrecked America's public finances; divisiveness and riots in the streets; the drug plague that infected the troops and returned home with them; the human cost to all involved, those who survived as well as those who did not.

The Vietnam War should not be blamed on Johnson, in Brands' view; L.B.J. merely happened to be president when the reckoning came due for America's global overextension. The true architects of the Vietnam disaster, Brands argues, were Truman and Acheson, because of the inflated rhetoric with

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which they pledged the United States, in coming to the aid of Greece and Turkey in 1947, to combat communist aggression everywhere. But their rhetoric, however deplorable, was only rhetoric. In practice, at least until 1950, they—and former U.S. Army General George C. Marshall, especially in his State Department years—pursued a policy of intervening only to maintain the balance of power and protect vital American interests.

Brands could have made a stronger case against Kennedy, who also used globalist rhetoric but did not show similar restraint in practice. Rebelling against the generations of both Truman and Stevenson, with their focus on vital American interests in Europe, Kennedy's New Frontiersmen proposed to battle communism in the Third World. Special Forces, Green Berets, paratroopers, helicopter gunships, "lift": these were the catchwords of the glamorous young men who had come to Washington with Kennedy.

James Reston of the *New York Times* remembers that in June 1961, after Kennedy had bungled his first moves in foreign policy—the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the summit in Vienna with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev—Kennedy told him that he "had tried to convince Khrushchev of U.S. determination but had failed. It was now essential to demonstrate our firmness, and the place to do it, he remarked to my astonishment, was Vietnam!" Wrote Reston: "I was speechless."

Southeast Asia was the battlefield chosen by the youthful president, and it was to be the proving ground for the kind of limited war that he and his brilliant secretary of defense, McNamara, intended to wage against communism around the world. George C. Herring, the dean of American experts on the war, tells us: " 'The greatest contribution Vietnam is making,' McNamara observed in the early days of the conflict, 'is developing an ability in the United States to fight a limited war . . . without arousing the public ire. In that sense,' he added, 'Vietnam is almost a necessity in our history because this is the kind of war we'll likely be facing for the next fifty years.' "

NO STRATEGY, NO FOREIGN POLICY

In 1965 Johnson was persuaded by McNamara and Bundy that the United States had come to a fork in the road and could avoid losing in Vietnam only by committing major resources to the conflict in a full-scale escalation. Yet, caught up in the confusion of McNamara's limited war theories, the president told others—and perhaps himself—that the United States was still at peace. Determined to exercise power, L.B.J. immersed himself in the smallest details of the Air Force's bombing campaign and the casualties suffered in the campaign. He took charge; he barked out orders at all hours of the day and night; his physical presence was overwhelming. Audibly and visibly, he was in command.

Perhaps for that reason, those who were with him did not notice what now strikes scholars: he did not have a grand strategy. Herring argues, in a 1993 study based on newly released documents, that "there was no real strategy. Johnson and McNamara provided no firm strategic guidance to those military and civilian advisers who were running programs in the field . . . Without direction from the

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top, each service or agency did its own thing . . . Perhaps equally important . . . despite widespread and growing dissatisfaction . . . with the way the war was being fought and the results that were being obtained, there was no change of strategy or even systematic discussion of such a change."

The latest archival studies suggest that the same was true of foreign policy: in a sense, Johnson did not have one. The historians show us a president who, when his advisers disagreed, would try to split the difference between them. He acted as a majority leader, reconciling diverse points of view within his own camp rather than making decisions on the merits of the issue. He wanted to quell dissent, and he was a master at it. In a typically original and brilliant essay, Walter LaFeber, in the Cohen-Tucker volume, shows that Johnson was an extraordinary success in dealing with what concerned him most: keeping public opinion behind him, year after year, in holding to his course in Vietnam. In a written contribution to the 1993 Austin conference, former CIA official George H. Carver, Jr., explained, "President Johnson was more concerned about the adverse image of the Vietnam struggle in the United States than about the substantive complexities of the situation on the ground in Indochina."

Instead of a policy, he had only a set of unoriginal opinions that he articulated with great force and conviction and was unwilling to question even in the face of failure. That did not leave much room for any policy in Vietnam other than the one he had been handed by Kennedy and McNamara. He had seen the Democratic Party bloodied by the charge that Truman and Marshall had "lost" China, so he did not want to let another country in Asia fall to communism. Since Kennedy had engaged U.S. forces in Vietnam, L.B.J. also (as he said often) did not want to be the first American president to lose a war.

Like many in his generation, he misunderstood the experience of the Nazi menace in the 1930s, wrongly believing that its lesson was that if the United States did not stop every act of aggression overseas, an aggressor would keep going until it crossed the ocean to attack America. Specifically, he accepted the domino theory, outlined on the front page of the "News of the Week in Review" of the Sunday *New York Times* only three weeks before he inherited the presidency, according to which the fall of South Vietnam would be followed by that of the rest of the Indochina region.

He had seen President Truman lose control of the Korean War when Chinese "volunteers" flooded over the Yalu and was determined not to have the experience repeated. He ordered the Vietnam war fought in such a way as not to risk bringing in the Chinese. China would intervene to save North Vietnam from losing the war, so the United States would have to avoid both defeating and being defeated by the enemy. This was the kind of war of attrition, or limited war, that McNamara advocated. Moreover, Johnson subscribed to the doctrine of credibility, which dictates that a great power must be consistent in its direction, even when it discovers it is wrong, in order to husband its credibility and maintain the trust of other nations.

There were important dissenters from

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McNamara's Vietnam policy in early 1965, when the de facto decision to go to war was made. The three dissenters who had access to the president were all from Johnson's wing of the Democratic Party, that broad coalition of experienced politicians from whom young John Kennedy and his youthful outsiders had wrested the presidential nomination in 1960. There was George Ball, Adlai Stevenson's friend and adviser; Washington attorney and Democratic Party stalwart Clark Clifford, who had backed Stuart Symington for the presidency; and Senator Hubert Humphrey, who had run against Kennedy in the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries. Humphrey, in collaboration with his former aide Thomas Hughes, wrote a memorandum to Johnson that masterfully made the political case for immediate withdrawal from Indochina.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

An intriguing question, unanswerable but often asked, is whether Kennedy, had he lived, would have listened to such views. An equally intriguing question, although asked less often, is whether Johnson would have listened to them had he won the presidency in 1960—and never learned to think of those in his wing of the party as losers.

Furious with his own side for letting him down, fearful of the Kennedys and their machinations, and angered by his generals for their political clumsiness in asking for large reinforcements, Johnson was driven to explain the reversal of his Vietnam policy and the destruction of his presidency in much the same way as he had explained his loss of the 1960 nomination. "This," he said, "is caused by the 206,000-troop request, leaks, Ted and Bobby Kennedy." Even at the end, he did not question the assumptions and opinions that shaped the policies that led him to political ruin.

In June 1967 in meetings in Glassboro, New Jersey, with Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, the two leaders seemed to agree on some things, and to agree on a peaceful framework for disagreement on the others. But the Soviet prime minister warned the American president that the Vietnam War was a continuing obstacle to good relations between their two countries. He observed that the war had provided China with "a chance to raise its head with consequent great danger for the peace of the entire world." L.B.J. seems not to have understood that he was being told that, by withdrawing his forces from Vietnam, he would free the Soviet government to widen its split with China. He was ignoring an opportunity to let each of the two communist powers neutralize the other: a balancing of power that any of history's great foreign ministers would have given anything to achieve.

The Glassboro episode throws into relief the massive opportunity that Johnson wasted. He served as president at a time when the vital interests of the United States were not under attack anywhere in the world. The country was free to relax. The Soviet Union, the only country physically capable of threatening the western hemisphere, was securely in the hands of a conservative and somewhat elderly government, averse to risk and disposed to cooperate. In addition, it was ready to play itself off against Amer-

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ica's only other potential adversary so that neither would pose a danger.

It was a good time to shift attention and resources to the economic and social rebuilding of the United States, which, as the president rightly saw, was long overdue. Johnson had his chance to do it, but threw it away. The 1960s were years in which conventional thinking about international politics needed to be challenged, but he was not the sort of person who would do that. So, in a changing world, he might have made a poor foreign policy president even without the Vietnam War. That was a common view at the time. Perhaps no reassessment is necessary.

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Review Essay

The Last Revisionist Zionist

History Left Yitzhak Shamir Behind

Meron Benvenisti

Summing Up: An Autobiography. BY YITZHAK SHAMIR. Boston: Little, Brown and Company Inc., 1994, 288 pp. $24.95.

A Death in Jerusalem. BY KATI MARTON. New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, 336 pp. $25.00.

"Ecclesiastes, of course, was right: indeed, nothing is new under the sun," writes Yitzhak Shamir in his autobiography. This seems a surprising statement from a man who has seen and molded dizzying changes in an amazingly active life. Inspired by the visions of Theodor Herzl, the father of modern Jewish nationalism, Shamir came to British-controlled Palestine in 1935 as a young Polish immigrant named Yitzhak Yezernitzky and joined the militant Jewish underground. The name Shamir came from a forged identification certificate he carried. Shamir became the commander of the underground militia known as the Stern Gang, or Lehi. After Israel's establishment in 1948, he spent 17 secretive years working as a Mossad agent. He then began a rapid political climb in the rightist Likud party: first a member of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), then its speaker, then foreign minister, and then in 1983 prime minister. Despite this remarkable career, Shamir considers his career as a Lehi fighter 50 years ago "the best part of my life." Shamir's formative experiences etched such lasting impressions on him that whatever occurred thereafter has seemed only a slight variation on the same theme. This is not an unusual phenomenon among people who, in their youth, participated in dramatic events and therefore consider later life a dull anticlimax. For a person who eventually assumed

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awesome responsibilities for an entire nation, however, such a nostalgic, petrified worldview is crippling and dangerous.

As prime minister, Shamir vehemently rejected any proposal to convene a superpower-sponsored international peace conference with the Arabs. "'Peace' secured in this way, under duress," he writes, "would only bring greater demands in its wake until everything the Arabs wanted would, at last, be theirs, even Jerusalem." His rejectionism strained relations with the United States and brought down the government of national unity that he had formed with the opposition Labor Party. Shamir candidly admits that "somewhere in the back of my mind there still echoed the fiasco of 1939," when the British brought Jewish and Arab leaders to a roundtable conference in London as a final attempt to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict in Palestine. Shamir's militant opposition to attempts to avert a direct clash between the defenseless Jewish minority and the Arab world just before the Second World War seem relevant to him 50 years later, when a powerful Israel forced the Arab states begrudgingly to come to terms with its existence. But Shamir's perceptions of the Arabs have not changed, so there is no reason for him to change his mind.

It is a pity that, even as he sums up his life, Shamir remains totally mobilized. His personal account reads just like his beloved underground's old pamphlets—a perpetual struggle between the sons of light and the sons of darkness. Shamir does not allow himself to open up and share with his readers the emotional intensity, the personal passions, or the intellectual and literary wealth of the fascinating political culture—the Revisionist Zionist movement—of which he is the last remaining founding father.

SHAMIR TACTICS

Israeli political history is in large measure the conflict between Revisionist Zionism and Labor Zionism writ large: the more pragmatic Labor Zionists, with their devotion to socialism and compromise, formed the pre-state majority and, through the Labor Party, held power until 1977; the Revisionists, who insist on Jewish sovereignty in the entire biblical land of Israel, formed the pre-state underground and later the Likud Party. "As for myself," writes Shamir, "nothing I have learned since I was a young man in Poland has altered, or in any way lessened or diluted, my belief in the logic, the justice and, yes, the grandeur of the objectives, as Jabotinsky articulated them, of Zionist activism." Shamir still retains this emotional allegiance to Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the charismatic founder and leader of Revisionist Zionism.

Like his fellow believers, Shamir was attracted to Jabotinsky's sweeping vision: his magnetic oratory, ideology of integral nationalism and monism, distaste for socialism, obsession with ceremony, and particularly his cult of power. Much has been written on the political and cultural environment in post-World War I Europe that nurtured such ideas and on the tragic paradox of Jabotinsky, the Jewish liberal who was influenced by those cultural trends. Shamir's attachment is merely emotional, for he and most of his Jewish colleagues in Palestine exposed Jabotinsky's inherent contradiction: he wanted to achieve a Jewish state in the whole land of

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Israel (including Transjordan) by a show of strength and military power—while under the patronage of Great Britain. The British, who ruled Palestine under a League of Nations mandate after World War I, would assume moral responsibility for the Jewish "orphans," Jabotinsky believed, or at least treat Jewish settlers returning to their biblical homeland as well as it treated white settlers in Kenya, Ceylon, or Singapore.

Jabotinsky abhorred wanton killing and condemned terrorism, but his disciples in Palestine believed that only acts of terror directed against the British occupiers would free the land and establish a Jewish state. Shamir and Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, the largest underground group and Lehi's main competitor, planned their revolt against the British despite the objections of Jabotinsky. The underground therefore was both an indirect challenge to Shamir's mentor and a direct challenge to the elected bodies of the Yishuv, the pre-1948 Jewish community in Palestine. David Ben-Gurion, the doughty Labor leader who would become Israel's first prime minister, and the leadership of the Yishuv "had the habits of settling for immediate, if deceptive, calm," writes Shamir, adding a fat hint about his feelings on Labor's current politics. Then, as now, his leftist opponents displayed "a kind of pessimism inappropriate to the daring concepts that were both Herzl's and Jabotinsky's." Shamir is not concerned in the least that those "pessimists" represented the overwhelming majority of the Yishuv, and that they correctly assumed that the real threat to Jewish statehood was Arab belligerence, not British intransigence. Ben-Gurion and his allies opposed terrorist acts against the British on moral and political grounds. Strained relations with the British jeopardized military preparations for the inevitable confrontation with the Arabs, which of course came when six Arab armies immediately invaded Israel after it declared its independence on May 14, 1948. One shudders to think what would have happened had the "dissenters"—Shamir and Begin—been directing Jewish political activity during the crucial years before 1948.

But the Lehi, led by Shamir, had no doubts about the "daring concepts" of Zionism, and dismissed the realpolitik of Ben-Gurion, depicting him as the founder of the "Jerusalem National Old-Aged Home." Avraham Stern, the founder of Lehi, wrote: "Force always forged the destiny of nations . . . The destiny of the land of Israel has always been determined by the sword, not diplomacy. The only justice in the world is force and the dearest asset in the world is freedom. The right to life is granted only to the strong, and power, if not given legally, should be taken illegally."

STERN UND DRANG

Kati Marton has written a fine new book about Lehi's final act of pistol diplomacy—the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, the U.N. mediator given the unenviable task of resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute during the warfare of 1948. Marton has done a splendid job of recounting the tragic tale of the Swedish messenger of peace who paid with his life for his naive attempt to meddle in the Byzantine politics of the Middle East. She provides a solid historical background

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THE BETTMANN ARCHIVE

Shamir puts his best face forward

to explain Bernadotte's murder in Jerusalem's Katamon neighborhood by Shamir's gunmen on September 17, 1948. Some of Marton's historical contexts are strained, and her attempt to connect the 1948 assassination to the 1994 massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron's Ibrahimi mosque by a fanatical Jewish settler is tenuous at best. She highlights, however, important facts that Shamir, in his autobiography, chooses to blur. Marton meticulously describes Shamir's direct responsibility for planning and giving the order to commit the crime, a widely known fact in Israel. Shamir, however, dismisses the deed: "The idea was conceived in Jerusalem by Lehi members operating there more or less independently. Our opinion was asked and we offered no opposition." This laconic treatment is another reason why the Lehi commander's autobiography cannot be treated as a wholly reliable historical document.

Lehi's modus operandi was objectionable even to Begin. "He opposed all assassinations," Shamir writes of the Irgun leader. "Going to war when there was no alternative was all right, but the singling out of one person, even of an informer, for execution was morally wrong in his eyes." Shamir writes disapprovingly about Begin's belief "in the primary importance of the political effort and its priority over armed conflict." Begin once asked Shamir, "Do you really think you can create a state with pistols?" Shamir, however, had no second thoughts. Even after the state of Israel was established, he believed

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that he could change the course of history itself with pistols.

Shamir would like to conclude the story of Lehi with the end of the underground days, and therefore devotes only one short paragraph to his failed attempt to form a political party. This was indeed a farce, and Shamir writes that he "had not especially welcomed or encouraged the party's birth, so its end . . . did not sadden me." Thus he exempts himself from describing the deep rift between ex-Lehi members from the radical left and the radical right.

More significantly, he does not have to reflect on the difference between himself and Begin, the other great underground leader: Shamir could not adapt to ordinary political life, while Begin showed great political skill in transforming his Irgun from an underground movement to a mass political party—the Likud. Thus, Begin could offer Shamir a place in the Likud's leadership when Shamir retired from the Mossad in 1970. What he was unable to achieve in 1949, he received from Begin on a silver platter: a place in Israel's national leadership. In 1983, in a moment of great irony, he received Begin's supreme gift, the prime ministership, after Begin suddenly resigned in agony over Israel's ill-fated invasion of Lebanon. Here, then, is the greatest example of the contrast between the principled Begin and the unscrupulous Shamir: it never would have occurred to Shamir to quit over such a matter of conscience.

AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE

Likud's victory in the 1977 elections, which made Begin the first non-Labor prime minister of Israel, marked a turning point in Israeli history. It inaugurated a period of rapid social mobility that soon made Israeli society unrecognizable. The old and established elites represented by the Labor party—most of whom were Ashkenazim, or Jews of Central European ancestry—lost their primacy, privileges, and preferred access to public funds. Government, social status, and economic resources passed into the hands of talented people from classes heretofore disadvantaged—especially the Sephardim, the Jews of Middle Eastern ancestry who were now the majority of Israel's population—or kept far from government for ideological reasons. The Likud's economic policies, which caused running inflation and hurt economic growth, nevertheless contributed to the emergence of Israeli nouveaux riches and the opening of the affluent society to many members of the weaker classes. The gap between the haves and the have-nots grew, but in contrast with the past, the haves were no longer only Ashkenazim. The massive influx of new government officials led to protectionism, inefficiency, and even corruption. Yet it improved the Sephardim's self-image and helped consolidate a confident new elite. One could see this as the consummation of the Likud's historical purpose, which was no longer based so much on the Jabotinskyite creed as it was on venting frustration and rage against the Ashkenazi establishment that had disadvantaged the Sephardi masses. After the 1977 upheaval, Likud supporters could make political choices unencumbered by feelings of ethnic grievance, whether justified or not.

This new sociopolitical environment caused considerable changes in the Israeli value system. The old ideological barri-

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ers—the final remnants of the pre-state pioneering ethos—were removed and Israelis unashamedly pursued the good life. But history constantly intruded. Israel, which had fought traumatic wars in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, fought its most divisive conflict after the Begin government invaded Lebanon in 1982. After the intifada began in 1987, Israelis, who generally preferred not to dwell on the question of what to do with the 1.5 million Palestinians who had been living under military occupation since Israel took the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, found the Palestinians at center stage. While the country endured constant terrorist attacks and bravely attempted to absorb hundreds of thousands of Jews fleeing the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Likud poured money into Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The persistence of the intifada caused Israelis to realize that the Likud's ideology of "Greater Israel" entailed the permanent burden of controlling a murderously hostile population, which interfered with the main new Israeli concern: pursuing the ideals of the consumer society. They wished to be rid of the Palestinians even if it meant relinquishing control of the West Bank and Gaza. Yitzhak Rabin, the taciturn war hero who now led the Labor Party, offered an approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on pragmatism, not ideology. In 1992, Israeli voters chose Rabin, not Shamir; on September 13, 1993, Rabin signed an autonomy plan with the Palestine Liberation Organization and shook hands with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, marking an Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. Likud's social and economic agenda eventually undermined its own foreign policy.

Shamir could not adapt. He remained loyal to the old Revisionist ideology. After the 1992 elections, he writes, "the inevitable, grim post-mortem commenced. How had it happened? Why did so many voters turn their back on the Likud?" Shamir cannot find plausible answers, but his book's epilogue provides a clue: Israelis longed for peace, but for Shamir, they were a "a nation led by men who made peace paramount, like a golden calf, to be worshipped at the expense of the values and aspirations that made Israel unique and placed it at the heart of world Jewry." Israel longed for prosaic sobriety, but for the old warrior this was dull and unheroic. "Calm is rubbish," goes the old Jabotinskyite saying.

To the Israeli prime ministership Shamir brought his old traits: tenacity, willpower, a Manichaean worldview, a tribal morality, and a fossilized ideology. He was not a man interested in ideas. Shamir was a pragmatist who believed in revolutionary action, not an ideological hairsplitter. When Shamir read insults to intellectuals in Russian revolutionary literature, he once said, "I did not understand it, but now I do understand it through our experience . . . Without their ideas we are nothing, but without understanding reality—their ideas remain always in the realm of ideas." But from the wealth of Jabotinsky's ideas, Shamir culled only two principles—holding on to the occupied territories and denying any collective rights to the Palestinians—both of which he stubbornly defended, frustrating his American and Israeli interlocutors, and both of which were overriden by Rabin. Once again, the last doctrinaire of the old school was overtaken by history.

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Review Essay

Ralph Bunche

A Man of the World, But Never at Home

Stanley Hoffmann

Ralph Bunche: An American Life. BY BRIAN URQUHART. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1993, 480 pp. $27.50.

Brian Urquhart, who was Ralph Bunche's chief assistant from 1954 until Bunche's death in 1971, succeeded him as United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs—a position created for Bunche by U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1953. Some years ago, Urquhart published a fine and rich biography of Hammarskjöld. He has now given us a sensitive, informative, comprehensive, and often heartbreaking biography of Bunche: a great book about a great man. There are three main topics in it: race, the role of the United Nations in world politics, and that of Bunche in the United Nations.

He was the great-grandson of a Baptist preacher and freemason. Orphaned at the age of 11, he was raised by his grandmother, Lucy, the daughter of a house slave. Bunche later said that she instilled in him "a desire to do my best in anything I tried to do . . . she taught me the value of self-respect and dignity." He went to college at UCLA, majoring in political science; thanks to a fellowship, he went to Harvard's Department of Government for graduate study, earning money by working in a bookshop. After receiving a master's degree, he was invited to become an instructor at Howard University and to set up its political science department.

GOING TO CLASS

Bunche met his future wife, Ruth Harris, while at Howard; she was the daughter of the chief mailing clerk in Montgomery,

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Alabama. He began working for his doctorate at Harvard in 1929 and married her in 1930; their first child was born in 1931. Soon thereafter he left for Africa to research his thesis: a comparison of French administration in the colony of Dahomey and in Togoland, a League of Nations mandate. The thesis, according to Urquhart, prefigured Bunche's later work on decolonization and trusteeships. His views on race at that time had a strong streak of Marxist economic determinism: imperialism was the product of capitalism; racial discrimination resulted from economic competition. He wrote and published a great deal in the 1930s and disagreed with both W.E.B. du Bois' idea of a "Negro nation within the nation" and the NAACP, which he deemed "incorrigibly middle class and elitist." He thought that racism could be cured only by improving the living conditions of the working classes. On a grant to study the crises of modern imperialism, he traveled to London, South Africa, Singapore, Batavia (now Jakarta), and Hong Kong. After his return to the United States, he worked part-time for Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal on the project that resulted in Myrdal's famous study of race, *An American Dilemma*. The two men became close despite substantial disagreements—Myrdal "considered Marxism to be a fatalistic dogma and disagreed with Bunche's view that working class solidarity was the best basis for ending racial division," Urquhart writes.

SELMA AND SEOUL

In June 1941, F.D.R. created the Office of the Coordinator of Information—later to become the Office of Strategic Services—which needed an African specialist. The Harvard history department, consulted, recommended Bunche; Professor C. H. McIlwain called him "the best graduate student of his race at Harvard in my time." Urquhart comments that "even Harvard seems to have been unable to judge Bunche on his ability without reference to his race." Bunche joined the organization, but continued to suffer from Washington's racism: when the family dog died, he found that there was one section of the pet cemetery for white people's pets, another for blacks'. Bunche moved to the State Department to work on the colonial aspects of postwar planning. After having been "loaned" in April 1946 to the new U.N. Secretariat as acting head of the trusteeship division, the secretary-general, Trygve Lie, offered him a permanent position as director of his division. He accepted, partly because of his dislike of the segregation in Washington.

When he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 for his role in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict the previous year, he was irritated by the frequent references in the American press to his race: he hated being described (falsely) as the grandson of a slave or as the first American Negro to have done this or that. By the 1950s, his own view of race had evolved from an emphasis on economics to one on racism as a matter of "our thinking and concepts." But he still believed that the only proper way for American blacks to advance was to join the civil rights movement and fight for racial integration and full equality. He was critical of black extremists and their "fantasy of separation" and supportive of the Reverend

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Martin Luther King, whom he joined in 1965 for a march from Selma to Montgomery. The Watts riots of August 1965 revived his conviction that the black ghetto was at the root of racial tension and that the ideal of integration required "the dispersal of every black ghetto in the land." But his "call to arms" against ghettos, written for *Look* magazine, was never published, and he failed to persuade the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation to support his proposals. One of his last speeches denounced worldwide polarization between whites and nonwhites, and one of the reasons for his hostility to the Vietnam War—in which his son served—was the plight of blacks "who were in Vietnam to fight for the rights and freedoms of seventeen million South Vietnamese" but did not enjoy full constitutional rights at home. He himself suffered racial slurs and slights all his life.

REWRITING WAR AND PEACE

The concern for victims of racism that had fueled his scholarly work in the 1930s inspired his career as an international public servant. Here, the list of his accomplishments is astonishing. In the State Department's International Security Organization section in 1944, he worked on the idea of trusteeships for areas under colonial rule—a subject intra-agency wrangling had kept out of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the future United Nations. Bunche wanted the colonial system to become self-liquidating. At the historic 1945 conference in San Francisco, where the U.N. Charter was formally adopted by 50 states, he played a key role as secretary of the U.S. group on trusteeships, drafting the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories. When he joined the U.N. Secretariat, he became an activist head of its Trusteeship Council, which was set up to help some 14 million people living in trust territories make the transition from colonial dependency to self-sufficient nationhood.

Lie appointed him special assistant to his representative on the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine, established in May 1947. Bunche wrote its reports—including all of the crucial final report, in which a majority endorsed the partition of Palestine.

When Israel proclaimed its independence and the Arabs invaded, the Security Council's permanent members chose Swedish diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte as U.N. mediator, and Lie appointed Bunche to be the secretary-general's chief representative in Palestine. Bunche was in charge of the first U.N. peacekeeping operation, set up after the parties' acceptance of a cease-fire. He thus drafted the principles that have governed these operations ever since—truce observers had to be strictly impartial and unarmed. When the four-week truce was running out, Bernadotte and Bunche were summoned by Jordanian King Abdallah to Amman. He pleaded with them to have the United Nations "force" the Arabs to prolong the truce. Bunche drafted the report in which Bernadotte asked the Security Council to order a cease-fire and the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Security Council did so, and the resolution is still in force. After the assassination of Bernadotte by Jewish extremists, Bunche became acting mediator; he got the General Assembly to create the Palestinian Conciliation

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Commission. This was an especially trying period, given Israel's hostility and the pro-Israeli sentiments of Lie as well as Herbert Evatt, the Australian foreign minister and president of the General Assembly, and W.E.B. Du Bois, who attacked Bunche in a speech to the American Jewish Congress. Nevertheless, in protracted negotiations in Rhodes, he obtained an Israeli-Egyptian armistice. He skillfully proceeded in such a way that the Israelis were able to assert that they had had direct dealings with their foes and the Egyptians that all contacts had occurred through the mediator. His achievements in the Middle East earned him the Nobel Prize.

Next he served as midwife to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. But he was drawn back into the Arab-Israeli conflict during the Suez crisis. Once again, he created a precedent in setting up the U.N. Emergency Force, which was made of armed troops instead of unarmed observers. Aware of UNEF's importance as a model, Hammarskjöld and Bunche defined the legal status of the force. Bunche, who was in charge of obtaining the troops, decided they could fly only the U.N. flag. He dealt successfully—despite acrimonious negotiations with Israeli diplomat Abba Eban—with the problem of Egypt's return to the Gaza Strip, but failed to get the Egyptians to reopen the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.

CONGO AUDITIONS AS HELL

Bunche's biggest crisis was the Congo drama of 1960, when the country fractured amid its transition from colony to independent nation. Urquhart titles his chapter on the conflict "First Aid to a Wounded Rattlesnake." Another precedent was being set here: what the United Nations had to do was neither collective security nor the kind of peacekeeping by observers or armed personnel that occurs after an agreement. The Congo crisis, largely forgotten today, was a hellish forerunner of the troubles the United Nations has been engulfed in recently in Somalia and in Yugoslavia. Although the U.N. operation in the Congo was set up by the Security Council at Hammarskjöld's initiative after a call from independence leader Patrice Lumumba, the complexities of the case soon became overwhelming. Once again, Bunche was put in charge. He had to deal with the Belgians, whose troops (sent in after rebellious Congolese forces had attacked Europeans) he wanted out of the country; with Lumumba's "irrationality and instability" and his veering "wildly between requests for assistance and advice, and ultimatums about the Belgian troops"; with rebel leader Moïse Tshombe's secession in Katanga and his refusal to allow U.N. forces into his domain; with the latent split between Lumumba and his president, Joseph Kasavubu; and "with the Cold War, which divided the United Nations and was beginning to make the Congo a battleground between East and West, with [the U.N.] in the middle." Hammarskjöld and Bunche laid down the principle that the United Nations would not try to influence the outcome of domestic conflicts. Bunche, criticized by the British chief of staff of Ghana, which had contributed a large contingent to the Congo, for refusing to disarm the Con-

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golese soldiers, pointed out that U.N. forces were not supposed to be fighters, but peacekeepers. Accused by the Soviets of being partial to the United States and colonialism, Bunche and his boss were also in trouble with U.S. diplomats and other Western representatives, who would have preferred more energetic moves. Actually, in conformity with a Security Council resolution, U.N. forces began to round up foreign mercenaries, the backbone of Tshombe's forces. Ultimately, when Tshombe's forces attacked U.N. troops after the failure of a reconciliation plan, U.N. forces drove Tshombe out of Katanga despite a restraining order by Bunche that failed to reach them in time. Bunche himself, carrying a letter from an angry Secretary-General U Thant to the U.N. commander, sought to smooth over the dispute by delivering the letter—along with another containing his own suggestions for a politic reply to U Thant.

The Congo crisis proved the extraordinary difficulty for the United Nations of stepping into the minefields of a civil war, avoiding the use of force, and preserving a consensus of its key members. But it was not Bunche's last attempt at U.N. diplomacy. Over the next few years, he helped set up a U.N. observer mission in Yemen; helped defuse a threatening crisis in Cyprus where the Security Council established a U.N. force twice the size of the U.N. observer group in Kashmir; and defused a crisis between Iran and Bahrain. U Thant called the latter "the perfect good offices operation . . . one which is not heard of until it is successfully concluded, or even heard of at all."

LIVING LARGE

This record shows at least two things. One is the diversity of missions the United Nations actually undertook, despite the Cold War—something that fascination with the East-West conflict, and with the frequent paralysis of the Security Council that the Cold War engendered, has led many observers, scholars, and practitioners to underestimate or forget. Bunche's era was one in which principles and precedents were set, and practically every case the United Nations has dealt with in recent years has an antecedent in this earlier period. Thus the usefulness of the United Nations, despite the limitations imposed by power politics, cannot be denied. Secondly, Bunche's unique qualities contributed enormously to this record: patience, impartiality, skill in managing conflicting as well as converging interests, a gift for clear and specific drafts, an apparently inexhaustible supply of goodwill, and the art of finding fulfillment in his task rather than in displays of vanity.

Yet this admirable book is also a sad one. Bunche's great achievements were not sufficiently recognized in his country, partly because of race, partly because he chose not to serve the U.S. government. One particularly lamentable episode was the witch-hunt of U.S. employees of international organizations ordered by Truman in 1953. The International Employees Loyalty Board charged Bunche with having attended a "fraction" meeting of the Communist Party in May 1935; "thus began a painful and Kafkaesque period in Bunche's life." He replied with a document of over 100 pages. The Loyalty Board's investigation

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occurred, ironically, just as the CIA was asking Bunche for advice. The White House, meanwhile, was asking him to go on a goodwill tour for the United States in Europe—something he could not do anyway because of his running of the Trusteeship Council and helping Hammarskjöld reorganize the U.N. Secretariat. The board unanimously cleared Bunche, but far-right fanatics continued to attack him.

Equally sad was the destruction of one of Bunche's greatest achievements—the U.N. Emergency Force—by Nasser's reckless decision to ask for its removal from the Sinai in May 1967 and by the Six Day War that followed. U Thant has often been criticized for having bowed to Nasser, and perhaps bowing deeper and faster than Nasser had expected. But Urquhart does a convincing job of showing that U Thant had, legally, no leeway. Even though Bunche would have preferred a protracted withdrawal, Urquhart argues, there were practically no options: nobody called for a General Assembly or Security Council meeting, and had such meetings been called they probably would have failed. In this disaster, Bunche still made a contribution in saving U Thant from accepting an Egyptian request to link a call to Nasser not to interfere with Israel-bound shipping through the Straits of Tiran with an appeal to all countries not to send oil or strategic materials to Israel through the straits.

DAYS OF WINE AND ROSES

By that time—1967—Bunche's private life had also taken a depressing turn. His marriage had been marked by acrimony and reproach from his wife, who complained that he was sacrificing his family life to his career. She felt abandoned, with three children to bring up. Already in 1945, he replied that he was "obsessed with a burning desire to excel in everything I undertake," and moved by "a calculated and deliberate interest to prove to (whites) that I am, despite their race, their equal if not their superior in intellect, ability, knowledge, and general savoir-faire." In October 1966, one of his two daughters, who had earlier been under psychiatric care, committed suicide—a tragedy that heightened his wife's bitterness. Moreover, he had never enjoyed perfect health. In the mid-1960s, his health deteriorated drastically; diabetes led to steadily diminishing eyesight. He could no longer drive, but insisted on taking notes himself. In early 1967, he tried to resign, but U Thant insisted that he stay. His kidneys began to fail, and he spent much of 1971 in New York Hospital, where he died on December 9.

If this review seems more like a summary than a critique, it is because I hope this sketch will incite readers to read this thought-provoking and admirable tribute to an extraordinary man. The strongest feeling created by this remarkable biography, itself so full of restrained passion and narrative skill, is admiration for both Bunche and Urquhart. We hear a great deal about great national statesmen and about the mediocrity of international civil servants. But here are two splendid international officials, whose performance is as inspiring as their discretion in office was exemplary. It is fortunate that Urquhart's gifts as a writer should have not only reminded us of his own continuing wisdom but brought back to life an important and neglected personality.

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Letters to the Editor

W. W. Rostow, Alan Tonelson, Alvaro de Soto, Olivier Roy, Anders Åslund, & Padma Desai

To the Editor:

Because he uses growth accounting—a poor instrument for analyzing economic growth—Paul Krugman makes a false analogy between the growth of the vital East Asian economies and the Soviet economy ("The Myth of Asia's Miracle," November/December 1994).

Writing about Soviet growth rates in 1960, I warned against the use of linear projections and predicted the deceleration of Soviet heavy industry. With no rapidly growing new sectors, the Soviet Union thus skipped two technological revolutions: the age of the automobile and durable consumer goods and the age of microelectronics, genetic engineering, and other technologies that went from research laboratories to commercial application in the mid-1970s. Moscow continued to allocate up to 30 percent of its GNP, including its best human resources, to military outlays. That is why the economy ground down to the Brezhnev stagnation of the early 1980s, and that is why the civilian sector of the Soviet economy still has the look of the early 1950s.

By contrast, the economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore (the "tigers") and now Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and China are progressively picking up the international backlog of proven technologies that are suitable for their per capita income and technological skill. Their growth rates are thus higher than those of the West and Japan, which are at the technological frontier and drawing mainly on new inventions. Plant and equipment investment continues to rely on the plowback of profits, and profits depend heavily on the rate of introduction of new technology. The tigers' investment rates are thus also higher, which is why they have the look of the mid-1990s.

In addition, there was little diversion of resources to defense. In the 1980s, East Asia as a whole spent about three percent of its GNP on defense. The Warsaw Pact countries' military expenditures were at least nine percent at the end of the decade, after a peak of over 12 percent in 1982. Thus, there is no basis for comparing the tigers and the Soviet Union.

The Japanese set the pattern for development in East Asia by absorbing the backlog of technology and limiting military expenditures to about one percent of GNP. Krugman is right to point out that Japan's growth rate has decreased from the highs of the 1970s. Japan's present crisis will pass, and it will join the older, slower-growing industrial countries that depend on new technology rather than

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on the backlog of unapplied technology.

Krugman's growth accounting attributes economic expansion in part to increases in output per unit of input that "in the long run are primarily due to increases in knowledge." His analysis' fatal flaw is the phrase "increases in knowledge." Krugman argues that both East Asia and the U.S.S.R. achieved high growth rates due to an increase in inputs, not "increases in knowledge." But Singapore looks the way it does because it had a large technological backlog to make up, which it duly did. Its inputs reflected this, as well as "increases in knowledge." Moscow looks the way it does because the Soviet economy did not greatly modernize either its inputs or its "advances in knowledge."

Growth accountants treat "advances in knowledge" as a residual, and do not estimate it independently. They do not pierce the veil of technological change to identify precisely what "advances in knowledge" are relevant to East Asia's per capita income and technical prowess. This, however, is precisely what ministers of science and technology do from Seoul to Singapore. And their governments act on their insights, which is what politburos from Stalin's time to Brezhnev's failed to do in the vain conduct of the Cold War.

The great historic event of the last half-century is that East Asia (except Myanmar, Vietnam, and North Korea) have begun absorbing the backlog of technologies. What has happened in Asia is no myth. It proves that the tricks of modern technology can be systematically picked up by many different cultures. Krugman is right that their growth rates will decelerate as they approach the technological frontier, but the industrialization of Asia will shape the next century, miracle or not.

W. W. ROSTOW

Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin

WOODROW'S WORLD

To the Editor:

Tony Smith's "In Defense of Intervention" (November/December 1994) shows precisely why American interventions on behalf of human rights and democracy have been opposed by the American people and even by normally utopian foreign policy experts.

Smith grounds his arguments in history, calling the promotion of democracy "intrinsic" to America's creation of a successful Western economic and security system after World War II. But far more important was the U.S. decision to stabilize noncommunist Europe and Asia by protecting their countries militarily and providing open markets for their exports. Relieved of the need to carry out their own foreign policies by this "offer they could not refuse," America's allies understandably focused on peaceful economic development.

Furthermore, the notion that this "success" can be readily duplicated in Latin America is far-fetched. Japan and the West European countries were already what might be called "real countries." They had the institutions and cohesive senses of national identity essential for creating not only viable democracies, but viable societies. Most of Latin America still fails to qualify.

Smith is no more convincing when restating the broader argument that pro-

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moting democracy promotes U.S. national security because democracies rarely fight one another. Unfortunately, the world's experience with significant numbers of democracies is so brief that the studies he cites reflect more wishful thinking than serious scholarship.

But can democracy-building advance America's self-interest in a more down-to-earth sense? Smith focuses on Latin America but, like the Clinton administration, completely ignores the questions that distinguish foreign policy making from an exercise in drawing up wish lists. How much will success cost economically? What are the military risks? How long will these burdens need to be borne? Are there safer, cheaper ways to achieve our essential goals? And how exactly will success benefit the great majority of Americans? All that Smith offers are unsupported assertions ("democratic government increases the likelihood that the United States can build trade with Latin America and better control its borders") and well-intentioned platitudes ("to seek a greater sense of mutual understanding" and "nurturing mutual respect").

Like all too many neo-Wilsonians, Smith equates his personal preferences with the needs of the American people. Promoting democracy and human rights around the world clearly is important to Smith and others like him, and they have every right to push their cause. What is not acceptable is to portray those predilections as objectives so important to the entire nation that they justify expending the public's precious resources and even spilling American blood. Too many Americans already have died recently in the kinds of "splendid little wars" Smith urges in areas that are simply too poor, weak, and remote to affect America's future.

ALAN TONELSON
Research Director, Economic Strategy Institute

THE U.N. RESPONDS

To the Editor:

Saadia Touval contends that the United Nations cannot mediate ("Why the U.N. Fails," September/October 1994). Recent successes are dismissed as freakish events for which the credit belongs elsewhere.

If Touval carefully examines mediation exercises past and present, he will find that, in fact, *all* mediations stem from unique circumstances. They are not uniformly baked in cookie factories.

At the United Nations, we do not claim a monopoly on successful mediation. U.N. assistance in conflict resolution is implicitly available in most disputes, if the parties wish it and the membership supports such involvement. But where others are successfully or even promisingly engaged, we are quite content to remain on the sidelines, though we appreciate being kept abreast and given a say if, down the road, we are expected to play a role in verifying or

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otherwise implementing negotiated agreements. We are acutely conscious of the problems that can arise where there are too many would-be mediators. Whatever else they are adept at, parties to disputes usually excel at playing them off against each other. They are especially good at this if the mediators have an interest in a particular outcome of the negotiations—which is never the case with the United Nations.

I was baffled by Touval's statement that it is nearly impossible for the United Nations "to pursue a dynamic negotiation, reacting to events quickly, seizing opportunities, and having the necessary flexibility to adjust positions and proposals as the situation unfolds." Upon careful scrutiny, however, I realize that his perception is based on a fundamental misunderstanding concerning how the United Nations works and, specifically, how it mediates. Touval seems to believe that somehow U.N. intergovernmental bodies such as the Security Council conduct the negotiations (shuttling in lockstep *à quinze?*) and vote on the proposals that are put before the parties.

I am happy to report that U.N. mediation is not such a multilateral exercise, and that the micromanagement described by Touval does not occur. U.N. mediation is conducted by the secretary-general directly or through a representative. The secretary-general, at his discretion, keeps the Security Council informed of progress, sometimes requesting its support to strengthen his hand—certainly never to "decide between competing proposals," as Touval seems to believe. The handicap mentioned by him—"tortuous decision-making" by the Security Council—simply does not arise. Touval has quite evidently confused two discrete U.N. bodies and their distinct, albeit complementary, roles.

Just as the United Nations is the right venue in many cases (viz. the 20 or so efforts currently in train), state-directed mediation has proven to be the right recipe in others. In attempting to substantiate his contention that the United Nations is never the right avenue, Touval attributes overriding, even exclusive, importance to the mediator's ability to provide incentives or to exercise the levers of power to persuade parties in conflict to resolve their disputes. This may be called for in certain cases. In others, however, a higher premium is paid to the United Nations' impartiality and lack of vested interest, which tends to strengthen the parties' trust. The companion piece to Touval's article (Giandomenico Picco, "The U.N. and the Use of Force," September/October 1994) eloquently makes the case for intrinsic weakness and dispassion as an advantage rather than a drawback. There could be little doubt about the secretary-general's comparative advantage precisely on those grounds in the cases of El Salvador and the Iran-Iraq War—not to mention the score or so of others that he is currently handling.

Obviously, it would strengthen the secretary-general's hand if he were able to offer credits out of pocket to "reluctant disputants." (Can *anybody* do that?) For this he must rely on the member states' assistance and their capacity to mobilize such resources. But in most cases, this is not the determining factor, and it cannot substitute for the trust and respect that

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can only be won by his lack of any agenda other than the search for peace and justice in conformity with the U.N. Charter.

ALVARO DE SOTO

Senior Political Adviser to the U.N. Secretary-General

RADICAL ISLAM'S FAILURE

To the Editor:

Judith Miller and I agree that there has been a decline in the momentum of radical Islam in the last decade ("Faces of Fundamentalism," November/December 1994). However, she believes this is only a lull, and that leaders such as Lebanon's Sheikh Muhammed Fadlallah and Sudan's Hassan al-Turabi are the harbingers of a likely new dawn for radical Islam. I do not think so, although it is clear that political Islam will remain a means of mobilizing disgruntled youth in many Muslim countries.

True, Algeria will sooner or later be under some form of Islamist government, although I have doubts about Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is also clear that there are still some outstanding political and religious leaders, among them Fadlallah and Turabi, who should not be ignored. As sophisticated political thinkers, Fadlallah and Turabi have no doubt drawn lessons from the failures of the "Islamic revolution," as Miller shows.

But the key question is whether this new wave of Islamic fundamentalism could really alter the geostrategic balance in the Muslim world. My answer is no. With the exception of Egypt, the current Islamist movements are—both geographically and politically—at the margins of the Muslim world: Sudan, Algeria, southern Lebanon, and suburban Beirut. They are unable to bypass or discard national, ethnic, or even communal identities. Despite their fondest dreams and best speeches, Turabi and Fadlallah are ruled, limited, and largely defined by local politics—Turabi by Sudan's endless struggle between the Islamic north and the Christian south, Fadlallah by his leadership of the majority of Lebanon's Shiites. Their appeal outside their constituencies does not go further than certain uprooted Islamic militants.

At best, Islamic fundamentalism—from the Palestinian Hamas to the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the Lebanese Hezbollah—is an expression of nationalism deprived of its soul by previous nationalist ideologies. At worst—from the Yemeni al-Islah movement to the Afghan Hizb-i-Islami or even the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood—it is an expression of ethnic and tribal fragmentation.

When it expresses a new surge of nationalism, contemporary Islamism strengthens the fragile national entities born during and after the colonial period—which is the opposite of a return to an older norm of the ancient Muslim community known as the *umma,* or progress toward a new borderless community of believers. This FIS-type fundamentalism will leave a "traditional" mark on Muslim public street life and daily dress. But it will also unintentionally contribute to the growing nationalist and ethnic divides of the contemporary world.

OLIVIER ROY

Researcher, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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RUSSIAN TO JUDGMENT

To the Editor:

Marshall Goldman's reaction (Letters, November/December 1994) to my article on the Russian economy ("Russia's Success Story," September/October 1994) clarifies that our key disagreement is over whether Russia's economic woes would have been mitigated by a less radical reform policy.

Ironically, Goldman's prime concerns logically call for more radical policies. First, high inflation in 1992 was not caused by former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar's attempt at fiscal restraint, but was a consequence of the prior collapse of state finances and loose monetary policy in 1992. High inflation must be fought with strict fiscal and monetary policy. The longer extreme inflation is allowed to persist, the greater the total fall in production will be. Second, the monopolization of Russian production has been widely exaggerated. Russia has thousands of industrial enterprises, with plenty of potential for competition. The biggest Russian enterprises are small by international standards and not very specialized. A recent World Bank study shows that, using American definitions, less than one percent of Russian industrial production is monopolistic. Competition, however, is lacking and small enterprises are scarce because the liberalization was not sufficiently far-reaching. Third, organized crime could establish its hold over much of the economy because lingering regulations allow criminals to gain control over burgeoning private traders.

It takes time to build new legal institutions. They are best developed in the environment of a liberalized market economy, as both Western and Eastern European experiences show.

The Russian economy must not be left in a state of collapse to be plundered by criminals and old *apparatchiki,* as was Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Romania under Ion Iliescu. The results of gradualism are far worse than those of half-hearted radicalism.

ANDERS ÅSLUND

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

To the Editor:

As a former Gaidar aide, Anders Åslund writes like a general who has lost a war but would like to declare victory. In Åslund's revised view, Russia's radical transformations were accomplished by the reformers, leaving the new government of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin the practical chores of carrying out its predecessor's agenda. Contrast this with Åslund's immediate postelection view of the Chernomyrdin transition in *The New York Times:* "After vacillating back and forth on reform, Russia has now really abandoned the course of fundamental reform." Åslund has taken a U-turn, now arguing that fundamental change had already irreversibly occurred prior to the Chernomyrdin government. Åslund misleadingly suggests that Chernomyrdin's ongoing stabilization effort simply continues the financial and monetary stabilization begun by former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov. But Fyodorov had been forced to abandon radical inflation control and move to measured stabilization. The earlier efforts, based on the shock therapy approach, failed, while recent efforts based on the gradualist school have been

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more rewarding. But there are still serious problems to be surmounted—fiscal revenues, for example, are currently running at 53 percent of projections. The Russian economy has not yet crossed the Rubicon.

PADMA DESAI
Professor of Comparative Economic Systems, Columbia University

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

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

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